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Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fischbacher, U., G�chter, S., & Fehr, E.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2000
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2131338530
- Cited by
- 582
- References
- 70
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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