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Cited by 384Child and Animal Learning DevelopmentPsychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentEmotions and Moral Behavior

The accidental transgressor: Morally-relevant theory of mind

Open access
Killen, Melanie, Mulvey, Kelly Lynn, Richardson, Cameron, Jampol, Noah, Woodward, Amanda·2011·Cognition
DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.006PMC PMC4142201
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Abstract

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered 3 tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

In two experiments, children’s false-belief theory of mind was related to morally relevant judgments: children who failed false-belief ToM attributed more negative intentions to an accidental transgressor and endorsed more punishment, while those who passed distinguished intentions from outcomes. Embedding false belief in a moral context made the transgressor false-contents question harder than a prototypic false-belief task.

Key findings

  • Children who did not pass false-belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to the accidental transgressor and to use moral reasons when blaming him/her. In the MoToM task, children who passed false belief judged the actor’s intentions as more all right (M = 2.72) than they evaluated the act (M = 1.71), whereas children who failed did not differ (M = 1.56 vs. M = 1.50), F(1,150) = 10.63, p < .01.
  • The morally relevant false-contents task was harder than the prototypic false-contents task: more participants failed the MoToM false-contents task and succeeded on the prototypic task, χ²(1, N = 37) = 11.92, p < .01. Location-change false belief was equally difficult in both contexts.
  • In Experiment 2, children who passed MoToM false belief viewed punishment as less acceptable (M = .73) than children who did not pass (M = 1.61), F(1,31) = 7.862, p < .01. Children who passed also differentiated punishment acceptability between the moral transgression (M = 1.91) and MoToM (M = .69) scenarios, while children who failed did not.
  • All participants viewed the prototypic moral transgression as wrong (M = 1.26), and older participants viewed it as more wrong than younger groups, F(2,154) = 7.35, p < .01.

Methods

  • Experiment 1 included N = 162 children at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age in a within-participants design with fixed task order. Tasks were a prototypic moral transgression (pushing someone off a swing), prototypic false-belief ToM tasks (false contents and location change), and a morally relevant theory-of-mind task (MoToM) in which a classroom helper throws away a paper bag containing another child’s cupcake.
  • Experiment 2 included N = 46 children in the same three age groups and repeated the tasks with an added punishment-acceptability question.
  • Analyses used ANOVAs with repeated measures, chi-square tests, and age as a covariate where noted; justifications were coded into harm, negligence, and lack of negative intent categories, with inter-rater reliability Cohen’s κ = .85.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the verbal protocol did not allow assessment of nonlinguistic participants and that nonverbal or spontaneous-response paradigms are needed. It also notes that the oldest participants still evaluated the accidental transgression as wrong, suggesting further work with older children and adults is warranted.
  • The paper notes a possible fixed-order carry-over effect, in which participants may have anticipated positive intentions after receiving a scenario with explicit positive intentions.
  • Evident from the text: Experiment 2 had a small sample (N = 46), and both experiments drew from suburbs of a large Mid-Atlantic city in preschools and elementary schools serving a middle- to low-income population, limiting generalizability.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.006

Cites

65 of 65 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

0 of 51 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingown data

    Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM.

    “Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data

    In Experiment 2, children who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM.

    “In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data

    Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM.

    “Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data

    Location False Belief task performance increased significantly with age.

    “for Location False Belief, F (2,157) = 45.97, p < .001, η2 = .36, (Myoungest =.25, SD =.43; Mmiddle = .74, SD =.44; Moldest = .97, SD =.16).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Findingown data

    Use of harm justifications for intentions decreased with age.

    “Follow-up tests indicated that the use of harm justifications decreased with age, with half of the youngest participants using harm reasons (M = .49, SD = .05), less than half of the middle group (M = .23, SD = .05) and virtually none of the oldest group using harm reasons (M = .03, SD = .06).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims. 51
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 20
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The youngest age group judged the intentions of the actor and evaluated the act negatively with no difference.

    “As shown in Figure 1, the youngest age group judged the intentions of the actor (M = 1.62, SD = .13) and evaluated the act (M = 1.45, SD = .13) negatively (no difference).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Initial analyses revealed no significant effects for gender, thus gender was not included in further analyses.

