The DOI matches its Crossref record; 179 of the 181 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 15 of the 92 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
The impacts of climate change on violent conflict risk: a review of causal pathways
Open accessAbstract
This review examines four key pathways through which climate affects conflict: economic shocks, agricultural decline, natural resources competition, and migration.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
This review concludes that climate change can increase violent conflict risk, but mainly in specific contexts rather than as a standalone driver. It argues that the most important causal pathways are economic shocks, agricultural decline, natural resource competition, and migration.
## Key findings
- The paper reviews literature on climate change and violent conflict and finds that most recent studies—especially those using fine-grained data and considering contextual factors—support a climate-conflict link.
- It identifies four key pathways: economic shocks, agricultural decline, natural resource competition, and migration.
- For temperature, the paper says the evidence is mixed, but newer studies using finer data find effects in places such as tropical regions, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East; it also notes that the substantial effect is often small.
- For precipitation/drought, the paper reports an increasing scholarly consensus that droughts and precipitation declines raise conflict risks, with a generally stronger impact on communal violence and riots than on high-intensity civil wars.
- The review emphasizes that climate change is usually not the most important conflict driver; it tends to amplify existing risks in already vulnerable contexts.
## Methods
- Narrative literature review of research on climate change and violent conflict, with emphasis on temperature and precipitation and on causal pathways.
- The authors say they gathered literature from Scopus and Web of Science using search terms related to climate change and violent conflict.
- The review focuses on violent conflict within states—including civil wars, community violence, and riots—because the paper argues interstate climate-conflict links are less likely.
## Limitations
- The paper states that there are limited long-term data, insufficient integrated studies, and an inadequate understanding of causal mechanisms.
- It also notes that validating temperature effects via process tracing and specific pathways remains challenging, which makes it hard to turn statistical associations into clear causal evidence.
- Evident from the text: the review relies on existing studies and does not report a new original dataset or a formal meta-analysis, so its conclusions depend on the scope and quality of prior literature.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
12 Valid · 1 Not valid · 40 Not checked · 19 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Recent evidence suggests, however, that unusually low rainfall was at least one conflict driver (interacting with others, presumably more important) both in Syria (Ash and Obradovich 2020, Dinc and Eklund 2023) and Western Africa (Newman et al 2023).”
§ The impacts of climate change on violent conflict risk: a review of causal pathways > Is there a significant impact of climate change on conflict risk? > The impact of precipitation on conflict risk
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Ash and Obradovich 2020 source
- Partly supportedcites Dinc and Eklund 2023 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy supports only the 'one interacting factor among more important ones' half of the attribution: the Findings section reports that for the sampled farmers the main pre-war drivers of migration were financial difficulties and job opportunities elsewhere, with 'drought and water scarcity were other important factors'. The conflict-level claim is not the paper's own conclusion — the Introduction and 'Drought, conflict, and migration in Syria' sections present drought-as-conflict-driver as the position of others (Gleick 2014; Kelley et al. 2015; Ash & Obradovich 2020), state that 'the main motivation of the 2011 protests in Syria was to end repression and injustices', and note the climate-induced-conflict narrative 'has received much criticism for being oversimplified, deterministic'; the Discussion adds that the drought-migration narrative 'is not as straightforward'. So citing this paper as evidence that unusually low rainfall was a conflict driver in Syria overstates what it reports (migration decisions, not conflict onset). (LLM, conf=0.72)
- Partly supportedcites Newman et al 2023 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our copy supports the interaction-with-other-drivers part and a drought/extreme-weather contribution, but not the specific 'unusually low rainfall' framing: in Section 5 (Ecological stresses) the paper says 'episodic weather extremes, droughts, and flooding may be more instructive than general, long-term climate change for understanding conflict' and that the Lake Chad region 'presents a case which is more persuasive in terms of the climate change-conflict model', while Section 6 (Data findings and analysis) concludes only that 'environmental factors are likely a contributory factor in the distribution of violence, but that other drivers are essential variables' and stresses that 'the causal link between environmental degradation and violence is ambiguous' and that some literature shows Lake Chad resources improving since 2010. The paper never isolates low rainfall as a driver — its empirical work is ACLED conflict-event analysis with secondary land-use/environmental data, and it groups drought with flooding, lake-level decline and climate change. Geographically the study is the Lake Chad Basin (Borno State, Nigeria; Diffa, Niger; Far North, Cameroon; Lac Province, Chad), treated as part of 'the Sahel and West Africa' in Section 4, so 'Western Africa' is an approximation rather than the paper's own scope. (LLM, conf=0.72)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Apart from directly affecting crop yields, climate change could also impact food prices by fluctuating the demand and supply of the affected crops, especially when the climate becomes variable (Bradbear and Friel 2013, Cater and Lew 2018, Mohamed et al 2024).”
