Cooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties
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Abstract
Conventional evolutionary game theory predicts that natural selection favours the selfish and strong even though cooperative interactions thrive at all levels of organization in living systems. Recent investigations demonstrated that a limiting factor for the evolution of cooperative interactions is the way in which they are organized, cooperators becoming evolutionarily competitive whenever individuals are constrained to interact with few others along the edges of networks with low average connectivity. Despite this insight, the conundrum of cooperation remains since recent empirical data shows that real networks exhibit typically high average connectivity and associated single-to-broad-scale heterogeneity. Here, a computational model is constructed in which individuals are able to self-organize both their strategy and their social ties throughout evolution, based exclusively on their self-interest. We show that the entangled evolution of individual strategy and network structure constitutes a key mechanism for the sustainability of cooperation in social networks. For a given average connectivity of the population, there is a critical value for the ratio W between the time scales associated with the evolution of strategy and of structure above which cooperators wipe out defectors. Moreover, the emerging social networks exhibit an overall heterogeneity that accounts very well for the diversity of patterns recently found in acquired data on social networks. Finally, heterogeneity is found to become maximal when W reaches its critical value. These results show that simple topological dynamics reflecting the individual capacity for self-organization of social ties can produce realistic networks of high average connectivity with associated single-to-broad-scale heterogeneity. On the other hand, they show that cooperation cannot evolve as a result of "social viscosity" alone in heterogeneous networks with high average connectivity, requiring the additional mechanism of topological co-evolution to ensure the survival of cooperative behaviour.
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“Endogenous network transitions often produce predictable results for the evolution of cooperation [17-29].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [18]
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BackgroundMethodNetwork Fluctuations Hinder Cooperation in Evolutionary Games
Antonioni, A., & Tomassini, M. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025555 · Cited by 27
“The finding that fixed Barabási–Albert scale-free networks of contacts notably increase cooperation in social dilemmas has been an important one [8,14] and has raised substantial hope, since scale-free graphs are better representations of actual networks of contacts than the random graphs and regular lattices that hav…”
BackgroundMethodChiang, Y.-S. (2008) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463108089544 · Cited by 37
“Future research can approach this issue either through agent-based models (Santos et al. 2006) or through human subject experiments (Barclay and Willer 2007).”
Evolution of cooperation on dynamical graphs
Kun, Á., & Scheuring, I. (2009) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2008.11.009 · Cited by 29
Effects of adaptive dynamical linking in networked games
Yang, Z., Li, Z., Wu, T., & Wang, L. (2013) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.88.042128 · Cited by 30
Jordan, M. R., Jordan, J., & Rand, D. G. (2016) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.07.005 · Cited by 34
Assortativity provides a narrow margin for enhanced cooperation on multilayer networks
Duh, M., Gosak, M., Slavinec, M., & Perc, M. (2019) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/ab5cb2 · Cited by 30
Cognitive strategies take advantage of the cooperative potential of heterogeneous networks
Vukov, J., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2012) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/14/6/063031 · Cited by 30
“As previously shown [51, 52], fear (S) of being cheated plays a central role in the outcome of evolution in heterogeneous structured populations.”
BackgroundSelf-citationHuman-inspired computational fairness
de Jong, S., & Tuyls, K. (2010) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-010-9122-9 · Cited by 31
“Many mechanisms (such as reputation [36,37], volunteering [29], priorities [18], and rewiring in social networks [ 44 ,55]) have been proposed and supported according to this procedure.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialThe evolution of cooperation in signed networks under the impact of structural balance
He, X., Du, H., Cai, M., & Feldman, M. W. (2018) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0205084 · Cited by 31
Evolution of favoritism and group fairness in a co-evolving three-person ultimatum game
Takesue, H., Ozawa, A., & Morikawa, S. (2017) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/118/48002 · Cited by 30
Multigames with social punishment and the evolution of cooperation
Deng, Z., Huang, Y., Gu, Z., & Li-Gao (2018) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2018.03.054 · Cited by 28
Adaptive-network models of collective dynamics
Zschaler, G. (2012) · The European Physical Journal Special Topics · doi:10.1140/epjst/e2012-01648-5 · Cited by 34
“Network adaptivity has also been found to produce phase transitions in many di erent models from game-theory (Pacheco et al., 2006b; Santos et al., 2006a; Szolnoki and Perc, 2009b; van Segbroeck et al., 2009, 2011; Demirel et al., 2011a).”
BackgroundCooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation
Antonioni, A., Sánchez, Á., & Tomassini, M. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep27160 · Cited by 29
Avoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperation among unequals
Foley, M., Smead, R., Forber, P., & Riedl, C. (2021) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008847 · Cited by 40
“Network structure has been shown to be more important in games of conflict than the Prisoner’s Dilemma [33], which warrants additional analysis of this game in connection with partner choice.”
BackgroundInfluentialEvolution of cooperation in a conformity-driven evolving dynamic social network
Yang, Z., Li, Z., & Wang, L. (2020) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2020.125251 · Cited by 27
The evolution of fairness in the coevolutionary ultimatum games
Miyaji, K., Wang, Z., Tanimoto, J., Hagishima, A., & Kokubo, S. (2013) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2013.05.007 · Cited by 27
Artificial agents learning human fairness
de Jong, S., Tuyls, K., & Verbeeck, K. (2008) · TU/e Research Portal · doi:10.5555/1402298.1402344 · Cited by 29
Why mussels stick together: spatial self-organization affects the evolution of cooperation
de Jager, M., Weissing, F. J., & van de Koppel, J. (2017) · Evolutionary Ecology · doi:10.1007/s10682-017-9888-1 · Cited by 29
“…highly viscous populations, where cooperative traits are transferred locally, the effects of network structure and neighborhood size have been studied extensively (Pfeiffer and Bonhoeffer 2003; Rainey and Rainey 2003; Santos and Pacheco 2005; Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Santos et al. 2006; Masuda 2007).”
InfluentialConflict and convention in dynamic networks
Foley, M., Forber, P., Smead, R., & Riedl, C. (2018) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0835 · Cited by 29
“to avoid conflict by evolving network ties can produce realistic network structures and thus provides another potential mechanism for social network formation that differs from preferential attachment (5,14,36). In games of conflict each agent can play one of two strategies: an aggressive, competitive strategy (hawk) or…”
InfluentialKnow Thy Neighbor: Costly Information Can Hurt Cooperation in Dynamic Networks
Antonioni, A., Cacault, M. P., Lalive, R., & Tomassini, M. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110788 · Cited by 25
“, [12–21] among others, and the recent review in [22]).”
BackgroundTakesue, H. (2018) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/121/48005 · Cited by 25
“explain why both cases reach similar results. In the simulation, we imposed the restrictionthatthelinktoanagentwhohasonlyoneneighbour may not be severed so that all agents can participate in the PDG [41]. Results To investigate the results of the evolutionary process, we conducted Monte Carlo simulations. The simulati…”
ResultHistorical payoff promotes cooperation in voluntary prisoner's dilemma game
Geng, Y., Shen, C., Guo, H., Chen, C., Yu, D., & Ши, Л. (2017) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2017.10.017 · Cited by 25
Effective usage of credit records promotes cooperation on weighted networks
Zhai, C., Zhang, H., Zhao, Y., Chen, M. Z. Q., Rong, Z., & Wang, B.-H. (2010) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.81.036112 · Cited by 24
Public Goods Games on Coevolving Social Network Models
Tomassini, M., & Antonioni, A. (2020) · Frontiers in Physics · doi:10.3389/fphy.2020.00058 · Cited by 21
Beyond pairwise strategy updating in the prisoner's dilemma game
Wang, X., Perc, M., Liu, Y., Chen, X., & Wang, L. (2012) · University of Maribor digital library (University of Maribor) · Cited by 24
Metadata
- Authors
- Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M., & Lenaerts, T.
- Affiliations
- Université Libre de Bruxelles (BE)
- Harvard University (US)
- Vrije Universiteit Brussel (BE)
- Corresponding author
- Lenaerts, Tom
- Venue
- PLoS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2006-10-20
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- e140
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- OpenAlex
- W1980096296
- Cited by
- 556
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 39 · 2012: 33
- FWCI
- 105.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- PLoS Computational Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Dépôt institutionnel de l'Université libre de Bruxelles (Université Libre de Bruxelles) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- European Commission
- Vlaamse regering
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Network Analysis Techniques
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, social networks, network co-evolution, network heterogeneity, strategy evolution
- MeSH terms
- Computer Simulation, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Behavior
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