The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
The Political Economy of the Resource Curse
Ross, M. L. (1999) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100008200 · Cited by 1,991
Skaperdas, S. (1996) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01213906 · Cited by 1,342
Evans, P., & Rauch, J. E. (1999) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2657374 · Cited by 1,232
Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia
Dube, O., & Vargas, J. F. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt009 · Cited by 1,187
The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action
Cooley, A., & Ron, J. (2002) · International Security · doi:10.1162/016228802320231217 · Cited by 996
Competition, Cooperation, and the Search for Economic Rents: A Syncretic Model
Lado, A. A., Boyd, N. G., & Hanlon, S. C. (1997) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259226 · Cited by 981
POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS*
Hillman, A. L., & Riley, J. G. (1989) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00003.x · Cited by 943
The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services
LAKE, D. A., & BAUM, M. A. (2001) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414001034006001 · Cited by 910
Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns
COOPER, M. J., GULEN, H., & OVTCHINNIKOV, A. V. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01548.x · Cited by 870
Svensson, J. (2000) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(99)00014-8 · Cited by 857
The all-pay auction with complete information
Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G. (1996) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01211819 · Cited by 812
TOLLISON, R. D. (1982) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1982.tb00174.x · Cited by 785
Self-citationPowerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War
Lake, D. A. (1992) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1964013 · Cited by 739
Evans, P. B. (1989) · Sociological Forum · doi:10.1007/bf01115064 · Cited by 735
Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?
Gibbons, R. (2005) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.010 · Cited by 690
The Economic Design of Sporting Contests
Szymanski, S. (2010) · The Comparative Economics of Sport · doi:10.1057/9780230274273_1 · Cited by 676
The New Institutionalism in Sociology
Scott, W. R., Brinton, M. C., & Nee, V. (1999) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2655306 · Cited by 619
Modelling rent-seeking contests
Nitzan, S. (1994) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/0176-2680(94)90061-2 · Cited by 611
Strategic Behavior in Contests
Dixit, A. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_30 · Cited by 597
Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success
Hirshleifer, J. (1989) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00153394 · Cited by 564
Esteban, J., & Ray, D. (1999) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2549 · Cited by 553
Power and political institutions
Moe, T. M. (2005) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592705050176 · Cited by 550
Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success
Hirshleifer, J. (2001) · Efficient Rent-Seeking · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3_11 · Cited by 523
Watershed Partnerships and the Emergence of Collective Action Institutions
Lubell, M., Schneider, M., Scholz, J. T., & Mete, M. (2002) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/3088419 · Cited by 514
The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries
Hodler, R. (2006) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.05.004 · Cited by 505
Hirshleifer, J. (1991) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00046.x · Cited by 505
Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction
Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_18 · Cited by 491
Environmental innovation and societal transitions: Introduction and overview
van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., Truffer, B., & Kallis, G. (2011) · Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions · doi:10.1016/j.eist.2011.04.010 · Cited by 483
Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, Democracy, and Trade
Sandholtz, W., & Koetzle, W. (2000) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00147 · Cited by 469
Huberman, B. A., Loch, C. H., & ÖNçüler, A. (2004) · Social Psychology Quarterly · doi:10.1177/019027250406700109 · Cited by 389
Firm-level responses to government regulation: Theoretical and research approaches
Shaffer, B. (1995) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1016/0149-2063(95)90017-9 · Cited by 382
Limited Access Orders In The Developing World :A New Approach To The Problems Of Development
North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., Webb, S. B., & Weingast, B. R. (2007) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-4359 · Cited by 372
(2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511488900 · Cited by 361
Estimating and Visualizing Conditional Densities
Hyndman, R. J., Bashtannyk, D. M., & Grunwald, G. K. (1996) · Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics · doi:10.1080/10618600.1996.10474715 · Cited by 357
Skaperdas, S., & Grofman, B. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2083074 · Cited by 354
Domain Maintenance as an Objective of Business Political Activity: An Expanded Typology
Baysinger, B. D. (1984) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258438 · Cited by 343
Reinhardt, F. (1999) · Journal of Industrial Ecology · doi:10.1162/108819899569368 · Cited by 336
The analytics of continuing conflict
Hirshleifer, J. (1988) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00869589 · Cited by 332
Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights
Sonin, K. (2003) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.005 · Cited by 325
The institutional economics of corruption and reform: theory, evidence, and policy
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-0389 · Cited by 320
How to Stabilize: Lessons from Post-Communist Countries
Aslund, A., Boone, P., Johnson, S., Fischer, S., & Ickes, B. W. (1996) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.2307/2534649 · Cited by 318
Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
Sheremeta, R. M. (2010) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.001 · Cited by 297
Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: How the Future Matters
Garfinkel, M. R., & Skaperdas, S. (2000) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002700044006005 · Cited by 275
Evans, P., & Rauch, J. (2006) · Journal of Economic Sociology · doi:10.17323/1726-3247-2006-1-38-60 · Cited by 270
Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study
Cason, T. N., Masters, W. A., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.006 · Cited by 257
Bad Loans to Good Friends: Money Politics and the Developmental State in South Korea
Kang, D. C. (2002) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081802753485179 · Cited by 256
Between Corruption and Development: The Political Economy of State Robbery in Nigeria
Agbiboa, D. E. (2012) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-011-1093-5 · Cited by 175
Sabotage in contests: a survey
Chowdhury, S. M., & Gürtler, O. (2015) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-015-0264-9 · Cited by 149
Rival definitions of economic rent: historical origins and normative implications
Stratford, B. (2023) · New Political Economy · doi:10.1080/13563467.2022.2109612 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- Keating, B., Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., & Tullock, G.
- Venue
- Southern Economic Journal
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1982-01
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 823
- ISSN
- 0038-4038 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1969872310
- Cited by
- 2,544
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 71.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.