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A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight

Rachlinski, Jeffrey J. · 1998 · The University of Chicago Law Review

Abstract

Past events frequently seem inevitable and predictable after they unfold -- a tendency that cognitive psychologists have labeled the This bias affects judgments of liability in the legal system. For example, by making adverse outcomes seem more predictable (and hence avoidable) than they really were, defendants can be held liable for adverse outcomes that hey could not have foreseen. In effect, judgments of liability made under a negligence standard resemble those made under a standard of strict liability. Courts, however, have historically shown an awareness of the hindsight bias. When possible, courtshave developed methods of making judgments that avoid reliance on the hindsight bias. These adaptations include barring after-acquired information from the decision-making process and carefully enforcing any ex ante understanding about liability that parties may have had. When no such mechanisms are available, the courts choose sensibly among second-best solutions. The legal system is thus shown to incorporate and adapt to this limitation on human judgment.

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Metadata

Authors
Rachlinski, J. J.
Venue
The University of Chicago Law Review
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1998
Volume
65
Issue
2
Pages
571
ISSN
0041-9494 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3121354989
Cited by
222
References
0
FWCI
1.09
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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