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Form and Substance in International Agreements
Abstract
International agreements exhibit a wide range of variation. Many are negotiated as legally binding agreements, while others are expressly nonbinding. Some contain substantive obligations requiring deep, demanding policy changes; others demand little or simply ratify the status quo ante. Some specify institutions to monitor and sanction noncompliance; others create no review structure at all. Thus, there is considerable variation both in the form of international agreements—in their legal bindingness, as well as in the range of structural provisions for monitoring and addressing noncompliance—and in the substantive obligations they impose. This variation in form and substance raises several fundamental questions about the role of international agreements in world politics.’ Why do states differentiate commitments into those which are legally binding and those which are not? What relationship exists between legality and the substantive provisions of an accord, and between legality and structural provisions for monitoring behavior? What is the relationship between substantive obligations and monitoring provisions? Finally, what difference, if any, do these choices make as to the effectiveness of an agreement?
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Metadata
- Authors
- Raustiala, K.
- Venue
- American Journal of International Law
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2005-07
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 581-614
- ISSN
- 0002-9300 (ISSN-L)
- 2161-7953
- OpenAlex
- W3123265095
- Cited by
- 352
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 87.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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