Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
What is the mission of epistemology, and what is its proper methodology? Such meta-epistemological questions have been prominent in recent years, especially with the emergence ofvarious brands of naturalistic epistemology. In this paper, I shall reformulate and expand upon my own meta-epistemological conception (most fully articulated in Goldman, 1986), retaining many of its former ingredients while reconfiguring others. The discussion is by no means confined, though, to the meta-epistemological level. New substantive proposals will also be advanced and defended. Let us begin, however, at the meta-epistemological level, by asking what role should be played in epistemology by our ordinary epistemic concepts and principles. By some philosophers' lights, the sole mission of epistemology is to elucidate commonsense epistemic concepts and principles: concepts like knowledge, justification, and rationality, and prin-
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“The reader be warned: the term 'epistemic opacity' 21 does not actually have a univocal and well-defined meaning but refers to a multi-dimensional, plural and (epistemic) context-dependent problem”
From Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems (2024) · cites this paper as Goldman, 1993
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“Y, como he sugerido, la razón por la cual este rol es importante es que deberíamos evitar posiciones filosóficas que nos resultan ajenas (Goldman, 1992, p. 272; Pritchard, 2009, p. 4).20 Por lo tanto, dado que la filosofía surge de lo común y no puede perder conexión con ello, seguramente hay un…”
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“…exteriorizan cierto «conservadurismo categorial, lo que los lleva a éstos a mostrar una preferencia por aquellas estructuras “arraigadas” […] Como consecuencia de ello, tales individuos no complementan ni revisan a la ligera sus propios esquemas interpretativos» (Goldman, 1993, pp. 279-280).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Goldman, A. I.
- Corresponding author
- Goldman, Alvin I.
- ORCID
- Goldman, Alvin I.
- Venue
- Philosophical Issues
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993
- Volume
- 3
- Pages
- 271
- ISSN
- 1533-6077 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1569260870
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 22
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 15
- FWCI
- 7.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophical Issues (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Keywords
- meta-epistemology, naturalized epistemology, epistemic concepts, epistemic principles, knowledge, justification, rationality
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