    “Initial analyses revealed no significant effects for gender, thus gender was not included in further analyses.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Prototypic false belief ToM performance increased significantly with age across 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years, with less than a quarter of the youngest children passing and the vast majority of the older children fully passing the two tasks.

    “As expected, there were significant changes for age, with less than a quarter of the youngest children passing the test, and the vast majority of the older children fully passing the two tasks, F (2,141) = 40.63, p < .001, η2 = .36 (Myoungest = .24, SD =.43; Mmiddle = .73, SD =.46; Moldest = .97, SD =.16).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    For both MoToM tasks, all age groups were significantly different in pass rates.

    “Follow-up tests revealed all groups were significantly different, ps <.01.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    For own evaluations of the accidental transgressor's act, most participants used harm reasons, about a quarter used 'no negative intent,' and a minority cited negligence.

    “with most participants using harm reasons (M = .40, SD = .04), about a quarter of participants using “no negative intent” (M =.25, SD = .03) and a minority of participants cited negligence (M = .11, SD = .02) for their evaluation of the accidental transgressor’s act.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    More participants failed the MoToM False Contents task and succeeded on the prototypic False Contents task.

    “As expected, more participants failed the MoToM False Contents task and succeeded on the prototypic False Contents task, χ2 (1, N = 37) = 11.92, p < .01.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    Less than 5% of the participants used two codes.

    “Less than 5% of the participants used two codes.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Participants attributed positive intentions to the accidental transgressor but evaluated the act itself more negatively.

    “A main effect was found for Accidental Transgression, F (1,150) = 35.63, p < .001, η2 = .19, revealing that participants attributed positive intentions to the accidental transgressor (M = 2.26, SD = .08), but evaluated the act itself more negatively (M = 1.63, SD = .08).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    While all children evaluated the act as wrong, younger children evaluated the act as more wrong than did older children.

    “While all children evaluated the act as wrong, younger children evaluated the act as more wrong than did older children.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    There were interaction effects for false belief ToM by Prototypic Transgression and age by Prototypic Transgression.

    “Interaction effects were found for false belief ToM (pass, fail) by Prototypic Transgression (Intentions of the Actor, Evaluations of the Act), F (1,150) = 4.56, p < .05, η2 =.03, as well as for age by Prototypic Transgression, F (2,150) = 4.16, p < .05, η2 = .05.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The middle group evaluated an accidental transgression as wrong but recognized that the target did not have negative intentions.

    “The middle group evaluated an accidental transgression as wrong but recognized that the target did not have negative intentions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The middle and oldest group, who had false belief theory of mind competence, differentiated the intentions of the 'transgressor' (viewing them positively) from the transgressor's act (viewing it as bad), but still maintained that the act itself was bad.

    “the middle and oldest group, who had false belief theory of mind competence, differentiated the intentions of the “transgressor” (“he didn’t mean to throw it away”), viewing the intentions positively, from the transgressor’s act (“it was a bad thing to do”), but still maintained that the act itself was bad.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    While all children viewed pushing someone off a swing as wrong, only the older children coordinated their evaluations of the act with their attributions of intentions for the accidental transgressor in the MoToM task.

    “While all children viewed pushing someone off a swing as wrong, only the older children coordinated their evaluations of the act with their attributions of intentions for the accidental transgressor in the MoToM task.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    References to harm decreased with age for both attributing intentions of the actor as well as evaluating the act.

    “References to harm decreased with age for both attributing intentions of the actor as well as evaluating the act.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In the prototypic moral transgression scenario, no significant differences were found for intentions of the actor or evaluation of the act in relation to punishment acceptability.

    “Unlike in the MoToM scenario, no significant differences were found for intentions of the actor (all right: M = 1.75, SD = .45, not all right: M = 1.95, SD = .23) or evaluation of the act (all right: M = 1.87, SD = .35, not all right: M = 2.00, SD = .00).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    For evaluations of the transgressor's act in prototypic condition, majority used harm reasons and very few referenced negligence or 'no negative intent.'

    “A main effect for justifications was found, F (2,316) = 248.81, p < .001, η2 =.61, with the majority of participants using harm reasons (M = .63, SD = .04) and very few participants referencing negligence (M = .01, SD = .00) or “no negative intent” (M = .02, SD = .01).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Participants who passed false belief ToM judged the transgressor's intentions as significantly more all right than they evaluated the act to be all right, whereas participants who did not pass judged intentions and act similarly not all right.

