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Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition
Abstract
With the end of the Cold War, the International Monetary Fund emerged as the most powerful international institution in history. But how much influence can the IMF exert over fiercely contested issues in domestic politics that affect the lives of millions? In Lending Credibility , Randall Stone develops the first systematic approach to answering this question. Deploying an arsenal of methods from a range of social sciences rarely combined, he mounts a forceful challenge to conventional wisdom. Focusing on the former Soviet bloc, Stone finds that the IMF is neither as powerful as some critics fear, nor as weak as others believe, but that the answer hinges on the complex factor of how much credibility it can muster from country to country. Stone begins by building a formal, game-theoretic model of lending credibility, which he then subjects to sophisticated quantitative testing on original data from twenty-six countries over the 1990s. Next come detailed, interview-based case studies on negotiations between the IMF and Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and Bulgaria. Stone asserts that the IMF has exerted startling influence over economic policy in smaller countries, such as Poland and Bulgaria. However, where U.S. foreign policy interests come more heavily into play, as in Russia, the IMF cannot credibly commit to enforcing the loans-for-policy contract. This erodes its ability to facilitate enduring market reforms. Stone's context is the postcommunist transition in Europe and Asia, but his findings carry implications for IMF activities the world over.
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Citations
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Mosley, L. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615672 · Cited by 617
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The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa
STONE, R. W. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540404136x · Cited by 474
Self-citationThe Scope of IMF Conditionality
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Self-citationBabb, S. (2013) · Review of International Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09692290.2011.640435 · Cited by 410
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Lake, D. A. (2009) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-009-9060-y · Cited by 381
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Gray, J. (2018) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqx086 · Cited by 338
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Buchanan, A., & Keohane, R. O. (2009) · Legitimacy, Justice and Public International Law · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511691720.002 · Cited by 313
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Milner, H. V., & Tingley, D. (2013) · The Review of International Organizations · doi:10.1007/s11558-012-9153-x · Cited by 258
D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation
Kelley, J. (2009) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818309990117 · Cited by 153
“…in 31+ Roth 2008+ 32+ See Alesina and Dollar 2000; and Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998+ 33+ Stone 2008+ 34+ Bjornlund 2004+ 35+ See Kelley 2004; and Stone 2002+ Russia, Kenya, Cambodia, and elsewhere in the 1990s suggest that international monitors may be similarly torn between praising progress—a…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Stone, R. W.
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2002-12-31
- OpenAlex
- W4255422669
- Cited by
- 303
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 23.45
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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