§ The impacts of climate change on violent conflict risk: a review of causal pathways > How does climate change affect conflict risk? > Agricultural decline Agriculture is primarily affected by climate through its impacts on productivity, crop yields, arable land, and water (Schlenker and Roberts 2009, Hsiang 2010, Chen et al 2024). It is estimated that fluctuations in seasonal temperature and precipitation levels account for roughly a third of the variation in major global crop yields (Ray et al 2015). Consequently, loss of agricultural income and food insecurity caused by adverse climatic conditions could increase social grievances, providing motives or lowering the opportunity costs for engaging in rebellion (Maxwell et al 2010, Wischnath and Buhaug 2014). Regarding the impact of climate change on conflict working through agriculture, we found evidence supporting the relationship between climate-induced reduction in agricultural production and conflict in historical research. For example, Zhang et al (2007) and Jun and Sethi (2021) showed that climate-induced food shortages increased the risk of conflict when climate variation undermined agricultural production in agriculture-dominated societies and economies. Recent findings were also in line with the historical evidence, especially in areas highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture, with social divisions, and with limited coping capacities (Jun 2017, Crost et al 2018). Empirical research regarding the Philippines showed that excessive precipitation had hugely impacted the agricultural income in acutely deprived areas and thereby increased conflict participation (Crost et al 2018, Eastin 2018). Similarly, rainfall shocks could also increase the intensity of India’s Maoist insurgency via their effect on agricultural output (Gawande et al 2017, Fetzer 2020). For instance, the 2015 drought in Maharashtra led to widespread farmer suicides and heightened tensions in the region, illustrating how climate-induced agricultural distress can exacerbate social unrest (Kulkarni et al 2016). There was also research suggesting that temperature and precipitation anomalies during the core months of the crop-growing seasons could reduce the yield of rice in Indonesia (Caruso et al 2016), maize in sub-Saharan Africa (Jun 2017), and main crops in the Philippines (Crost et al 2018), resulting in the increased incidence of civil conflict. Apart from directly affecting crop yields, climate change could also impact food prices by fluctuating the demand and supply of the affected crops, especially when the climate becomes variable (Bradbear and Friel 2013, Cater and Lew 2018, Mohamed et al 2024). This adds to several other factors increasing food prices, such as oil price variability, speculations on globalized food markets, and increasing investments in land for food and energy production. Rendering staple foods unaffordable for the masses increases the sense of relative deprivation, arouses new and pre-existing grievances, and further provides a political trigger with a higher risk of protests, riots, and violent collective action (Bellemare 2015, Hendrix and Haggard 2015, Jones et al 2017, Ten Brink et al 2023). Evidence favoring such theories can be found in some research in Africa, revealing the complex relationship between climate change, rising food prices, and conflict (Sharma et al 2024). For example, the African food riots during 2007–2008 (Berazneva and Lee 2013) and the Arab Spring (Maystadt et al 2014, Soffiantini 2020) have been considered partly as a consequence of price increases. Smith (2014) found that the probability of civil unrest rose with the increase in domestic food prices by using international food commodity prices and rainfall scarcity as instrumental variables. Raleigh et al (2015) suggested that rainfall exerts an indirect effect on conflict through its impact on food prices. Another example was food riots in countries like Mozambique and Egypt that were associated with high grain prices, following drought and its associated heat wave over Russia and severe flooding in Asia (Hunt et al 2021). Further studies have also identified the rise in food prices as a possible explanatory mechanism linking climate change and conflict, given the positive relationship between soaring food prices (caused by climate shocks) and social unrest (Bellemare 2015, Rudolfsen 2023). In summary, a considerable number of studies indicate that climate change’s adverse impacts on agricultural productivity and food security could increase intrastate violent conflict risks. Grievances about livelihood loss and higher food prices as well as reduced opportunity costs for joining insurgents, are key underlying mechanisms identified in the literature. Specific cases, such as the the riots in Mozambique and Africa, illustrate how climate-related agricultural challenges can catalyze conflict (Berazneva and Lee 2013). This causal mechanism is most likely to occur in poor, agriculturally dependent, and already food insecure countries.
