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The Importance of Moral Construal: Moral versus Non-Moral Construal Elicits Faster, More Extreme, Universal Evaluations of the Same Actions

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Van Bavel, Jay J., Packer, Dominic J., Haas, Ingrid Johnsen, Cunningham, William A. · 2012 · PLoS ONE

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 88 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 3 of the 44 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have challenged the view that moral reasoning is the sole or even primary means by which moral judgments are made. Rather, intuitionist models posit that certain situations automatically elicit moral intuitions, which guide moral judgments. We present three experiments showing that evaluations are also susceptible to the influence of moral versus non-moral construal. We had participants make moral evaluations (rating whether actions were morally good or bad) or non-moral evaluations (rating whether actions were pragmatically or hedonically good or bad) of a wide variety of actions. As predicted, moral evaluations were faster, more extreme, and more strongly associated with universal prescriptions-the belief that absolutely nobody or everybody should engage in an action-than non-moral (pragmatic or hedonic) evaluations of the same actions. Further, we show that people are capable of flexibly shifting from moral to non-moral evaluations on a trial-by-trial basis. Taken together, these experiments provide evidence that moral versus non-moral construal has an important influence on evaluation and suggests that effects of construal are highly flexible. We discuss the implications of these experiments for models of moral judgment and decision-making.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

Three experiments show that instructing participants to evaluate the same actions morally versus non-morally (pragmatically or hedonically) produces faster, more extreme, and more universally prescriptive evaluations. Participants could shift between moral and non-moral construals even trial-by-trial, suggesting moral evaluation is flexibly construal-dependent rather than solely stimulus-driven.

Key findings

  • Moral evaluations were faster than non-moral evaluations of the same actions: Exp1 3,595 vs 3,877 ms, F(1,43)=11.29, p<.01; Exp2 3,188 vs 3,386 ms, F(1,65)=14.18, p<.01; Exp3 3,661 vs 3,822 ms, F(1,143)=28.86, p<.01.
  • Moral evaluations were more extreme: Exp1 5.85 vs 5.59 (p=.067); Exp2 5.53 vs 5.32, F(1,65)=3.93, p=.05; Exp3 5.10 vs 4.64, F(1,143)=26.67, p<.01.
  • Universality judgments were faster after moral than non-moral evaluations: Exp1 1,254 vs 1,443 ms, F(1,43)=9.17, p<.01; Exp2 1,438 vs 1,542 ms, F(1,65)=8.66, p<.01; Exp3 1,651 vs 1,701 ms, F(1,143)=10.81, p<.01. Universality ratings also correlated more strongly with moral than non-moral ratings: Exp1 β=.93 vs .83; Exp2 β=.75 vs .70; Exp3 β=.72 vs .58.
  • Exp3 showed trial-by-trial flexibility: participants made both moral and non-moral evaluations of the same actions within one session, and effects persisted; hedonic non-moral evaluations were less universalized than pragmatic ones.

Methods

  • Three experiments with undergraduate psychology students: Exp1 n=45 (1 removed), Exp2 n=70 (4 removed), Exp3 n=148 (3 did not complete). Participants rated actions on moral versus pragmatic/hedonic dimensions, then made universality judgments (Exp1: “how many other people should”; Exp2/3: universally prohibited/required).
  • Task facilitation paradigm: stimuli were held constant while evaluation mode varied; Exp1/2 used blocked switches, Exp3 used trial-by-trial switches and within-subject same-action evaluations. Reaction times and ratings were recorded; RTs >10,000 ms were excluded and remaining RTs log-transformed.
  • Analyses used repeated-measures ANOVAs and multilevel models with trials nested within participants, plus item-level hierarchical regressions for action-level effects.

Limitations

  • Stated: the research relied on participants’ lay understanding of moral versus non-moral evaluation, and the paradigm made that contrast salient, so effects may partly reflect lay theories; future work should test whether salience enhances differences. Also stated: it cannot rule out that moral versus non-moral modes activated different underlying representations/contents.
  • Stated: Exp1 used different scale anchors for moral (wrong/right) versus pragmatic (bad/good) evaluations, which was addressed in Exp2 by holding labels constant; Exp3 likely included a task-switching cost from trial-by-trial switches.
  • Evident: samples were undergraduate psychology students completing lab computer tasks, limiting generalizability; the paper does not report non-student or field samples.

