Intention, Act, and Outcome in Behavioral Prediction and Moral Judgment
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Abstract
at 3,4, and 5 years of age and 24 undergraduates were required to use information about intention under a normal causal system or a noncanonical one (e.g., hitting causes pleasure) to predict an agent's behavior. Additionally, they were asked to integrate intentions, acts, and outcomes to judge an act's acceptability and assign punishment. 3-year-olds performed poorly on behavioral prediction in the noncanonical condition. Most participants at all ages made categorical judg-ments of act acceptability based solely on outcome, although quantitative ratings reflected an age-related increase in sensitivity to intention information. When assigning punishment, many 3-year-olds used a simple intention or outcome rule, whereas older participants were more likely to use a conjunction rule (if outcome is negative and intention is negative then punish). Together, the results reveal both an early understanding of harm and changes in the complexity of the rules that children use to predict behavior and integrate information. A large body of researcb on social rea-soning has demonstrated that, by the pre-school years, children differentiate moral acts involving harm and unfairness from so-cial conventions, judging the former to be independent of external authority, punish-ment, and explicit sanctions (Nucci & Tu-
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“The interpretation we offer here is compatible with the significant developmental literature showing that young chil- dren's moral judgments are determined primarily by information about the outcomes of actions rather than the intentions of the actor (13, 16, 19).”
From The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment (2007) · cites this paper as [13]
In the citing paper
“When moral scenarios present con- flicting information about the outcome of an action and the intention of the actor, young children's moral judgments and justifications are determined by the action's outcome rather than the actor's intention (9–13).”
From The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment (2007) · cites this paper as [13]
In the citing paper
“What develops then is not just ''theory of mind,'' or the ability to represent the mental states of others, but the ability to integrate this information with information about consequences in the context of moral judgment (12, 13, 24, 25).”
From The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment (2007) · cites this paper as [13]
In the citing paper
“Understanding the intentions of another person reflects a core aspect of moral judgment (Killen & Smetana, 2008; Turiel, 2006; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996) and theory of mind (Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989; Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Liu, 2004; Woodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001).”
From The accidental transgressor: Morally-relevant theory of mind (2011) · cites this paper as Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996
In the citing paper
“one of the most frequent source of interpersonal conflicts among children has to do with the misattribution of intentions (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Zelazo, et al., 1996).”
From The accidental transgressor: Morally-relevant theory of mind (2011) · cites this paper as Zelazo, et al., 1996
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Cited by
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
Cushman, F. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006 · Cited by 990
The development of aggressive behaviour during childhood: What have we learned in the past century?
Tremblay, R. E. (2000) · International Journal of Behavioral Development · doi:10.1080/016502500383232 · Cited by 842
The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment
Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Saxe, R. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0701408104 · Cited by 625
The contribution of emotion and cognition to moral sensitivity: A neurodevelopmental study
Decety, J., Michalska, K. J., & Kinzler, K. D. (2012) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhr111 · Cited by 482
The accidental transgressor: Morally-relevant theory of mind
Killen, M., Mulvey, K. L., Richardson, C., Jampol, N., & Woodward, A. (2011) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.006 · Cited by 384
Metadata
- Authors
- Zelazo, P. D., Helwig, C. C., & Lau, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Toronto (CA)
- Venue
- Child Development
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1996-10
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 2478
- ISSN
- 0009-3920 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2041649970
- Cited by
- 257
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 19
- FWCI
- 0.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Child Development (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
- Keywords
- intention, ACT, outcomes, moral judgment, behavior prediction, punishment, harm, moral reasoning development, children's moral judgment, social reasoning
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