    “participants who passed false belief ToM judged the transgressor’s intentions as significantly more all right (M = 2.13, SD = .11) than participants evaluated the act to be all right (M = 1.28, SD =.09), p < .001, whereas participants who did not pass false belief ToM judged that the transgressor’s intentions (M = 1.48, SD = .16) and the act itself were similarly not all right (M = 1.23, SD = .07)”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In Experiment 2, participants who passed false belief in a MoToM scenario judged that it was more acceptable to punish a transgressor in the moral transgression scenario than in the MoToM scenario, whereas participants who did not pass false belief in a MoToM scenario did not differentiate between the scenarios.

    “Further, in Experiment 2, participants who passed false belief in a MoToM scenario judged that it was more acceptable to punish a transgressor in the moral transgression scenario than in the MoToM scenario, whereas participants who did not pass false belief in a MoToM scenario did not differentiate between the scenarios”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingnone given

    While children did not refer to negligence when discussing the actor's intentions, with age, a minority of children referred to negligence when evaluating the act itself.

    “While children did not refer to negligence when discussing the actor’s intentions, with age, a minority of children referred to negligence when evaluating the act itself.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The vast majority of participants who did not pass false belief in a MoToM scenario justified punishment acceptability using harm reasons, while only a minority of participants who passed false belief used harm reasons.

    “As expected, the vast majority of participants who did not pass false belief in a MoToM scenario justified punishment acceptability using harm reasons (M =.73, SD = .12) while only a minority of participants who passed false belief in a MoToM scenario used harm reasons (M = .30, SD = .09).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In the present study, children with false belief theory of mind competence differentiated punishment acceptability in the MoToM condition while those without false belief theory of mind did not.

    “Despite this, in the present study, children with false belief theory of mind competence differentiated punishment acceptability in the MoToM condition while those without false belief theory of mind did not”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Virtually all participants felt that the victim would feel bad about being pushed off the swing and would feel bad about the transgressor in the Prototypic moral transgression.

    “Virtually all participants felt that the victim would feel bad about being pushed off the swing (who passed false belief ToM, M = 1.00, SD = .01; who did not pass false belief ToM, M =.96, SD = .04) and would feel bad about the transgressor (who did not pass false belief ToM, M = 1.34, SD = .08; who passed false belief ToM, M = 1.31, SD = .06).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Children found it challenging to identify a protagonist's false belief when it led to a moral violation, and more so than when it pertained to action predictions made outside of the moral context.

    “Most centrally, children found it challenging to identify a protagonist’s false belief when it led to a moral violation, and more so than when it pertained to action predictions made outside of the moral context.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Harm justifications were used most often for Prototypic Transgressor's intentions, with no use of negligence and almost no use of 'no negative intent.'

    “A main effect for Justifications was found, F (2, 314) = 104.84, p < .001, η2 =.40, indicating that harm justifications were used most often (M = .53, SD = .04), with no use of negligence (M = .00), and almost no use of “no negative intent” (M = .09, SD = .02).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The results replicated previous studies on children's evaluations of acts of harm towards another ('It's wrong'), with age, children expected that the transgressor thought what he/she was doing was not wrong.

    “While the results replicated previous studies on children’s evaluations of acts of harm towards another (“It’s wrong”), with age, children expected that the transgressor thought what he/she was doing was not wrong.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingreasoning

    While in MoToM condition references to harm decreased with age for evaluation of act, in Prototypic condition references to harm increased with age.

    “As shown in Table 1, while in the MoToM condition references to harm decreased with age for the evaluation of the act, in the Prototypic condition, references to harm increased with age (see Table 1).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data

    False belief ToM abilities were related to evaluations of the Prototypic Transgression above and beyond age.

    “An interaction effect was found, indicating differences in judgment between intentions and evaluation of the act, by false belief competence F (1,138) = 9.27, p < .01, η2 = .06.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Our oldest participants evaluated the accidental transgression as wrong, though they did advocate for less punishment than did younger children.

    “Additionally, our oldest participants evaluated the accidental transgression as wrong, though they did advocate for less punishment than did younger children.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    There was an increase in speculating that the transgressor meant to do something positive and this was related to false belief ToM competence.

