Cited by 192Political Conflict and GovernanceTransboundary Water Resource ManagementClimate Change Policy and Economics

Climate variability, economic growth, and civil conflict

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Koubi, Vally, Bernauer, Thomas, Kalbhenn, Anna, Spilker, Gabriele·2012·Journal of Peace Research

Abstract

Despite many claims by high-ranking policymakers and some scientists that climate change breeds violent conflict, the existing empirical literature has so far not been able to identify a systematic, causal relationship of this kind. This may either reflect de facto absence of such a relationship, or it may be the consequence of theoretical and methodological limitations of existing work. In this article we revisit the climate–conflict hypothesis along two lines. First, we concentrate on indirect effects of climatic conditions on conflict, whereas most of the existing literature focuses on direct effects. Specifically, we examine the causal pathway linking climatic conditions to economic growth and to armed conflict, and argue that the growth–conflict part of this pathway is contingent on the political system. Second, we employ a measure of climatic variability that has advantages over those used in the existing literature because it can presumably take into account the adaptation of production to persistent climatic changes. For the empirical analysis we use a global dataset for 1980–2004 and design the testing strategy tightly in line with our theory. Our empirical analysis does not produce evidence for the claim that climate variability affects economic growth. However, we find some, albeit weak, support for the hypothesis that non-democratic countries are more likely to experience civil conflict when economic conditions deteriorate.

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Crossref · 10.1177/0022343311427173

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  • Participation in conflict is more attractive when individuals expect to earn more from criminal or insurgent activities than from lawful and peaceful ones.

    “In such situations, participation in conflict is rated more attractive when individuals (especially low-income groups) expect to earn more from criminal or insurgent activities than from lawful and peaceful ones (Chassang and Padro i Miquel 2009, Koubi et al 2012).”

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Authors
Koubi, V., Bernauer, T., Kalbhenn, A., & Spilker, G.
Affiliations
  • University of Bern (CH)
  • ETH Zurich (CH)
  • European Central Bank (DE)
Corresponding author
Koubi, Vally
Venue
Journal of Peace Research
Published
2012-01-01
Volume
49
Issue
1
Pages
113-127
ISSN
  • 0022-3433 (ISSN-L)
  • 1460-3578
OpenAlex
W2135104700
Cited by
192
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 13
FWCI
62.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Peace Research (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • BORIS (University Library Bern) (submittedVersion)
  • KOPS (University of Konstanz) (submittedVersion)
  • Open Access CRIS of the University of Bern
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Transboundary Water Resource Management
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
Keywords
climate variability, civil conflict, armed conflict, economic growth, political system, democracy, non-democratic regimes, climate change adaptation, indirect effects

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