The DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 61 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Epistemic beliefs’ role in promoting misperceptions and conspiracist ideation
Open accessAbstract
Widespread misperceptions undermine citizens' decision-making ability. Conclusions based on falsehoods and conspiracy theories are by definition flawed. This article demonstrates that individuals' epistemic beliefs-beliefs about the nature of knowledge and how one comes to know-have important implications for perception accuracy. The present study uses a series of large, nationally representative surveys of the U.S. population to produce valid and reliable measures of three aspects of epistemic beliefs: reliance on intuition for factual beliefs (Faith in Intuition for facts), importance of consistency between empirical evidence and beliefs (Need for evidence), and conviction that "facts" are politically constructed (Truth is political). Analyses confirm that these factors complement established predictors of misperception, substantively increasing our ability to explain both individuals' propensity to engage in conspiracist ideation, and their willingness to embrace falsehoods about high-profile scientific and political issues. Individuals who view reality as a political construct are significantly more likely to embrace falsehoods, whereas those who believe that their conclusions must hew to available evidence tend to hold more accurate beliefs. Confidence in the ability to intuitively recognize truth is a uniquely important predictor of conspiracist ideation. Results suggest that efforts to counter misperceptions may be helped by promoting epistemic beliefs emphasizing the importance of evidence, cautious use of feelings, and trust that rigorous assessment by knowledgeable specialists is an effective guard against political manipulation.
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“reliance on emotion is associated with misinformation sharing (Weeks, 2015) or believing in conspiracy theories (Garrett & Weeks, 2017;Martel et al., 2019)”
From The fingerprints of misinformation: how deceptive content differs from reliable sources in terms of cognitive effort and appeal to emotions (2022) · cites this paper as Garrett & Weeks, 2017
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Science audiences, misinformation, and fake news
Scheufele, D. A., & Krause, N. M. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1805871115 · Cited by 878
Reliance on emotion promotes belief in fake news
Martel, C., Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications · doi:10.1186/s41235-020-00252-3 · Cited by 470
Durably reducing conspiracy beliefs through dialogues with AI
Costello, T. H., Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2024) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.adq1814 · Cited by 354
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Ideological asymmetries in conformity, desire for shared reality, and the spread of misinformation
Jost, J. T., van der Linden, S., Panagopoulos, C., & Hardin, C. D. (2018) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2018.01.003 · Cited by 242
Metadata
- Authors
- Garrett, R. K., & Weeks, B. E.
- Affiliations
- The Ohio State University (US)
- University of Michigan (US)
- Corresponding author
- Garrett, R. Kelly
- Venue
- PLOS ONE
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2017-09-18
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- e0184733
- ISSN
- 1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC5603156
- OpenAlex
- W2756124350
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 61
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 23 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 22.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Division of Information and Intelligent Systems (1149599)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Educational Strategies and Epistemologies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- epistemological beliefs, conspiracist ideation, misunderstanding, conspiracy theories, faith in intuition, belief accuracy, political manipulation, scientific misinformation
- MeSH terms
- Culture, Decision Making, Humans, Politics, United States
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