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Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, O., & Moore, J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1988-07
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 755
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2016995324
- Cited by
- 1,876
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 45.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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