The Bias Bias in Behavioral Economics
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Behavioral economics began with the intention of eliminating the psychological blind spot in rational choice theory and ended up portraying psychology as the study of irrationality. In its portrayal, people have systematic cognitive biases that are not only as persistent as visual illusions but also costly in real life—meaning that governmental paternalism is called upon to steer people with the help of “nudges.” These biases have since attained the status of truisms. In contrast, I show that such a view of human nature is tainted by a “bias bias,” the tendency to spot biases even when there are none. This may occur by failing to notice when small sample statistics differ from large sample statistics, mistaking people’s random error for systematic error, or confusing intelligent inferences with logical errors. Unknown to most economists, much of psychological research reveals a different portrayal, where people appear to have largely fine-tuned intuitions about chance, frequency, and framing. A systematic review of the literature shows little evidence that the alleged biases are potentially costly in terms of less health, wealth, or happiness. Getting rid of the bias bias is a precondition for psychology to play a positive role in economics.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 1×
“It also conflicts with contemporary cognitive scientists’ view of people’s conscious and unconscious cognitive processes as largely consistent with Bayesian statistics (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Chater et al., 2006) and with neuroscience research that speaks of the Bayesian brain (e.g., Friston, 2010).”
BackgroundExtensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Calibration of probabilities: the state of the art to 1980
Lichtenstein, S., Fischhoff, B., & Phillips, L. D. (1982) · Judgment under Uncertainty · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.023 · Cited by 1,967
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803321947001 · Cited by 1,874
Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence
Gigerenzer, G., Hoffrage, U., & Kleinbölting, H. (1991) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.98.4.506 · Cited by 1,506 · cited 4×
“In sum, by selectively using questions with “surprising” answers, researchers have mistaken intelligent inferences, as modeled by probabilistic mental models theory (Gigerenzer et al., 1991) for overconfidence bias.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe accuracy, fairness, and limits of predicting recidivism
Dressel, J., & Farid, H. (2018) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.aao5580 · Cited by 1,071
Simultaneous over- and underconfidence: the role of error in judgment processes
Erev, I., Wallsten, T. S., & Budescu, D. V. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.3.519 · Cited by 644
Will Democracy Survive Big Data and Artificial Intelligence?
Helbing, D., Frey, B. S., Gigerenzer, G., Hafen, E., Hagner, M., Hofstetter, Y., van den Hoven, J., Zicari, R. V., & Zwitter, A. (2019) · Towards Digital Enlightenment · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-90869-4_7 · Cited by 355
Self-citationJohnson, E. J., & Goldstein, D. (2003) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1091721 · Cited by 35
Cited by
Dorst, K. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3918498 · Cited by 108
“10E.g. Cohen 1981; Gigerenzer 1991, 2018; Krueger and Massey 2009; Stafford 2015, 2020; Whittlestone 2017; Rizzo and Whitman 2019; Mercier 2020; Cushman 2020.”
Satisficing: Integrating Two Traditions
Artinger, F. M., Gigerenzer, G., & Jacobs, P. (2022) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20201396 · Cited by 90
Self-citationMoving beyond disciplinary silos towards a transdisciplinary model of wellbeing: an invited review
Mead, J., Fisher, Z., & Kemp, A. H. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.642093 · Cited by 71
“An alternative approach involves “psychological boosting,” guided by a much more positive view of humanity described as “ecological rationality” in which non-rationality is viewed as an adaptive capacity to be valued (Gigerenzer, 2018; Hertwig et al., 2019; Fabian and Pykett, 2021).”
BackgroundGeneralization Bias in Science
Peters, U., Krauss, A., & Braganza, O. (2022) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.13188 · Cited by 63
“Many cognitive biases can be adaptive (Gigerenzer, 2018; Peters, 2022).”
BackgroundClassification in the Wild: The Science and Art of Transparent Decision Making
Katsikopoulos, K. V., Şimşek, Ö., Buckmann, M., & Gigerenzer, G. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/11790.001.0001 · Cited by 42
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Gigerenzer, G.
- Venue
- Review of Behavioral Economics
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2018-12-31
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 3-4
- Pages
- 303-336
- ISSN
- 2326-6198 (ISSN-L)
- 2326-6201
- OpenAlex
- W2906942504
- Cited by
- 210
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 10.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Bias Bias in Behavioral Economics. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1561/105.00000092
- The paper
- Gigerenzer, G. (2018). The Bias Bias in Behavioral Economics. Review of Behavioral Economics. https://doi.org/10.1561/105.00000092
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.