Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
What is the mission of epistemology, and what is its proper methodology? Such meta-epistemological questions have been prominent in recent years, especially with the emergence ofvarious brands of naturalistic epistemology. In this paper, I shall reformulate and expand upon my own meta-epistemological conception (most fully articulated in Goldman, 1986), retaining many of its former ingredients while reconfiguring others. The discussion is by no means confined, though, to the meta-epistemological level. New substantive proposals will also be advanced and defended. Let us begin, however, at the meta-epistemological level, by asking what role should be played in epistemology by our ordinary epistemic concepts and principles. By some philosophers' lights, the sole mission of epistemology is to elucidate commonsense epistemic concepts and principles: concepts like knowledge, justification, and rationality, and prin-
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“The reader be warned: the term 'epistemic opacity' 21 does not actually have a univocal and well-defined meaning but refers to a multi-dimensional, plural and (epistemic) context-dependent problem”
From Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems (2024) · cites this paper as Goldman, 1993
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“Goldman argues that one “proper task of epistemology is to elucidate our epistemic folkways,” and that an adequate epistemology must “have its roots in the concepts and practices of the folk” (Goldman 1993: 271).”
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“If these roots are utterly rejected and abandoned, by what rights would the new discipline call itself “epistemology” at all?. (Goldman 1993, 272) And another take on the worry, from Frank Jackson: [I]f we give up too many of the properties common sense associates with belief as represented by the…”
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“…justification that closely parallel consequentialism in ethics will at best be highly revisionary, revisionary enough to 35See Berker (2013a-b), Fumerton (2001) and Firth (1981). fail the desideratum of continuity with ordinary attribution that Goldman (1993) imposes on ‘scientific’ epistemology.”
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“It should be noted that approved-list reliabilism was originally offered as an explanation of our attributions of justification to the subject, and not as an account of what the subject’s justification consists in [see Goldman (1993)].”
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“In addition, Sosa (1991, 2001, 2007), Goldman (1992) , and many others offer externalist definitions of the virtues.”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Goldman, A. I.
- Corresponding author
- Goldman, Alvin I.
- ORCID
- Goldman, Alvin I.
- Venue
- Philosophical Issues
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993
- Volume
- 3
- Pages
- 271
- ISSN
- 1533-6077 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1569260870
- Cited by
- 170
- References
- 22
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 15
- FWCI
- 7.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophical Issues (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Keywords
- meta-epistemology, naturalized epistemology, epistemic concepts, epistemic principles, knowledge, justification, rationality
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.