The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Governance And Earnings Management: A Survey Of Literature
Open accessAbstract
Corporate governance can reduce or even eliminate the extent of earnings management. Normally, an institutional environment that provides better legal protection can control managers self-interest to a certain extent. Takeover force can exert market pressure on managers to do the best for shareholders. Prior studies have investigated different corporate governance mechanisms that can have negative relationships with earnings management. Board independence can enhance certain monitoring behaviors in managers, including the misappropriation of assets. Female directors can develop trust leadership, which requires managers to share information, and are more likely to be risk-averse to frauds and opportunistic earnings management. An audit committee can oversee the internal control for financial reporting and the quality of financial information. Directors with financial expertise can provide incremental control effects on earnings management, especially in firms with weak corporate governance. This paper contributes to corporate governance by providing detailed reviews of different corporate governance mechanisms, reviewing the latest findings on classification shifting, and summarizing earnings management measures, including a new diagnostic system. In the future, this new diagnostic system may be investigated in different contexts.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · cited 5×
“However, this paper does not address the agency theory behind corporate governance mechanisms, as reviewed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).”
BackgroundInfluentialExit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.
Tullock, G., & Hirschman, A. O. (1970) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2325604 · Cited by 10,904
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848
Investor protection and equity markets
Shleifer, A., & Wolfenzon, D. (2002) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00149-6 · Cited by 1,077 · cited 1×
“Prior studies demonstrate that it is less likely for managers to divert earnings or assets when there is greater legal protection (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Nenova, 2003).”
BackgroundEvidence of Earnings Management from the Provision for Bad Debts
McNichols, M., & Wilson, G. P. (1988) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491176 · Cited by 919
Is there Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (1999) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556062 · Cited by 221 · cited 1×
“Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999a, 1999b, 2000) find similar results.”
Result
Cited by
Pucheta‐Martínez, M. C., & Gallego‐Álvarez, I. (2019) · Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management · doi:10.1002/csr.1707 · Cited by 270
Arhinful, R., & Radmehr, M. (2023) · Sage Open · doi:10.1177/21582440231204099 · Cited by 99
Metadata
- Authors
- Man, C.-K., & Wong, B.
- Venue
- Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR)
- Publisher
- Clute Institute
- Published
- 2013-02-13
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 391
- ISSN
- 0892-7626 (ISSN-L)
- 2157-8834
- OpenAlex
- W3121391682
- Cited by
- 183
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 26.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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