Cited by 132Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEmotions and Moral BehaviorPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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The Role of Compassion in Altruistic Helping and Punishment Behavior

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Abstract

Compassion, the emotional response of caring for another who is suffering and that results in motivation to relieve suffering, is thought to be an emotional antecedent to altruistic behavior. However, it remains unclear whether compassion enhances altruistic behavior in a uniform way or is specific to sub-types of behavior such as altruistic helping of a victim or altruistic punishment of a transgressor. We investigated the relationship between compassion and subtypes of altruistic behavior using third-party paradigms where participants (1) witnessed an unfair economic exchange between a transgressor and a victim, and (2) had the opportunity to either spend personal funds to either economically (a) help the victim or (b) punish the transgressor. In Study 1, we examined whether individual differences in self-reported empathic concern (the emotional component of compassion) was associated with greater altruistic helping or punishment behavior in two independent samples. For participants who witnessed an unfair transaction, trait empathic concern was associated with greater helping of a victim and had no relationship to punishment. However, in those who decided to punish the transgressor, participants who reported greater empathic concern decided to punish less. In Study 2, we directly enhanced compassion using short-term online compassion meditation training to examine whether altruistic helping and punishment were increased after two weeks of training. Compared to an active reappraisal training control group, the compassion training group gave more to help the victim and did not differ in punishment of the transgressor. Together, these two studies suggest that compassion is related to greater altruistic helping of victims and is not associated with or may mitigate altruistic punishment of transgressors.

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Crossref · 10.1371/journal.pone.0143794

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Fig 1 Third-party punishment and helping game paradigms. a) In the first step of the games, the Dictator transfers any X amount of $10 (100 points) to the anonymous Recipient while the Third Party observes. b) In the Punishment Game, the Third Party may spend any Y amount of $5 (50 points) to take twice the amount from the dictator, constrained by the amount the dictator originally gave (cannot punish below $0). c) In the Helping Game, the Third Party may spend any Y amount of $5 (50 points) to transfer twice the amount to the Recipient. In the Compassion and Reappraisal Training study, all participants witnessed an unfair Dictator transfer (< $2.50/$10).
Fig 1 Third-party punishment and helping game paradigms. a) In the first step of the games, the Dictator transfers any X amount of $10 (100 points) to the anonymous Recipient while the Third Party observes. b) In the Punishment Game, the Third Party may spend any Y amount of $5 (50 points) to take twice the amount from the dictator, constrained by the amount the dictator originally gave (cannot punish below $0). c) In the Helping Game, the Third Party may spend any Y amount of $5 (50 points) to transfer twice the amount to the Recipient. In the Compassion and Reappraisal Training study, all participants witnessed an unfair Dictator transfer (< $2.50/$10).CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig 2 The association between trait compassion and third-party altruistic behavior after an unfair dictator transfer. a) In the Helping Game, individuals who report greater compassion give more to the recipient after an unfair interaction (< = 25%). Including the two “extreme altruist” outliers in Helping Game responses, the correlation remains significant (r 89 = 0.214, p < 0.05). b) In the Punishment Game, trait compassion is not associated with punishment behavior after an unfair interaction in the full sample. However, within Punishers (individuals who decided to punish at all and spend > $0, indicated by black shaded circles), those who report greater compassion decide to punish less at trend level. † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05
Fig 2 The association between trait compassion and third-party altruistic behavior after an unfair dictator transfer. a) In the Helping Game, individuals who report greater compassion give more to the recipient after an unfair interaction (< = 25%). Including the two “extreme altruist” outliers in Helping Game responses, the correlation remains significant (r 89 = 0.214, p < 0.05). b) In the Punishment Game, trait compassion is not associated with punishment behavior after an unfair interaction in the full sample. However, within Punishers (individuals who decided to punish at all and spend > $0, indicated by black shaded circles), those who report greater compassion decide to punish less at trend level. † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05CC BY · PubMed Central
Fig 3 Altruistic behavior after short-term online Compassion Training or Reappraisal Training. Individuals who learn Compassion Training were more altruistic towards the Recipient in the Helping Game after witnessing an unfair interaction compared to Reappraisal Training (responses were ranked among 30 participants, * independent t 28 = 2.29, p < .05). Compassion trainees spent 1.87 times more money than Reappraisal trainees in order to altruistically help the recipient. Compassion trainees on average spent $1.14 (mean rank = 19.0) and increased equality between the dictator by 29%, where the Reappraisal trainees spent an average of $0.61 (mean rank = 12.8) and increased the equality by 15%. Compassion Training did not significantly alter altruistic punishment towards the Dictator compared to Reappraisal Training. Punishment Game responses were ranked among 41 participants. Error bars indicate the standard error of the % mean rank.
Fig 3 Altruistic behavior after short-term online Compassion Training or Reappraisal Training. Individuals who learn Compassion Training were more altruistic towards the Recipient in the Helping Game after witnessing an unfair interaction compared to Reappraisal Training (responses were ranked among 30 participants, * independent t 28 = 2.29, p < .05). Compassion trainees spent 1.87 times more money than Reappraisal trainees in order to altruistically help the recipient. Compassion trainees on average spent $1.14 (mean rank = 19.0) and increased equality between the dictator by 29%, where the Reappraisal trainees spent an average of $0.61 (mean rank = 12.8) and increased the equality by 15%. Compassion Training did not significantly alter altruistic punishment towards the Dictator compared to Reappraisal Training. Punishment Game responses were ranked among 41 participants. Error bars indicate the standard error of the % mean rank.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Metadata

Authors
Weng, H. Y., Fox, A. S., Hessenthaler, H. C., Stodola, D. E., & Davidson, R. J.
Affiliations
University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
Corresponding author
  • Weng, Helen Y.
  • Davidson, Richard J.
Venue
PLOS ONE
Published
2015-12-10
Volume
10
Issue
12
Pages
e0143794
ISSN
1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2191876901
Cited by
132
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 49 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 2
FWCI
19.39
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • Fetzer Institute
  • University of Wisconsin-Madison (T32-MH018931)
  • Mind and Life Institute
  • Osher Center for Integrative Medicine
  • Curtin University of Technology
  • National Institutes of Health (AT003997)
  • University of California, San Francisco
  • National Institute of Mental Health (T32MH018931)
  • National Center for Complementary and Integrative Health (T32AT006956, P01AT004952, T32AT003997)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Keywords
compassion, altruistic punishment, empathic concern, trait empathy
MeSH terms
Adult, Altruism, Empathy, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment, Young Adult

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