The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?
Abstract
In Russia and elsewhere, proponents of rapid, mass privatization of state-owned enterprises (ourselves among them) hoped that the profit incentives unleashed by privatization would revive faltering, centrally planned economies. Instead, the Russian economy has shrunk steadily since 1991 and suffered a major collapse in 1998, which exposed deep structural flaws in the privatization effort. We offer here some partial explanations. First, rapid mass privatization of medium and large firms is likely to lead to massive self-dealing by managers and controlling shareholders unless (implausibly in the initial transition from central planning to markets) a country has a good infrastructure for controlling self-dealing. Russia accelerated the self-dealing process by selling control of many of its largest enterprises cheaply to crooks, who got the funds to buy the enterprises by skimming from the government, and transferred their skimming talents to the enterprises they acquired. Second, profit incentives to restructure privatized businesses and create new ones can be swamped by the burden on business imposed by a combination of (among other things) a punitive tax system, official corruption, organized crime, and an unfriendly bureaucracy. Third, while self-dealing will still occur (though perhaps to a lesser extent) if state enterprises aren’t privatized, since self-dealing accompanies privatization, it politically discredits privatization as a reform strategy and can undercut longer-term reform efforts. A principal lesson is that developing the infrastructure to control self-dealing is central to successful privatization of large firms -as important, and in the early stages, perhaps more important than privatization itself. Please address comments to: Professor Bernard Black Stanford Law School Stanford CA 94305 bblack@stanford.edu * We thank Kevin Covert, Richard Craswell, David Ellerman, Itzhak Goldberg, Dale Gray, Hugh Patton, Michael Klausner, Peter Murrell, John Nellis, Katarina Pistor, Andrei Shleifer, Alexander Yushkevich, and [to come], and participants in workshops at the American Law and Economics Association, an OECD Conference on Corporate Governance in Russia, an IMF Workshop on Comparative Corporate Governance in Developing and Transition Economies, Stanford Law School, and University of California Berkeley, Haas School of Business and [to come] for helpful discussions and comments. Special thanks to James Fenkner of Troika Dialog for the data on Russian market capitalization and comparable Western values for Russian companies reported in Part III of this article.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity
Schneider, P. A., & Fukuyama, F. (1996) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.2307/1251846 · Cited by 10,501
The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041464498 · Cited by 3,107
Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis
Johnson, S., Boone, P., Breach, A., & Friedman, E. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00069-6 · Cited by 1,853
From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization
Megginson, W. L., & Netter, J. M. (2001) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.39.2.321 · Cited by 434
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined
Black, B. S. (1990) · Michigan Law Review · doi:10.2307/1289384 · Cited by 409
Self-citationShare issue privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends
Jones, S. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00021-5 · Cited by 403
Winners and Losers in Russia's Economic Transition
Brainerd, E. (1998) · American Economic Review · Cited by 360
Gaddy, C. G., & Ickes, B. W. (2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.40-3522 · Cited by 329
What is Shock Therapy? What Did it Do in Poland and Russia?
Murrell, P. (1993) · Post-Soviet Affairs · doi:10.1080/1060586x.1993.10641362 · Cited by 297
Private Enforcement of Public Laws: a Theory of Legal Reform
Hay, J., & Shleifer, A. (1998) · American Economic Review · Cited by 231
Cited by
The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead
Williamson, O. E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.38.3.595 · Cited by 6,397
Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00642.x · Cited by 2,509
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth
Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., & Yeung, B. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205105774431252 · Cited by 1,863
The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics
Stiglitz, J. E. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555015 · Cited by 1,469
Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect
Berkowitz, D., Pistor, K., & Richard, J.-F. (2003) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00196-9 · Cited by 928
Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey
Djankov, S., & Murrell, P. (2002) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205102760273788 · Cited by 908
China's Long March toward Rule of Law
Peerenboom, R. (2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511493737 · Cited by 798
Corporate Governance and Control
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01005-7 · Cited by 795
Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment during the Reform Era
Pye, L. W., Huang, Y., & Wedeman, A. H. (2004) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20033878 · Cited by 675
A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption
Jong-sung, Y., & Khagram, S. (2005) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/000312240507000107 · Cited by 662
Finance and inequality: Channels and evidence
Claessens, S., & Perotti, E. (2007) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2007.07.002 · Cited by 604
Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2002) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8711 · Cited by 578
Economic growth in the 1990s: learning from a decade of reform
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-2318 · Cited by 462
From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization
Megginson, W. L., & Netter, J. M. (2001) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.39.2.321 · Cited by 434
The corporate governance behavior and market value of Russian firms
Black, B. (2001) · Emerging Markets Review · doi:10.1016/s1566-0141(01)00012-7 · Cited by 421
Self-citationChina׳s secondary privatization: Perspectives from the Split-Share Structure Reform
Liao, L., Liu, B., & Wang, H. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.05.007 · Cited by 415
The Political Economy of Transition
Roland, G. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330027102 · Cited by 409
The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?
Haggard, S., & Tiede, L. (2011) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.10.007 · Cited by 399
The Rule of Law and Economic Development
Haggard, S., MacIntyre, A., & Tiede, L. (2008) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.100244 · Cited by 365
After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies
Hoff, K., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041464533 · Cited by 358
Foundations of complexity economics
Arthur, W. B. (2021) · Nature Reviews Physics · doi:10.1038/s42254-020-00273-3 · Cited by 355
Brown, J. D., Earle, J. S., & Telegdy, Á. (2006) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/499547 · Cited by 326
Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2013) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.27.2.173 · Cited by 325
Egalitarianism and international investment
Siegel, J. I., Licht, A. N., & Schwartz, S. H. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.010 · Cited by 303
Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey
Djankov, S. D., & Murrell, P. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.238716 · Cited by 301
Corporate Governance and Development
Claessens, S. (2006) · The World Bank Research Observer · doi:10.1093/wbro/lkj004 · Cited by 299
Gerber, T. P., & Mendelson, S. E. (2008) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5893.2008.00333.x · Cited by 134
Metadata
- Authors
- Black, B., Kraakman, R., & Tarassova, A.
- Venue
- Stanford Law Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2000-07
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1731
- ISSN
- 0038-9765 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122596610
- Cited by
- 565
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 248.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.