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Bradbear and Friel 2013 source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Cater and Lew 2018 source
- Partly supportedcites Mohamed et al 2024 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Background (page unavailable) says climate variability disrupts crop production and reduces food availability. It does not say that climate variability changes food prices through fluctuations in crop demand and supply; the paper discusses food price inflation separately as a factor in malnutrition. (LLM, conf=0.83)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“It is estimated that fluctuations in seasonal temperature and precipitation levels account for roughly a third of the variation in major global crop yields (Ray et al 2015).”
§ The impacts of climate change on violent conflict risk: a review of causal pathways > How does climate change affect conflict risk? > Agricultural decline Agriculture is primarily affected by climate through its impacts on productivity, crop yields, arable land, and water (Schlenker and Roberts 2009, Hsiang 2010, Chen et al 2024). It is estimated that fluctuations in seasonal temperature and precipitation levels account for roughly a third of the variation in major global crop yields (Ray et al 2015). Consequently, loss of agricultural income and food insecurity caused by adverse climatic conditions could increase social grievances, providing motives or lowering the opportunity costs for engaging in rebellion (Maxwell et al 2010, Wischnath and Buhaug 2014). Regarding the impact of climate change on conflict working through agriculture, we found evidence supporting the relationship between climate-induced reduction in agricultural production and conflict in historical research. For example, Zhang et al (2007) and Jun and Sethi (2021) showed that climate-induced food shortages increased the risk of conflict when climate variation undermined agricultural production in agriculture-dominated societies and economies. Recent findings were also in line with the historical evidence, especially in areas highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture, with social divisions, and with limited coping capacities (Jun 2017, Crost et al 2018). Empirical research regarding the Philippines showed that excessive precipitation had hugely impacted the agricultural income in acutely deprived areas and thereby increased conflict participation (Crost et al 2018, Eastin 2018). Similarly, rainfall shocks could also increase the intensity of India’s Maoist insurgency via their effect on agricultural output (Gawande et al 2017, Fetzer 2020). For instance, the 2015 drought in Maharashtra led to widespread farmer suicides and heightened tensions in the region, illustrating how climate-induced agricultural distress can exacerbate social unrest (Kulkarni et al 2016). There was also research suggesting that temperature and precipitation anomalies during the core months of the crop-growing seasons could reduce the yield of rice in Indonesia (Caruso et al 2016), maize in sub-Saharan Africa (Jun 2017), and main crops in the Philippines (Crost et al 2018), resulting in the increased incidence of civil conflict. Apart from directly affecting crop yields, climate change could also impact food prices by fluctuating the demand and supply of the affected crops, especially when the climate becomes variable (Bradbear and Friel 2013, Cater and Lew 2018, Mohamed et al 2024). This adds to several other factors increasing food prices, such as oil price variability, speculations on globalized food markets, and increasing investments in land for food and energy production. Rendering staple foods unaffordable for the masses increases the sense of relative deprivation, arouses new and pre-existing grievances, and further provides a political trigger with a higher risk of protests, riots, and violent collective action (Bellemare 2015, Hendrix and Haggard 2015, Jones et al 2017, Ten Brink et al 2023). Evidence favoring such theories can be found in some research in Africa, revealing the complex relationship between climate change, rising food prices, and conflict (Sharma et al 2024). For example, the African food riots during 2007–2008 (Berazneva and Lee 2013) and the Arab Spring (Maystadt et al 2014, Soffiantini 2020) have been considered partly as a consequence of price increases. Smith (2014) found that the probability of civil unrest rose with the increase in domestic food prices by using international food commodity prices and rainfall scarcity as instrumental variables. Raleigh et al (2015) suggested that rainfall exerts an indirect effect on conflict through its impact on food prices. Another example was food riots in countries like Mozambique and Egypt that were associated with high grain prices, following drought and its associated heat wave over Russia and severe flooding in Asia (Hunt et al 2021). Further studies have also identified the rise in food prices as a possible explanatory mechanism linking climate change and conflict, given the positive relationship between soaring food prices (caused by climate shocks) and social unrest (Bellemare 2015, Rudolfsen 2023). In summary, a considerable number of studies indicate that climate change’s adverse impacts on agricultural productivity and food security could increase intrastate violent conflict risks. Grievances about livelihood loss and higher food prices as well as reduced opportunity costs for joining insurgents, are key underlying mechanisms identified in the literature. Specific cases, such as the the riots in Mozambique and Africa, illustrate how climate-related agricultural challenges can catalyze conflict (Berazneva and Lee 2013). This causal mechanism is most likely to occur in poor, agriculturally dependent, and already food insecure countries.