    “Thus, there was an increase in speculating that the transgressor meant to do something positive and this was related to false belief ToM competence.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Research on children's theory of mind has documented the emergence of increasingly robust reasoning about others' mental states during early childhood.

    “several decades of research on children’s “theory of mind” has documented the emergence of increasingly robust reasoning about others’ mental states during the same time period (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006; Perner, et al., 1989; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001)”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Carpendale & Lewis, 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Perner, et al., 1989 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Understanding the intentions of another person reflects a core aspect of moral judgment and theory of mind.

    “Understanding the intentions of another person reflects a core aspect of moral judgment (Killen & Smetana, 2008; Turiel, 2006; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996) and theory of mind (Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989; Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Liu, 2004; Woodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Killen & Smetana, 2008

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Turiel, 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The measure identified by Smetana (2006) for assessing moral judgment, in which children provide social reasons for what makes an act wrong from a moral viewpoint, has extensive empirical validation and cross-cultural generalizability.

    “This measure, which has served as a prototypic moral judgment assessment given its extensive empirical validation (Helwig, 1990; Killen, 2007; Nucci, 2001; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1998, 2008), derives from social domain theory (Turiel, 2006), and has been replicated in many countries, with cross-cultural generalizability”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Smetana, 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Helwig, 1990 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Killen, 2007 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    When preschoolers are told that 'child X called child Y a name' children evaluate the act as 'a game' when it's between two friends and as 'acting mean' when it is between two children who are not friends.

    “when preschoolers are told that “child X called child Y a name” children evaluate the act as “a game” when it’s between two friends and as “acting mean” when it is between two children who are not friends (Slomkowski & Killen, 1992).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Slomkowski & Killen, 1992

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductown data

    The warm-up Likert scale was deemed to be a valid assessment tool, as assessed by the participants' consistency between their verbal response to the questions posed and the point on the scale which they indicated best represented their verbal response.

    “The scale was deemed to be a valid assessment tool, as assessed by the participants’ consistency between their verbal response to the questions posed and the point on the scale which they indicated best represented their verbal response.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductown data

    Participants who failed the memory check were excluded from analyses; 15% of the participants were excluded due to memory check failures, all in the youngest age group (3-4 year olds).

    “participants who failed the memory check were excluded from analyses; 15% of the participants were excluded due to the memory check failures (all of these children were in the youngest age group; 3 – 4 year olds).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    The false belief task assesses children's ability to use a person's belief state to predict his or subsequent actions when those beliefs differ from reality and from the child's own knowledge.

    “This task assesses children’s ability to use a person’s belief state to predict his or subsequent actions when those beliefs differ from reality and from the child’s own knowledge.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Wimmer & Perner, 1983

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Most developmental studies to date have used only one assessment for a single scenario, with some studies focused on children's affective responses towards the target and other studies on children's assignment of blame or punishment.

    “Most developmental studies, to date, have used only one assessment for a single scenario, with some studies focused on children’s affective responses towards the target and other studies on children’s assignment of blame or punishment.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductnone given

    The coding was conducted by two coders blind to the hypotheses of the study.

    “The coding was conducted by two coders blind to the hypotheses of the study.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Existing research has demonstrated that young children distinguish between intentions and outcomes.

    “while existing research has demonstrated that young children distinguish between intentions and outcomes”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Prior theory of mind research has not probed children's reasons for their answers.

    “Prior theory of mind research has not probed children’s reasons for their answers.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In the prototypic false belief task, socially meaningful motives are rarely ascribed to the person who transfers the object; yet it is in ongoing peer interactions that theory of mind competence is both applied and developed.

    “In the prototypic false belief task, socially meaningful motives are rarely ascribed to the person who transfers the object; yet it is in ongoing peer interactions that theory of mind competence is both applied and developed (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Carpendale & Lewis, 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Young children think about the motives of others, assign blame when acts are intentional, and, at times, interpret intentionality from a moral perspective.

    “young children think about the motives of others, assign blame when acts are intentional, and, at times, interpret intentionality from a moral perspective.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    References to the transgressor's negligence increased with age, indicating that the oldest children recognized the lack of negative intent while simultaneously condemning the actor.

    “Finally, and similar to the findings for “no negative intent” justifications, references to the transgressor’s negligence increased with age, indicating that the oldest children recognized the lack of negative intent while simultaneously condemning the actor.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    MoToM False Contents, which involved understanding the false belief of the transgressor, was more difficult than false belief ToM False Contents, whereas Location Change was equally difficult in both contexts.

