Colors, Smiles, and Frowns: External Affective Cues can Directly Affect Responses to Persuasive Communications in a Mood-like Manner Without Affecting Mood
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We argue that external affective cues provide information that directly affects processing strategy without affecting mood. Positively valenced (i.e., happy) cues lead to nonsystematic processing and negatively valenced (i.e., sad) cues lead to systematic processing. Four studies addressed this issue. In Study 1, participants were exposed to a set of strong or weak arguments, supporting comprehensive examinations for graduating students (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984) printed on either red (positively valenced external affective cue) or blue (negatively valenced external affective cue) paper. After participants read the arguments their mood and attitudes toward comprehensive exams were measured. The results showed that the blue paper participants elaborated the arguments and were persuaded by strong arguments only, while the red paper participants did not elaborate and were persuaded to the same extent by both strong and weak arguments. There were no differences in mood between the groups. In Study 2, under the auspices of a study addressing impromptu speeches, participants read aloud arguments from Study 1 to an audience that responded either favorably (i.e., smile; positively valenced external affective cue) or with a serious facial expression (i.e., somber expression; negatively valenced external affective cue). In Studies 3 and 4, participants read arguments used in Studies 1 and 2 on a computer screen while photographs of smiling or frowning faces were presented on the screen below threshold of awareness. The results of Study 1 were conceptually replicated in Studies 2 through 4. In addition, cognitive response measures collected in Study 3 were consistent with the pattern of results in all of the studies. The results are discussed in the context of an extension of the cognitive tuning hypothesis, in terms of other models of the effects of affective states on judgmental processes, and finally, in the broader context of the adaptive nature of tuning to situational signals.
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Citations
Cites
The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986) · Communication and Persuasion · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-4964-1_1 · Cited by 3,202
The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the organization of behavior
Easterbrook, J. A. (1959) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0047707 · Cited by 3,090
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1984) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.46.1.69 · Cited by 1,727
Heesacker, M., Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1983) · Journal of Personality · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1983.tb00872.x · Cited by 284
Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
Baas, M., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Nijstad, B. A. (2008) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0012815 · Cited by 1,676
Metadata
- Authors
- Soldat, A. S., & Sinclair, R. C.
- Venue
- Social Cognition
- Publisher
- Guilford Publications
- Published
- 2001-08
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 469-490
- ISSN
- 0278-016X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2034920850
- Cited by
- 76
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 66.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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