Cooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties
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Abstract
Conventional evolutionary game theory predicts that natural selection favours the selfish and strong even though cooperative interactions thrive at all levels of organization in living systems. Recent investigations demonstrated that a limiting factor for the evolution of cooperative interactions is the way in which they are organized, cooperators becoming evolutionarily competitive whenever individuals are constrained to interact with few others along the edges of networks with low average connectivity. Despite this insight, the conundrum of cooperation remains since recent empirical data shows that real networks exhibit typically high average connectivity and associated single-to-broad-scale heterogeneity. Here, a computational model is constructed in which individuals are able to self-organize both their strategy and their social ties throughout evolution, based exclusively on their self-interest. We show that the entangled evolution of individual strategy and network structure constitutes a key mechanism for the sustainability of cooperation in social networks. For a given average connectivity of the population, there is a critical value for the ratio W between the time scales associated with the evolution of strategy and of structure above which cooperators wipe out defectors. Moreover, the emerging social networks exhibit an overall heterogeneity that accounts very well for the diversity of patterns recently found in acquired data on social networks. Finally, heterogeneity is found to become maximal when W reaches its critical value. These results show that simple topological dynamics reflecting the individual capacity for self-organization of social ties can produce realistic networks of high average connectivity with associated single-to-broad-scale heterogeneity. On the other hand, they show that cooperation cannot evolve as a result of "social viscosity" alone in heterogeneous networks with high average connectivity, requiring the additional mechanism of topological co-evolution to ensure the survival of cooperative behaviour.
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“Endogenous network transitions often produce predictable results for the evolution of cooperation [17-29].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [18]
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Bennati, S. (2018) · Repository for Publications and Research Data (ETH Zurich) · doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000246194 · Cited by 5
Emotional Strategies as Catalysts for Cooperation in Signed NetworksPreprint
Righi, S., & Takács, K. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2376801 · Cited by 5
Effects of tag mediation and structural balance on the evolution of cooperation on signed networks
He, X., Li, G., & Du, H. (2025) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/5.0259970 · Cited by 6
Research on influencer marketing strategies based on double-layer network game theory
Qiu, Z., Han, H., Chen, Y., & Wang, T. (2025) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0326252 · Cited by 7
“Santos et al. [42] further revealed that the self-interested, autonomous rewiring of social networks by individuals is a core mechanism sustaining cooperation in highly connected heterogeneous networks.”
Evolution of cooperation with early social influence for explaining collective action
He, X., Li, G., & Du, H. (2024) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/5.0242606 · Cited by 4
Neighbourhood reaction in the evolution of cooperation
Yang, G., Zhang, W., & Xiu, B. (2015) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.02.022 · Cited by 6
Growing Networks Driven by the Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Poncela-Casasnovas, J., Gómez‐Gardeñes, J., Floría, L. M., & Moreno, Y. (2011) · Springer optimization and its applications · doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-0754-6_5 · Cited by 6
Beránek, L., & Remeš, R. (2021) · Symmetry · doi:10.3390/sym13071214 · Cited by 4
“The game was iterated forward following the Monte Carlo simulation procedure [64].”
MethodSang, B., Aghamohammadi, N., & Noor, R. M. (2023) · Journal of the Knowledge Economy · doi:10.1007/s13132-023-01297-7 · Cited by 4
“Some scholars have found that dynamic networks can boost cooperation (Santos et al., 2006), and the faster the network speed is updated, the higher the level of cooperation (Zimmermann et al., 2004).”
Way of Breaking Links in the Evolution of Cooperation
Liu, A.-Z., Zhang, Y., & Sun, C. (2018) · Chinese Physics Letters · doi:10.1088/0256-307x/35/9/098901 · Cited by 4
Modifying Trust Dynamics through Cooperation and Defection in Evolving Social Networks
Allodi, L., Chiodi, L., & Cremonini, M. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-21599-5_10 · Cited by 4
“Santos et al. analyzed the way cooperation prevails on defection when actors are constrained to interact with few others along the edges of a sparse graph [ 15 ].”
BackgroundEmergence of Cooperation in Adaptive Social Networks with Behavioral Diversity
Segbroeck, S. V., Santos, F. C., Lenaerts, T., & Pacheco, J. M. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-21283-3_54 · Cited by 4
“This effect even enhances when one recognizes that interaction networks are dynamic entities [6], whose structure co-evolves with the individual behavior [15,12,18].”
BackgroundSelf-citationEffect of community structure on coevolutionary dynamics with dynamical linking
Liu, Y., Li, Z., Chen, X., & Wang, L. (2010) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2010.02.051 · Cited by 4
Degree Variance And Emotional Strategies Catalyze Cooperation In Dynamic Signed Networks
Righi, S., & Takács, K. (2014) · European Conference on Modelling and Simulation (ECMS) · doi:10.7148/2014-0738 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M., & Lenaerts, T.
- Affiliations
- Université Libre de Bruxelles (BE)
- Harvard University (US)
- Vrije Universiteit Brussel (BE)
- Corresponding author
- Lenaerts, Tom
- Venue
- PLoS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2006-10-20
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- e140
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- OpenAlex
- W1980096296
- Cited by
- 556
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 39 · 2012: 33
- FWCI
- 105.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- PLoS Computational Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Dépôt institutionnel de l'Université libre de Bruxelles (Université Libre de Bruxelles) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- European Commission
- Vlaamse regering
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Network Analysis Techniques
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, social networks, network co-evolution, network heterogeneity, strategy evolution
- MeSH terms
- Computer Simulation, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Behavior
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.