    “Thus, MoToM False Contents, which involved understanding the false belief of the transgressor, was more difficult than false belief ToM False Contents, whereas Location Change was equally difficult in both contexts.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    With age, harm justifications decreased, indicating participants did not evaluate the accidental transgressor's act as a moral violation; instead, with age, participants justified answers by referring to 'no negative intent.'

    “As predicted, with age, harm justifications decreased, indicating that participants did not evaluate the accidental transgressor’s act as a moral violation; instead, with age, participants justified their answers by referring to “no negative intent.””
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    With age, children were able to recognize the accidental nature of the transgression, but evaluated the act itself as negative.

    “Thus, with age, children were able to recognize the accidental nature of the transgression, but evaluated the act itself as negative.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    Moral judgments often influence how individuals coordinate perspectives; attributions of blame or wrongdoing can determine how an individual takes perspectives of others, and the data in the present study provide support for this directionality of influence in young children.

    “In fact, moral judgments often influence how it is that we do or do not coordinate perspectives, that is, attributions of blame or wrongdoing can determine how an individual takes perspectives of others, and the data in the present study provide support for this directionality of influence in young children.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    These findings shed light on moral judgment findings and reveal the process by which children begin to connect acts and consequences, a central aspect of moral evaluations.

    “As well, these findings shed light on moral judgment findings and reveal the process by which children begin to connect acts and consequences, a central aspect of moral evaluations (Killen & Smetana, 2008; Killen & Smetana, 2006).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Killen & Smetana, 2008

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Killen & Smetana, 2006

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Past work suggests that participants' evaluations of a transgressor's actions provide a different measure of intent than ratings of the acceptability of punishment for those actions.

    “Past work (Zelazo, et al., 1996) suggests that participants’ evaluations of a transgressor’s actions provide a different measure of intent than ratings of the acceptability of punishment for those actions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Zelazo, et al., 1996 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    While young children at 3.5 years attributed negative intentions to an accidental transgressor, it was not until 7.5 years, 2.5 years beyond the canonical '5 year old' false belief knowledge marker, that children attributed positive intentions to the actor.

    “Thus, while young children at 3.5 years of age attributed negative intentions to an “accidental transgressor,” it was not until 7.5 years, 2.5 years beyond the canonical “5 year old” false belief knowledge marker, that children attributed positive intentions to the actor, that is, that the actor did not mean to throw away a desired object belonging to another child in the classroom.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    This is likely because children acquired false belief theory of mind with age and were thus better able to recognize the positive intentions of the transgressor, with age, in the MoToM condition; as they recognized the positive intentions in the MoToM condition, their references to harm decreased.

    “This is likely because children acquired false belief theory of mind with age and were thus better able to recognize the positive intentions of the transgressor, with age, in the MoToM condition. As they recognized the positive intentions in the MoToM condition, their references to harm decreased.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    Their negative evaluation of the act may have focused on the transgressor's negligence and that this focus was distinct from their moral evaluation of the transgressor's intention.

    “providing an indication that their negative evaluation of the act may have focused on the transgressor’s negligence and that this focus was distinct from their moral evaluation of the transgressor’s intention.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Zelazo et al. (1996) showed that punishment acceptability is influenced by intention judgments; with age, participants were more punitive when an actor intended to and succeeded in harming a victim than when the transgressor's intentions were positive.

    “Zelazo, et al. (1996) showed that punishment acceptability is influenced by intention judgments. More specifically, with age, participants were more punitive when an actor intended to and succeeded in harming a victim than when the “transgressor’s” intentions were positive.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Zelazo, et al. (1996) source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    While some participants judged that the transgressor in a prototypic moral transgression scenario might have had positive intentions they still believed that this transgressor should be punished for the transgression.

    “Thus, while some participants judged that the transgressor in a prototypic moral transgression scenario might have had positive intentions they still believed that this transgressor should be punished for the transgression.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    If the outcome of an action is negative then individuals are more likely to assume that the action was done intentionally; when the outcome of an action is positive then individuals are more likely to assume that the motive behind the action was neutral.

