The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
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Cited by
Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts
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Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions
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Government intervention and investment efficiency: Evidence from China
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The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2007) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13608 · Cited by 892
Differences between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross‐Country Analysis
Faccio, M. (2010) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1755-053x.2010.01099.x · Cited by 763
Metadata
- Authors
- Mian, A. R., & Khwaja, A. I.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2119182646
- Cited by
- 375
- References
- 31
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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