A Systematic Review of Re-Identification Attacks on Health Data
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Abstract
BACKGROUND: Privacy legislation in most jurisdictions allows the disclosure of health data for secondary purposes without patient consent if it is de-identified. Some recent articles in the medical, legal, and computer science literature have argued that de-identification methods do not provide sufficient protection because they are easy to reverse. Should this be the case, it would have significant and important implications on how health information is disclosed, including: (a) potentially limiting its availability for secondary purposes such as research, and (b) resulting in more identifiable health information being disclosed. Our objectives in this systematic review were to: (a) characterize known re-identification attacks on health data and contrast that to re-identification attacks on other kinds of data, (b) compute the overall proportion of records that have been correctly re-identified in these attacks, and (c) assess whether these demonstrate weaknesses in current de-identification methods. METHODS AND FINDINGS: Searches were conducted in IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital Library, and PubMed. After screening, fourteen eligible articles representing distinct attacks were identified. On average, approximately a quarter of the records were re-identified across all studies (0.26 with 95% CI 0.046-0.478) and 0.34 for attacks on health data (95% CI 0-0.744). There was considerable uncertainty around the proportions as evidenced by the wide confidence intervals, and the mean proportion of records re-identified was sensitive to unpublished studies. Two of fourteen attacks were performed with data that was de-identified using existing standards. Only one of these attacks was on health data, which resulted in a success rate of 0.00013. CONCLUSIONS: The current evidence shows a high re-identification rate but is dominated by small-scale studies on data that was not de-identified according to existing standards. This evidence is insufficient to draw conclusions about the efficacy of de-identification methods.
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“Even if the data collected by ChatGPT are deidentified, there is still the potential for individuals to be reidentified by combining them with other available data sources [31].”
From Ethical Considerations of Using ChatGPT in Health Care (2023) · cites this paper as [31]
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“Such re-identification attacks 39 have been shown to yield high success rates both with tabular data 40,41 (such as patient records) and medical imaging data 42 .”
From Secure, privacy-preserving and federated machine learning in medical imaging (2020) · cites this paper as [39]
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Metadata
- Authors
- El Emam, K., Jonker, E., Arbuckle, L., & Malin, B.
- Affiliations
- Children's Hospital of Eastern Ontario (CA)
- Vanderbilt University (US)
- Venue
- PLoS ONE
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2011-12-02
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- e28071
- ISSN
- 1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC3229505
- OpenAlex
- W2083384763
- Semantic Scholar
- 3803595fac5818f0fce6296a6e3afc414c280a5a
- Cited by
- 427
- References
- 64
- Citations by year
- 2026: 36 · 2025: 42 · 2024: 48 · 2023: 34 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 46 · 2019: 36 · 2018: 27 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 20 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 2.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Update notices
- correction (2015-04-16)
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- Vanderbilt University
- Canada Research Chairs
- National Institutes of Health
- National Human Genome Research Institute (U01HG00460301, U01HG004603)
- U.S. National Library of Medicine (R01LM009989)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Health Sciences › Health Professions › Health Information Management › Thoreau and American Literature
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Data Quality and Management
- Keywords
- re-identification attacks, health data privacy, de-identification, secondary use of health data, privacy law, health information disclosure
- MeSH terms
- Confidentiality, Humans, Software, United States, Reproducibility of Results, Models, Statistical, Databases, Factual, Medical Records Systems, Computerized, Computer Security, Privacy, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.