    “If the outcome of an action is negative then individuals are more likely to assume that the action was done intentionally; when the outcome of an action is positive then individuals are more likely to assume that the motive behind the action was neutral.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Research in social psychology has shown that stereotyping increases in ambiguous situations, and research in developmental psychology has shown that attributions of intentions based on group membership are revealed in interracial peer encounters in which the intentions of the potential perpetrator are ambiguous.

    “Research in social psychology, for example, has shown that stereotyping increases in ambiguous situations (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004), and research in developmental psychology has shown that attributions of intentions based on group membership are revealed in interracial peer encounters in which the intentions of the potential perpetrator are ambiguous (Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, 2010).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Killen, Kelly, Richardson, & Jampol, 2010

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Adults have been shown to consider negligence in action, as have children.

    “Adults have been shown to consider negligence in action (Finkel & Groscup, 1997; Shultz & Wright, 1985), as have children (M. J. Chandler, et al., 2001; Siegal & Peterson, 1998).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Finkel & Groscup, 1997

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Shultz & Wright, 1985

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites M. J. Chandler, et al., 2001

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    RTPJ activity may indeed become more specialized with development, thus enabling the child to more thoroughly integrate different actors' intentions when evaluating morally relevant scenarios.

    “RTPJ activity may indeed become more specialized with development, thus enabling the child to more thoroughly integrate different actors’ intentions when evaluating morally relevant scenarios (Saxe, et al., 2009).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Saxe, et al., 2009 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The ability to focus on intentions is potentially contingent on activation in the Right Temporo-Parietal Junction (RTPJ).

    “As Saxe and her colleagues have demonstrated, in the neuroscience area, the ability to focus on intentions is potentially contingent on activation in the Right Temporo-Parietal Junction (RTPJ) (L. Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010; L. Young, et al., 2007).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites L. Young, et al., 2010 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites L. Young, et al., 2007 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Individuals use information about the outcome of actions to make judgments about intentions.

    “Essentially, the researchers have shown that individuals use information about the outcome of actions to make judgments about intentions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Applying false belief theory of mind knowledge to situations with morally relevant information is complex, and children's ability to figure this out may have important implications for their social relationships and positive peer interactions.

    “We demonstrated that applying false belief theory of mind knowledge to situations with morally relevant information is complex, and children’s ability to figure this out may have important implications for their social relationships and positive peer interactions, both of which are central to the acquisition of social knowledge and social cognition throughout development.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisenone given

    This proposition is different from the traditional view which is that theory of mind is necessary for making a moral judgment.

    “This proposition is different from the traditional view which is that theory of mind is necessary for making a moral judgment.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Research testing false belief knowledge and helping behavior has revealed that children as young as 15 months old are able to apply false belief understanding to social situations.

    “Research testing false belief knowledge and helping behavior has revealed that children as young as 15 months old are able to apply false belief understanding to social situations (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Leslie, Knobe and colleagues have conducted research on the Side Effect Effect, which suggests that moral judgment may influence theory of mind in important ways.

    “Leslie, Knobe and colleagues have conducted research on the Side Effect Effect, which suggests that moral judgment may influence theory of mind in important ways (Knobe, 2005; Leslie, et al., 2006; Pettit & Knobe, 2009).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Knobe, 2005 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Leslie, et al., 2006 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Pettit & Knobe, 2009

      Not checked in the free run.

64 of 64

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Children's responses to the hypothetical vignettes reflect their moral judgments in daily peer interactions.

    “Most situations confronted by children in their daily lives involve the simultaneous activation of these forms of knowledge. Children’s theory of mind competence and moral understanding are called upon when making decisions on the playground and among peers in social situations.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Without an understanding of false belief, children should have difficulty with intent considerations.

    “Without an understanding of false belief, children should have difficulty with intent considerations.”
2 of 2

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Statistics recomputed

Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.

