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An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm

Hart, Oliver·1989·Columbia Law Review

DOI 10.2307/1122818

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“However, as pointed out by property rights theorists (see for example Hart (1989, 2011)) ex post property rights of many important, even crucial assets often reside with employees and outside parties – for example, unique knowledge and relationships – which in reality leaves the ex ante choice of…”
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“…is universally characterised by market-like transactions between instrumentally-motivated 7 This phrase is found throughout contract-based theories, including Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 311; Fama and Jensen, 1983: 322; Fama, 1980; Hart, 1989: 1763-5; Moore, 1992; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 777-8.”
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“Effective piracy requires team production, and team production requires 18 For surveys, see Hart (1989), Barzel (1997) and Williamson (2002). the monitoring of individual effort and the enforcement of a set of standards.”
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Authors: Hart, O.
Corresponding author: Hart, Oliver
ORCID: Hart, Oliver
Venue: Columbia Law Review
Publisher: JSTOR
Published: 1989-11
Volume: 89
Issue: 7
Pages: 1757
ISSN: 0010-1958 (ISSN-L)
DOI: 10.2307/1122818
OpenAlex: W1503687797
Cited by: 498
References: 1
Citations by year: 2026: 4 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 54 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 17
FWCI: 8.26
Type: journal article
Language: en
Open access: closed
Locations: Columbia Law Review (publishedVersion)
Topics: Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Legal and Constitutional Studies
Keywords: theory of the firm, firm economics

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