The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Mood-Related Persuasion Depends on (Mis)Attributions
Abstract
Previous research has shown that respondents in sad moods are likely to elaborate persuasive messages and to be highly persuaded by strong but not weak arguments. In contrast, respondents in happy moods are less likely to elaborate persuasive messages and hence show equal, moderate, persuasion by both strong and weak arguments. To examine how mood-related persuasion effects might be moderated by attributions concerning the source of a person's mood, students were approached on days with either pleasant or unpleasant weather and were asked to participate in a survey relating to higher education. Participants either were or were not cued to the weather as a source of their mood. They listened to either strong or weak arguments supporting the implementation of comprehensive examinations for graduating students. Attitudes toward comprehensive exams were measured. Participants reported more positive moods on pleasant days than on unpleasant days. When the weather was not made salient, weather (i.e., mood) interacted with argument strength: When weather was unpleasant, argument strength had an effect on attitudes, but when weather was pleasant, argument strength had no effect. In contrast, when participants were cued to the weather, there were no weather effects on persuasion; instead, attitudes were affected only by argument strength. Implications, mechanisms, and directions for future research are discussed.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1984) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.46.1.69 · Cited by 1,727
Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Petty, R. E., Wegener, D. T., & Fabrigar, L. R. (1997) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.48.1.609 · Cited by 2,290
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
Metadata
- Authors
- Sinclair, R. C., Mark, M. M., & Clore, G. L.
- Venue
- Social Cognition
- Publisher
- Guilford Publications
- Published
- 1994-12
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 309-326
- ISSN
- 0278-016X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2028683937
- Cited by
- 215
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 24.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Mood-Related Persuasion Depends on (Mis)Attributions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1521/soco.1994.12.4.309
- The paper
- Sinclair, R. C., Mark, M. M., & Clore, G. L. (1994). Mood-Related Persuasion Depends on (Mis)Attributions. Social Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.1994.12.4.309
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.