  • ConsistentF(2, 154) = 7.35reported p < .01 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (2,154) = 7.35, p < .01”

  • ConsistentF(2, 141) = 40.63reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (2,141) = 40.63, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(2, 157) = 32.02reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (2,157) = 32.02, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(2, 157) = 45.97reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (2,157) = 45.97, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(2, 154) = 34.81reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (2,154) = 34.81, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(2, 159) = 37.35reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (2,159) = 37.35, p < .001”

  • Consistentχ²(3) = 39.16reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “χ2 (3, N = 155) = 39.16, p < .001”

  • Consistentχ²(3) = 88.73reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “χ2 (3, N = 160) = 88.73, p < .001”

  • Consistentχ²(1) = 11.92reported p < .01 · recomputed p < .001

    “χ2 (1, N = 37) = 11.92, p < .01”

  • ConsistentF(1, 150) = 35.63reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (1,150) = 35.63, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(2, 150) = 4.05reported p < .05 · recomputed p = .019

    “F (2,150) = 4.05, p < .05”

  • ConsistentF(1, 150) = 10.63reported p < .01 · recomputed p = .001

    “F (1,150) = 10.63, p < .01”

  • ConsistentF(1, 152) = 7.99reported p < .01 · recomputed p = .005

    “F (1,152) = 7.99, p < .01”

  • ConsistentF(2, 318) = 62.84reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (2, 318) = 62.84, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(4, 318) = 26.21reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (4,318) = 26.21, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(2, 318) = 15.54reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (2, 318) = 15.54, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(4, 318) = 3.96reported p < .01 · recomputed p = .004

    “F (4,318) = 3.96, p < .01”

  • ConsistentF(1, 150) = 4.56reported p < .05 · recomputed p = .034

    “F (1,150) = 4.56, p < .05”

  • ConsistentF(2, 150) = 4.16reported p < .05 · recomputed p = .017

    “F (2,150) = 4.16, p < .05”

  • ConsistentF(1, 138) = 9.27reported p < .01 · recomputed p = .003

    “F (1,138) = 9.27, p < .01”

  • ConsistentF(2, 314) = 104.84reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (2, 314) = 104.84, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(2, 316) = 248.81reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “F (2,316) = 248.81, p < .001”

  • ConsistentF(1, 31) = 7.862reported p < .01 · recomputed p = .009

    “F (1, 31) = 7.862, p < .01”

  • ConsistentF(1, 27) = 4.75reported p < .05 · recomputed p = .038

    “F (1,27) = 4.75, p < .05”

  • ConsistentF(1, 34) = 5.91reported p < .05 · recomputed p = .020

    “F (1,34) = 5.91, p < .05”

  • ConsistentF(1, 43) = 8.75reported p < .01 · recomputed p = .005

    “F (1,43) = 8.75, p < .01”

  • ConsistentF(1, 43) = 8.3reported p < .01 · recomputed p = .006

    “F (1, 43) = 8.30, p < .01”

  • ConsistentF(1, 29) = 4.619reported p < .05 · recomputed p = .040

    “F (1, 29) = 4.619, p < .05”

28 of 28

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Overall no-negative-intent rate does not match age-group rates

    Major

    The three age-group rates for no-negative-intent justifications average .54, not the reported overall .25. The stated group sizes also do not suggest a weighting that would bring the overall rate near .25.

    Reported 0.25 · recomputed 0.543333

  • Overall harm-justification rate exceeds every age-group rate

    Major

    For justifications of the accidental transgressor's intentions, the reported overall harm rate is .54, but the three reported age-group rates are .49, .23, and .03. An overall rate cannot exceed every group's rate.

2 of 2

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Smetana, 1995, Morality in context: Abstractions, ambiguities, and applications, Vol. 10, 83
  2. Turiel, 1998, The development of morality, 5th ed., Vol. 3, 863

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Killen, M., Mulvey, K. L., Richardson, C., Jampol, N., & Woodward, A.
Affiliations
  • University of Maryland, College Park (US)
  • University of Chicago (US)
Corresponding author
Killen, Melanie
ORCID
Venue
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2011-05
Volume
119
Issue
2
Pages
197-215
ISSN
0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.006
PMC
PMC4142201
OpenAlex
W2129128322
Semantic Scholar
5238adce1239088b06e57a2e644147b80bd33521
Cited by
384
References
59
Citations by year
2026: 18 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 55 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 34 · 2015: 16 · 2014: 13 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 11
FWCI
30.52
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
Funders
Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (T32HD007542)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
Keywords
theory of mind, false belief understanding, moral transgression, moral judgment, intention attribution, blame, punishment, moral reasoning development, children
MeSH terms
Accidents, Child, Child, Preschool, Concept Formation, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Morals, Punishment, Reproducibility of Results, Crime Victims, Theory of Mind

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-10.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-10.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

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