The human visual system differentially represents subjectively and objectively invisible stimuli
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The study of unconscious processing requires a measure of conscious awareness. Awareness measures can be either subjective (based on participant’s report) or objective (based on perceptual performance). The preferred awareness measure depends on the theoretical position about consciousness and may influence conclusions about the extent of unconscious processing and about the neural correlates of consciousness. We obtained functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measurements from 43 subjects while they viewed masked faces and houses that were either subjectively or objectively invisible. Even for objectively invisible (perceptually indiscriminable) stimuli, we found significant category information in both early, lower-level visual areas and in higher-level visual cortex, although representations in anterior, category-selective ventrotemporal areas were less robust. For subjectively invisible stimuli, similar to visible stimuli, there was a clear posterior-to-anterior gradient in visual cortex, with stronger category information in ventrotemporal cortex than in early visual cortex. For objectively invisible stimuli, however, category information remained virtually unchanged from early visual cortex to object- and category-selective visual areas. These results demonstrate that although both objectively and subjectively invisible stimuli are represented in visual cortex, the extent of unconscious information processing is influenced by the measurement approach. Furthermore, our data show that subjective and objective approaches are associated with different neural correlates of consciousness and thus have implications for neural theories of consciousness.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Francken, J. C., Beerendonk, L., Molenaar, D., Fahrenfort, J. J., Kiverstein, J. D., Seth, A. K., & van Gaal, S. (2022) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niac011 · Cited by 136
“Thus, even though several methodological caveats have been identified over the years in the study of unconscious cognition (Schmidt and Vorberg 2006; Newell and Shanks 2014; Shanks 2017; Meyen et al. 2021; Stein et al. 2021) and the depth and scope of unconscious processes is debated (Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Kunde…”
BackgroundSelf-citationApical amplification—a cellular mechanism of conscious perception?
Marvan, T., Polák, M., Bachmann, T., & Phillips, W. A. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab036 · Cited by 45
“Thus, the methodological and theoretical issues of research on unconscious processing of contents are by no means solved and pertinent research continues (see, e.g. Hurme et al. 2017; Peel et al. 2018; Greenwald and Lai 2020; Stein et al. 2021).”
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“…on unconscious priming often involves post-hoc subject exclusion using non-independent data (e.g., reviewed in Shanks, 2017), many neuroimaging studies tend to measure awareness with low statistical power (discussed in Stein et al., 2021), and reliability estimates are rarely if ever provided.”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Stein, T., Kaiser, D., Fahrenfort, J. J., & van Gaal, S.
- Venue
- PLOS Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2021-05-05
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- e3001241
- ISSN
- 1544-9173 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-7885
- OpenAlex
- W3159968842
- Cited by
- 62
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 5.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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