The Self and its Brain
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this paper I argue that much of the confusion and mystery surrounding the concept of Self can be traced to a failure to appreciate the distinction between the self as a collection of diverse neural components that provide us with our beliefs, memories, desires, personality, emotions, etc. (the epistemological self) and the self that is best conceived as subjective, unified awareness, a point of view in the first person (ontological self). While the former can, and indeed has, been extensively studied by researchers of various disciplines in the human sciences, the latter most often has been ignored—treated more as a place holder attached to a particular predicate of interest (e.g., concept, reference, deception, esteem, image, regulation, etc.). These two aspects of the self, I contend, are not reducible—one being an object (the epistemological self) and the other a subject (the ontological self). Until we appreciate the difficulties of applying scientific methods and analysis to what cannot be reduced to an object of inquiry without stripping it of its essential aspect (its status as subject), progress on the Self, taken as a pluralistic construct, will continue to address only one part of the problems we face in understanding this most fundamental aspect of human experience.
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Citations
Cites
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Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)
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Self-citationWhat is self-specific? Theoretical investigation and critical review of neuroimaging results
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Cited by
Taves, A. (2020) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691619895047 · Cited by 140
“Philosophically oriented psychologists are insisting on careful distinctions between the self of first-person awareness (the conscious, subjective sense of self) and the diverse neural components that interact to produce that awareness (Klein, 2012a, 2012b; Metzinger, 2005).”
BackgroundDissociation and its disorders: competing models, future directions, and a way forward
Lynn, S. J., Maxwell, R., Merckelbach, H., Lilienfeld, S. O., Kloet, D. V. H.-V. D., & Miskovic, V. (2019) · Clinical Psychology Review · doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2019.101755 · Cited by 134
Hanley, A. W., & Garland, E. L. (2017) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2016.10.028 · Cited by 117
Klein, S. B. (2016) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/17470218.2015.1007150 · Cited by 92
Self-citationKlein, S. B. (2013) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00003 · Cited by 94
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Klein, S. B.
- Venue
- Social Cognition
- Publisher
- Guilford Publications
- Published
- 2012-08
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 474-518
- ISSN
- 0278-016X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2015669601
- Cited by
- 48
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 4.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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