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Ray et al 2015 source
The Discussion states that variability in temperature and precipitation explains 32–39% of global crop yield variability. The Abstract identifies the crops as maize, rice, wheat and soybean, matching the claim’s reference to major crops. (LLM, conf=0.93)
hedgedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“We focused on violent conflict within states—such as civil wars, community violence, and riots—as the literature suggests that climate-related interstate conflict is less likely (O’Loughlin et al 2014, Mach et al 2019, Helman et al 2020).”
§ The impacts of climate change on violent conflict risk: a review of causal pathways > Introduction
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites O’Loughlin et al 2014 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results distinguish among forms of violence in sub-Saharan Africa, but do not compare interstate with within-state conflict. A search for interstate conflict and related terms found no passage saying climate-related interstate conflict is less likely. Page numbers were not supplied in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)
- Partly supportedcites Mach et al 2019 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Direct and indirect future economic impacts” (page unavailable), the paper says water has prompted more cooperation than war among relatively well-functioning states over recent decades. That supports a narrower point, but it does not establish that climate-related interstate conflict generally is less likely than conflict within states; the same passage notes uncertainty about whether historical water cooperation will persist under substantial climate change. (LLM, conf=0.76)
- Could not verifycites Helman et al 2020 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction (page unavailable) says the study focuses on non-state conflicts because small-scale conflicts may be more sensitive to climate than civil wars. It does not assess whether climate-related conflict between states is less likely; searches for interstate and inter-state conflict found no passage addressing that comparison. (LLM, conf=0.76)
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Agriculture is primarily affected by climate through its impacts on productivity, crop yields, arable land, and water (Schlenker and Roberts 2009, Hsiang 2010, Chen et al 2024).”
§ The impacts of climate change on violent conflict risk: a review of causal pathways > How does climate change affect conflict risk? > Agricultural decline Agriculture is primarily affected by climate through its impacts on productivity, crop yields, arable land, and water (Schlenker and Roberts 2009, Hsiang 2010, Chen et al 2024). It is estimated that fluctuations in seasonal temperature and precipitation levels account for roughly a third of the variation in major global crop yields (Ray et al 2015). Consequently, loss of agricultural income and food insecurity caused by adverse climatic conditions could increase social grievances, providing motives or lowering the opportunity costs for engaging in rebellion (Maxwell et al 2010, Wischnath and Buhaug 2014). Regarding the impact of climate change on conflict working through agriculture, we found evidence supporting the relationship between climate-induced reduction in agricultural production and conflict in historical research. For example, Zhang et al (2007) and Jun and Sethi (2021) showed that climate-induced food shortages increased the risk of conflict when climate variation undermined agricultural production in agriculture-dominated societies and economies. Recent findings were also in line with the historical evidence, especially in areas highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture, with social divisions, and with limited coping capacities (Jun 2017, Crost et al 2018). Empirical research regarding the Philippines showed that excessive precipitation had hugely impacted the agricultural income in acutely deprived areas and thereby increased conflict participation (Crost et al 2018, Eastin 2018). Similarly, rainfall shocks could also increase the intensity of India’s Maoist insurgency via their effect on agricultural output (Gawande et al 2017, Fetzer 2020). For instance, the 2015 drought in Maharashtra led to widespread farmer suicides and heightened tensions in the region, illustrating how climate-induced agricultural distress can exacerbate social unrest (Kulkarni et al 2016). There was also research suggesting that temperature and precipitation anomalies during the core months of the crop-growing seasons could reduce the yield of rice in Indonesia (Caruso et al 2016), maize in sub-Saharan Africa (Jun 2017), and main crops in the Philippines (Crost et al 2018), resulting in the increased incidence of civil conflict. Apart from directly affecting crop yields, climate change could also impact food prices by fluctuating the demand and supply of the affected crops, especially when the climate becomes variable (Bradbear and Friel 2013, Cater and Lew 2018, Mohamed et al 2024). This adds to several other factors increasing food prices, such as oil price variability, speculations on globalized food markets, and increasing investments in land for food and energy production. Rendering staple foods unaffordable for the masses increases the sense of relative deprivation, arouses new and pre-existing grievances, and further provides a political trigger with a higher risk of protests, riots, and violent collective action (Bellemare 2015, Hendrix and Haggard 