Cited by 457Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsMemory Processes and InfluencesClinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills

Hindsight Bias

Roese, Neal J., Vohs, Kathleen D.·2012·Perspectives on Psychological Science

Abstract

Hindsight bias occurs when people feel that they “knew it all along,” that is, when they believe that an event is more predictable after it becomes known than it was before it became known. Hindsight bias embodies any combination of three aspects: memory distortion, beliefs about events’ objective likelihoods, or subjective beliefs about one’s own prediction abilities. Hindsight bias stems from (a) cognitive inputs (people selectively recall information consistent with what they now know to be true and engage in sensemaking to impose meaning on their own knowledge), (b) metacognitive inputs (the ease with which a past outcome is understood may be misattributed to its assumed prior likelihood), and (c) motivational inputs (people have a need to see the world as orderly and predictable and to avoid being blamed for problems). Consequences of hindsight bias include myopic attention to a single causal understanding of the past (to the neglect of other reasonable explanations) as well as general overconfidence in the certainty of one’s judgments. New technologies for visualizing and understanding data sets may have the unintended consequence of heightening hindsight bias, but an intervention that encourages people to consider alternative causal explanations for a given outcome can reduce hindsight bias.

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Crossref · 10.1177/1745691612454303

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  • Measures in accordance with (b) seem out of place because they introduce a concrete psychological aspect that sticks out from more technical and operational aspects, especially since automation bias is just one of many relevant biases, heuristics, and psychological phenomena.

    “Measures in accordance with (b), which are intended to maintain an awareness of the automation bias, seem out of place: it introduces a concrete psychological aspect that sticks out from the more technical and operational aspects outlined in the other provisions, especially considering that automation bias is just one of many relevant biases (e.g., hindsight bias, confidence bias [36, 66]), heuris”

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Authors
Roese, N. J., & Vohs, K. D.
Affiliations
  • Northwestern University (US)
  • University of Minnesota (US)
Venue
Perspectives on Psychological Science
Published
2012-09
Volume
7
Issue
5
Pages
411-426
ISSN
  • 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
  • 1745-6924
OpenAlex
W4211165067
Cited by
457
References
186
Citations by year
2026: 35 · 2025: 50 · 2024: 52 · 2023: 43 · 2022: 40 · 2021: 54 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 38 · 2017: 37 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 2
FWCI
9.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Perspectives on Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
Keywords
hindsight bias, memory distortion, perceived predictability, metacognition, overconfidence, causal explanation, sensemaking, alternative explanations, data visualization, bias reduction interventions

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