The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
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Citations
Cites
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Williamson, O. E. (1979) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466942 · Cited by 10,190
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. A. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466922 · Cited by 5,791
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.
Simon, H. A., Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1958) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2089260 · Cited by 1,944
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
Self-citationInvestment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach
Grout, P. A. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911498 · Cited by 945
Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.
Mann, I., Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1958) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2282062 · Cited by 777
Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants
(1985) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036889 · Cited by 704
The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts
Bull, C. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884685 · Cited by 649
Tirole, J. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261372 · Cited by 334
The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A SurveyPreprint
Maskin, E. S. (1983) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 218
The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand
Hall, R. E., & Lazear, E. P. (1984) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298032 · Cited by 212
Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract
Rogerson, W. P. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003668 · Cited by 196
The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach
Shavell, S. (1984) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885724 · Cited by 163
Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information and Bilateral Contracts
Riordan, M. H. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297706 · Cited by 46
Cited by
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
Self-citationFirms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Self-citationInsiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's‐Length Debt
RAJAN, R. G. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04662.x · Cited by 3,902
Discovery and creation: alternative theories of entrepreneurial action
Alvarez, S. A., & Barney, J. B. (2007) · Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal · doi:10.1002/sej.4 · Cited by 2,086
Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics
Callon, M. (1998) · The Sociological Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-954x.1998.tb03468.x · Cited by 1,809
Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, O., & Moore, J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1988-07
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 755
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2016995324
- Cited by
- 1,876
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 45.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.