2015, Jones et al 2017, Ten Brink et al 2023). Evidence favoring such theories can be found in some research in Africa, revealing the complex relationship between climate change, rising food prices, and conflict (Sharma et al 2024). For example, the African food riots during 2007–2008 (Berazneva and Lee 2013) and the Arab Spring (Maystadt et al 2014, Soffiantini 2020) have been considered partly as a consequence of price increases. Smith (2014) found that the probability of civil unrest rose with the increase in domestic food prices by using international food commodity prices and rainfall scarcity as instrumental variables. Raleigh et al (2015) suggested that rainfall exerts an indirect effect on conflict through its impact on food prices. Another example was food riots in countries like Mozambique and Egypt that were associated with high grain prices, following drought and its associated heat wave over Russia and severe flooding in Asia (Hunt et al 2021). Further studies have also identified the rise in food prices as a possible explanatory mechanism linking climate change and conflict, given the positive relationship between soaring food prices (caused by climate shocks) and social unrest (Bellemare 2015, Rudolfsen 2023). In summary, a considerable number of studies indicate that climate change’s adverse impacts on agricultural productivity and food security could increase intrastate violent conflict risks. Grievances about livelihood loss and higher food prices as well as reduced opportunity costs for joining insurgents, are key underlying mechanisms identified in the literature. Specific cases, such as the the riots in Mozambique and Africa, illustrate how climate-related agricultural challenges can catalyze conflict (Berazneva and Lee 2013). This causal mechanism is most likely to occur in poor, agriculturally dependent, and already food insecure countries.
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Schlenker and Roberts 2009 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Abstract and Results (page numbers not provided) link climate and weather to crop yields and agricultural output, including projected yield declines under warming. The Discussion mentions land values, not changes in arable land; the paper considers precipitation and irrigation but does not establish climate impacts on water resources. Those parts of the attributed claim are unsupported by this source. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Not checked yetcites Hsiang 2010 source
Checked before — its earlier verdict is held back until a new check runs.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Chen et al 2024 source
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
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Create a free account to see all 72 claims and to verify the 21 references still open.
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 9
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Citations
Cites
Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135231 · Cited by 3,915
Nonlinear temperature effects indicate severe damages to U.S. crop yields under climate change
Schlenker, W., & Roberts, M. J. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0906865106 · Cited by 3,420
Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic production
Burke, M., Hsiang, S. M., & Miguel, E. (2015) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature15725 · Cited by 2,913
Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/421174 · Cited by 2,460
Climate variation explains a third of global crop yield variability
Ray, D. K., Gerber, J. S., MacDonald, G. K., & West, P. C. (2015) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms6989 · Cited by 2,046
Quantifying the influence of climate on human conflict
Hsiang, S. M., Burke, M., & Miguel, E. (2013) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1235367 · Cited by 1,827
Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought
Kelley, C. P., Mohtadi, S., Cane, M. A., Seager, R., & Kushnir, Y. (2015) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1421533112 · Cited by 1,379
Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison
CEDERMAN, L.-E., WEIDMANN, N. B., & GLEDITSCH, K. S. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000207 · Cited by 1,028
Hsiang, S. M. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1009510107 · Cited by 992
Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa
Burke, M. B., Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., Dykema, J. A., & Lobell, D. B. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0907998106 · Cited by 985
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Dinc, 2024, Syrian farmers in the midst of drought and conflict: the causes, patterns, and aftermath of land abandonment and migration, Climate and Development, 16, 349, 10.1080/17565529.2023.2223600 · DOI · Paper page
- Nardulli, 2015, Climate change and civil unrest: the impact of rapid-onset disasters, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59, 310, 10.1177/0022002713503809 · DOI · Paper page
- Schon, 2023b, The need for willingness and opportunity: analyzing where and when environmental variability influences conflict in the Sahel, Population Environ., 45, 2, 10.1007/s11111-023-00413-8 · DOI · Paper page
Cited by
Ahmed, A., Rotich, B., & Czimber, K. (2025) · Climate · doi:10.3390/cli13030063 · Cited by 11
“This multi-source approach would enhance the accuracy of environmental monitoring and support more detailed analyses of vegetation–climate interactions in arid and semi-arid regions.”
