Intention Seekers: Conspiracist Ideation and Biased Attributions of Intentionality
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Conspiracist beliefs are widespread and potentially hazardous. A growing body of research suggests that cognitive biases may play a role in endorsement of conspiracy theories. The current research examines the novel hypothesis that individuals who are biased towards inferring intentional explanations for ambiguous actions are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories, which portray events as the exclusive product of intentional agency. Study 1 replicated a previously observed relationship between conspiracist ideation and individual differences in anthropomorphisation. Studies 2 and 3 report a relationship between conspiracism and inferences of intentionality for imagined ambiguous events. Additionally, Study 3 again found conspiracist ideation to be predicted by individual differences in anthropomorphism. Contrary to expectations, however, the relationship was not mediated by the intentionality bias. The findings are discussed in terms of a domain-general intentionality bias making conspiracy theories appear particularly plausible. Alternative explanations are suggested for the association between conspiracism and anthropomorphism.
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Citations
Cites
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“In line with Study 1, as well as previous research [68,69], the tendency towards endorsing anthropomorphic statements predicted stronger conspiracist ideation.”
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Cited by
Understanding Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Uscinski, J. E., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C. S., & Deravi, F. (2019) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12568 · Cited by 1,511
Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them
(2018) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190844073.001.0001 · Cited by 284
“I Know Things They Don’t Know!”: The Role of Need for Uniqueness in Belief in Conspiracy Theories
Lantian, A., Muller, D., Nurra, C., & Douglas, K. M. (2017) · Social Psychology · doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000306 · Cited by 176
Epistemic beliefs’ role in promoting misperceptions and conspiracist ideation
Garrett, R. K., & Weeks, B. E. (2017) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0184733 · Cited by 167
Metadata
- Authors
- Brotherton, R., & French, C. C.
- Venue
- PLOS ONE
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2015-05-13
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- e0124125
- ISSN
- 1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1960129947
- Cited by
- 125
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 60.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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