Cooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties
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Abstract
Conventional evolutionary game theory predicts that natural selection favours the selfish and strong even though cooperative interactions thrive at all levels of organization in living systems. Recent investigations demonstrated that a limiting factor for the evolution of cooperative interactions is the way in which they are organized, cooperators becoming evolutionarily competitive whenever individuals are constrained to interact with few others along the edges of networks with low average connectivity. Despite this insight, the conundrum of cooperation remains since recent empirical data shows that real networks exhibit typically high average connectivity and associated single-to-broad-scale heterogeneity. Here, a computational model is constructed in which individuals are able to self-organize both their strategy and their social ties throughout evolution, based exclusively on their self-interest. We show that the entangled evolution of individual strategy and network structure constitutes a key mechanism for the sustainability of cooperation in social networks. For a given average connectivity of the population, there is a critical value for the ratio W between the time scales associated with the evolution of strategy and of structure above which cooperators wipe out defectors. Moreover, the emerging social networks exhibit an overall heterogeneity that accounts very well for the diversity of patterns recently found in acquired data on social networks. Finally, heterogeneity is found to become maximal when W reaches its critical value. These results show that simple topological dynamics reflecting the individual capacity for self-organization of social ties can produce realistic networks of high average connectivity with associated single-to-broad-scale heterogeneity. On the other hand, they show that cooperation cannot evolve as a result of "social viscosity" alone in heterogeneous networks with high average connectivity, requiring the additional mechanism of topological co-evolution to ensure the survival of cooperative behaviour.
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“Endogenous network transitions often produce predictable results for the evolution of cooperation [17-29].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [18]
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Röhl, T., Röhl, C., Schuster, H. G., & Traulsen, A. (2007) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.76.026114 · Cited by 13
Evolutionary Origin of Asymptotically Stable Consensus
Tang, C., Wu, B., Wang, J., & Li, X. (2014) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep04590 · Cited by 12
Trust-based partner switching among partitioned regions promotes cooperation in public goods game
Kang, H., Wang, M., Shen, Y., Sun, X., & Chen, Q. (2021) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0253527 · Cited by 12
Leaders should be more persistent in evolutionary social dilemmas
Huang, C., Dai, Q., & Li, H. (2018) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/124/18001 · Cited by 14
Prisoner’s dilemma on a stochastic nongrowth network evolution model
Hatzopoulos, V., & Jensen, H. J. (2008) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.78.011904 · Cited by 12
The coevolution of cognition and sociality
Hahn, L. G., Sergiou, A. S. E., Arbon, J. J., Fürtbauer, I., King, A. J., & Thornton, A. (2025) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2024.0110 · Cited by 16
Evolution of cooperation and consistent personalities in public goods games
Salahshour, M. (2021) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-021-03045-w · Cited by 12
“However, motivated by many evidences of assortative behavior [32,33], such as breaking or forming ties [34,35], we assume individuals are sorted based on their strategies in the first round, such that all the individuals who cooperate in the first round form a subgroup to play a PGG (which we call the cooperative or s…”
BackgroundOlder partner selection promotes the prevalence of cooperation in evolutionary games
Yang, G., Huang, J., & Zhang, W. (2014) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.06.013 · Cited by 13
The web as an adaptive network: coevolution of web behavior and web structure
McCabe, C., Watson, R. A. R., Prichard, J. S., & Hall, W. (2011) · ACM Web Science Conference (WebSci) · doi:10.1145/2527031.2527044 · Cited by 11
“Some adaptive networks models simulate the action of playing games between agents on a network, and examples of this include models of cooperation that involve dynamic linking or ‘active linking’ [30, 49].”
BackgroundEvolutionary Public Goods Game on Evolving Random Networks
Liu, Q., Xu, Z., & Zhang, L. (2018) · Journal of the Korean Physical Society · doi:10.3938/jkps.72.480 · Cited by 11
Adaptive and probabilistic strategy evolution in dynamical networks
Yang, G., Zhu, C., & Zhang, W. (2018) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2018.11.046 · Cited by 11
The coevolution of long‐term pair bonds and cooperation
Song, Z., & Feldman, M. W. (2013) · Journal of Evolutionary Biology · doi:10.1111/jeb.12111 · Cited by 11
“…that the system is bistable when partners play Stag Hunt games, depending on the initial fraction of cooperators in the population, and long-term social bonds and cooperation may coevolve from a population with a sufficient fraction of cooperators (Skyrms & Pemantle, 2000; Skyrms, 2004).”
BackgroundProtection and improvement of indirect identity cognition on the spatial evolution of cooperation
Yao, Y., Pi, B., Zeng, Z., & Feng, M. (2023) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2023.128791 · Cited by 10
Population Fluctuation Promotes Cooperation in Networks
Miller, S., & Knowles, J. D. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep11054 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M., & Lenaerts, T.
- Affiliations
- Université Libre de Bruxelles (BE)
- Harvard University (US)
- Vrije Universiteit Brussel (BE)
- Corresponding author
- Lenaerts, Tom
- Venue
- PLoS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2006-10-20
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- e140
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- OpenAlex
- W1980096296
- Cited by
- 556
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 39 · 2012: 33
- FWCI
- 105.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- PLoS Computational Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Dépôt institutionnel de l'Université libre de Bruxelles (Université Libre de Bruxelles) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- European Commission
- Vlaamse regering
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Network Analysis Techniques
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, social networks, network co-evolution, network heterogeneity, strategy evolution
- MeSH terms
- Computer Simulation, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Behavior
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.