Foglia, M., Plakandaras, V., Gupta, R., & Bouri, E. I. (2025) · International Review of Economics & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.iref.2025.104183 · Cited by 13
Maphosa, M., Effossou, K. A., & Moyo, P. (2025) · Frontiers in Sustainability · doi:10.3389/frsus.2025.1601933 · Cited by 5
A Comprehensive Framework for the Relationship Between Organized Violence and Climate Change
Michelini, S. (2025) · Geopolitics · doi:10.1080/14650045.2025.2556673 · Cited by 4
“It is well known that climate hazards (e.g., droughts, floods, extreme weather events) can increase the risk of organised violence (IPCC 2023; Koubi 2019; Nagano and Sekiyama 2023; Suleymanov 2024; von Uexkull and Buhaug 2021; Xie et al. 2024).”
Smallholder farmers’ adaptation at the climate–conflict nexus: a systematic review
Rubangakene, D., Oryema, C., & Nielsen, M. R. (2026) · Frontiers in Climate · doi:10.3389/fclim.2026.1699078 · Cited by 3
“While many studies have systematically reviewed the causal pathways between conflict and climate change (Sakaguchi et al., 2017; Scartozzi, 2021; Xie et al., 2024), these studies primarily focus on understanding how climate variability and extreme events may contribute to the onset or escalation of…”
Metadata
- Authors
- Xie, X., Hao, M., Ding, F., Scheffran, J., Ide, T., Maystadt, J.-F., Qian, Y., Wang, Q., Chen, S., Wu, J., Sun, K., Ma, T., & Jiang, D.
- Affiliations
- Guizhou Normal University (CN)
- Chinese Academy of Sciences (CN)
- Universität Hamburg (DE)
- Murdoch University (AU)
- Fund for Scientific Research (BE)
- University of Oxford (GB)
- University at Buffalo, State University of New York (US)
- Corresponding author
- Ding, Fangyu
- Jiang, Dong
- ORCID
- Venue
- Environmental Research Communications
- Publisher
- IOP Publishing
- Published
- 2024-11-01
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 112002
- ISSN
- 2515-7620 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC11555642
- OpenAlex
- W4403628547
- Cited by
- 25
- References
- 181
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 10
- FWCI
- 17.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (vor, 10 d)
- iopscience.iop.org/info/page/text-and-data-mining (tdm, 10 d)
- Locations
- Environmental Research Communications (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Murdoch University Research Portal (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B)) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Lancaster EPrints (Lancaster University) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Youth Innovation Promotion Association (2023000117)
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (42001238)
- The National Social Science Fund of China (2022-SKJJ-C-064)
- Wellcome Trust (220211)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Transboundary Water Resource Management
- Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law › Environmental and Biological Research in Conflict Zones
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Keywords
- climate change, violent conflict, conflict risk, temperature, precipitation, economic shocks, agricultural decline, natural resource competition, migration, social vulnerability, causal pathways
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The impacts of climate change on violent conflict risk: a review of causal pathways. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1088/2515-7620/ad8a21
- The paper
- Xie, X., Hao, M., Ding, F., Scheffran, J., Ide, T., Maystadt, J.-F., Qian, Y., Wang, Q., Chen, S., Wu, J., Sun, K., Ma, T., & Jiang, D. (2024). The impacts of climate change on violent conflict risk: a review of causal pathways. Environmental Research Communications. https://doi.org/10.1088/2515-7620/ad8a21
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
