Cited by 176Misinformation and Its ImpactsSocial and Intergroup PsychologyParanormal Experiences and Beliefs

“I Know Things They Don’t Know!”: The Role of Need for Uniqueness in Belief in Conspiracy Theories

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Lantian, Anthony, Muller, Dominique, Nurra, Cécile, Douglas, Karen M.·2017·Social Psychology

Abstract

Abstract. In the current research, we investigated whether belief in conspiracy theories satisfies people’s need for uniqueness. We found that the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories was associated with the feeling of possessing scarce information about the situations explained by the conspiracy theories (Study 1) and higher need for uniqueness (Study 2). Further two studies using two different manipulations of need for uniqueness (Studies 3 and 4) showed that people in a high need for uniqueness condition displayed higher conspiracy belief than people in a low need for uniqueness condition. This conclusion is strengthened by a small-scale meta-analysis. These studies suggest that conspiracy theories may serve people’s desire to be unique, highlighting a motivational underpinning of conspiracy belief.

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Lantian, A. (2015). Rôle fonctionnel de l'adhésion aux théories du complot : un moyen de distinction ? [The functional role of believing in conspiracy theories: A way to distinguish ourselves from others?] (Doctoral dissertation, Université Grenoble Alpes). Retrieved from https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01251554/document
  2. Snyder, C. R., & Fromkin, H. L. (1980). Uniqueness: The pursuit of human difference. New York, NY: Springer.

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Authors
Lantian, A., Muller, D., Nurra, C., & Douglas, K. M.
Affiliations
  • Université Paris Nanterre (FR)
  • Univ. Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, France
  • Université Grenoble Alpes (FR)
  • University of Kent (GB)
Venue
Social Psychology
Published
2017-07
Volume
48
Issue
3
Pages
160-173
ISSN
  • 1864-9335 (ISSN-L)
  • 2151-2590
OpenAlex
W2735482984
Cited by
176
References
96
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 10
FWCI
24.51
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Social Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • Kent Academic Repository (University of Kent) (submittedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
Keywords
conspiracy theories, need for uniqueness, conspiracy beliefs

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