The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts?
Open accessAbstract
We investigate the effect of electoral rules and political regimes on fiscal policy outcomes in a sample of democracies, exploiting both cross country and time series variation in the data. Presidential regimes lead to smaller governments, while majoritarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs. Different constitutions are also associated with different spending patterns over time and different cyclical response to income shocks. Some of these empirical regularities are in line with recent theoretical work; others still await a theoretical explanation.
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Citations
Cites
Hsiao, C. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139839327 · Cited by 7,869
Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator: Evidence from evaluating a job training programme
Heckman, J. J., Ichimura, H., & Todd, P. E. (1997) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2971733 · Cited by 5,486
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.4.69 · Cited by 2,355
Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics
Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (1999) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(99)03004-7 · Cited by 1,628
Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., Tabellini, G., Malinvaud, E., & Pagano, M. (1991) · Economic Policy · doi:10.2307/1344630 · Cited by 1,585
Self-citationA Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (1990) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298021 · Cited by 1,568
Self-citation
Cited by
The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion
Fatas, A., & Mihov, I. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303322552838 · Cited by 766
Lizzeri, A., & Persico, N. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553041382175 · Cited by 757
Electoral Systems and Public Spending
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., Perotti, R., & Rostagno, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753650346 · Cited by 716
Endogenous Political Institutions
Aghion, P., Alesina, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553041382148 · Cited by 503
Current account balances, financial development and institutions: Assaying the world “saving glut”
Chinn, M. D., & Ito, H. (2007) · Journal of International Money and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jimonfin.2007.03.006 · Cited by 450
Metadata
- Authors
- Persson, T., & Tabellini, G.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1508392268
- Cited by
- 184
- References
- 7
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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