The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Auctions of Shares
Abstract
Unit and share auctions, 675.—Formulation, 676.—No proprietary information, 677.—Proprietary information, 680.—Discriminatory pricing, 686.—Vickrey auctions, 687.—Conclusion, 688.
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Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
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Metadata
- Authors
- Wilson, R.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1979-11
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 675
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2012176843
- Cited by
- 712
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 1.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.