The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Abstract
In Section 2, we review some important results of the received auction theory, introduce a new general auction model, and summarize the results of our analysis. Section 3 contains a formal statement of our model, and develops the properties of affiliated random variables. The various theorems are presented in Sections 4-8. In Section 9, we offer our views on the current state of auction theory. Following Section 9 is a technical appendix dealing with affiliated random variables.
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Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Cited by
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
Self-citationMultiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in Credit Markets
Hauswald, R., & Marquez, R. (2006) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhj021 · Cited by 766
On Product Uncertainty in Online Markets: Theory and Evidence1
Dimoka, A., Hong, Y., & Pavlou, P. A. (2012) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/41703461 · Cited by 682
Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet
Lucking-Reiley, D. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.5.1063 · Cited by 446
Metadata
- Authors
- Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1982-09
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1089
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1494498837
- Cited by
- 3,753
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 30.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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