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Crossref · 10.1371/journal.pone.0048693

Cites

86 of 86 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Figures

Figure 1 A visual representation of the moral and pragmatic evaluation trials presented in Experiment 1. On each trial, a fixation cross appeared for 1,000 ms before participants made a moral or pragmatic evaluation followed by a universality judgment. We recorded reaction times on the moral/pragmatic evaluation and university judgment. The trials were presented in four blocks. In each block, participants made moral and universality evaluations for 13 actions before switching to pragmatic and universality evaluations for 13 different actions.
Figure 1 A visual representation of the moral and pragmatic evaluation trials presented in Experiment 1. On each trial, a fixation cross appeared for 1,000 ms before participants made a moral or pragmatic evaluation followed by a universality judgment. We recorded reaction times on the moral/pragmatic evaluation and university judgment. The trials were presented in four blocks. In each block, participants made moral and universality evaluations for 13 actions before switching to pragmatic and universality evaluations for 13 different actions.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 The mean pragmatic and moral ratings (with standard errors) for each action in Experiment 1. The actions have been rank ordered on the Y-axis from the highest (left) to lowest (right) mean rating. The X-axis reflects the rating scale (range 1–7). Pragmatic ratings are relatively linear whereas moral ratings are curvilinear, reflecting differences in extremity.
Figure 2 The mean pragmatic and moral ratings (with standard errors) for each action in Experiment 1. The actions have been rank ordered on the Y-axis from the highest (left) to lowest (right) mean rating. The X-axis reflects the rating scale (range 1–7). Pragmatic ratings are relatively linear whereas moral ratings are curvilinear, reflecting differences in extremity.CC BY · PubMed Central

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  • ConsistentF(1, 43) = 9.17reported p < .01 · recomputed p = .004

    “F(1, 43) = 9.17, p < .01”

  • ConsistentF(3, 129) = 72.46reported p < .01 · recomputed p < .001

    “F(3, 129) = 72.46, p < .01”

  • ConsistentF(1, 43) = 11.18reported p < .01 · recomputed p = .002

    “F(1, 43) = 11.18, p < .01”

  • ConsistentF(1, 43) = 0.22reported p = .64 · recomputed p = .641

    “F(1, 43) = .22, p = .64”

  • ConsistentF(1, 43) = 3.54reported p = .067 · recomputed p = .067

    “F(1, 43) = 3.54, p = .067”

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Kohlberg L (1984) Essays on moral development: Vol. 2. The psychology of moral development. New York: Harper.
  2. Hare RM (1955) Universalizability. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
  3. Cunningham WA, Packer DJ, Kesek A, Van Bavel JJ (2009) Implicit measures of attitudes: A physiological approach. In: Petty RE, Fazio RH, Brinol P, editors. Attitudes: Insights from the new implicit measures. New York: Psychology Press. pp. 485–512.

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Metadata

Authors
Van Bavel, J. J., Packer, D. J., Haas, I. J., & Cunningham, W. A.
Affiliations
  • Lehigh University (US)
  • University of Nebraska–Lincoln (US)
  • University of Toronto (CA)
Venue
PLoS ONE
Published
2012-11-28
Volume
7
Issue
11
Pages
e48693
ISSN
1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2105391659
Cited by
107
References
88
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 6
FWCI
1.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Lincoln (University of Nebraska) (submittedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (0819250)
  • Ohio State University
  • Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Ethics in Business and Education
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Keywords
moral judgment, moral intuitions, intuitionism, moral evaluation, pragmatic assessment, hedonic evaluation, moral reasoning, ethical decision-making
MeSH terms
Adolescent, Adult, Decision Making, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Models, Theoretical, Morals, Young Adult

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Van Bavel, J. J., Packer, D. J., Haas, I. J., & Cunningham, W. A. (2012). The Importance of Moral Construal: Moral versus Non-Moral Construal Elicits Faster, More Extreme, Universal Evaluations of the Same Actions. PLoS ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0048693

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