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On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
Abstract
A basic problem in the theory of noncooperative games is the following: which Nash equilibria are strategically stable, i.e. self-enforcing, and does every game have a strategically stable equilibrium?We list three conditions which seem necessary for strategic stabilitybackwards induction, iterated dominance, and invariance-and define a set-valued equilibrium concept that satisfies all three of them.We prove that every game has at least one such equilibrium set.Also, we show that the departure from the usual notion of single-valued equilibrium is relatively minor, because the sets reduce to points in all generic games.
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Cites
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Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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EXTENSIVE GAMES AND THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION
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Cited by
Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt
Diamond, D. W. (1991) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261775 · Cited by 3,331
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261408 · Cited by 2,271
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
Metadata
- Authors
- Kohlberg, E., & Mertens, J.-F.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1986-09
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1003
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2130937741
- Cited by
- 1,397
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 43.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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