The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
Abstract
Recent developments in social theory are critically surveyed in the light of a categorization of interpersonal aggregation problems into four distinct types that seem to require varying treatment but typically do not receive it. Informational inadequacy of the usual social framework is discussed in this context. A fairly thorough exploration of the correspondences between consistency conditions for functions and regularity properties of the binary relation of preference leads to a re-examination of the class of impossibility results in social theory, necessitating reinterpretations of various theorems (including Arrow's). SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY is concerned with relationships between individuals' preferences and social choice (Fishburn (1973, p. 3)). But a great many problems fit this general description and they can be classified into types that are fundamentally different from each other. It can be argued that some of the difficulties in the general theory of social arise from a desire to fit essentially different classes of group aggregation problems into one uniform framework and from seeking excessive generality. An alternative is to classify these problems into a number of categories and to investigate the appropriate structure for each category. In a small way, this is what will be done in this paper, and some of the recent developments in the theory of social will be examined in that light.
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Citations
Cites
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Social Choice and Individual Values.
Shackle, G. L. S., & Arrow, K. J. (1951) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2549613 · Cited by 7,792
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On the measurement of inequality
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Justice as Fairness: A Restatement
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(2015) · Adversarial Risk Analysis · doi:10.1201/b18653-3 · Cited by 3,632
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
Gibbard, A. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914083 · Cited by 3,202
Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement
Sen, A. (1976) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912718 · Cited by 3,001
Self-citationThe Theory of Committees and Elections.
Stuart, A., & Black, D. (1959) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2550498 · Cited by 2,822
Cited by
Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation
Sen, A. (1983) · doi:10.1093/0198284632.001.0001 · Cited by 1,216
Self-citationHuman Development in Poor Countries: On the Role of Private Incomes and Public Services
Anand, S., & Ravallion, M. (1993) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.7.1.133 · Cited by 1,014
Some issues on consistency of fuzzy preference relations
Herrera-Viedma, E., Herrera, F., Chiclana, F., & Luque, M. (2004) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/s0377-2217(02)00725-7 · Cited by 1,000
Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice: The Capability Approach Re-Examined
Robeyns, I. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0130 · Cited by 994
Addressing a Theoretical Problem by Reorienting the Corporate Social Performance Model
Swanson, D. L. (1995) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258886 · Cited by 727
Sen, A. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198289286.001.0001 · Cited by 593
Self-citationCondorcet Social Choice Functions
Fishburn, P. C. (1977) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0133030 · Cited by 566
THE NORMATIVE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND PROVISION
CULYER, A. J. (1989) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/5.1.34 · Cited by 416
A Theory of Participation in Elections
Feddersen, T., & Sandroni, A. (2006) · The American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282806779468571 · Cited by 402
Issues in the Measurement of Poverty
Sen, A. (1979) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3439966 · Cited by 379
Self-citationBrouwer, W. B. F., Culyer, A. J., van Exel, N. J. A., & Rutten, F. F. H. (2008) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2007.07.003 · Cited by 333
Extended sympathy and the possibility of social choice
Arrow, K. J. (1978) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/bf02378811 · Cited by 327
Sen, A. (1976) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2553122 · Cited by 314
Self-citationCapabilities and Well-Being: Evidence Based on the Sen–Nussbaum Approach to Welfare
Anand, P., Hunter, G., & Smith, R. (2005) · Social Indicators Research · doi:10.1007/s11205-005-6518-z · Cited by 304
Miller, N. R. (1983) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1957271 · Cited by 286
Embedded Premium Promotion: Why It Works and How to Make It More Effective
Arora, N., & Henderson, T. (2007) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1060.0247 · Cited by 255
Metadata
- Authors
- Sen, A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1977-01
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 53
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2039760542
- Cited by
- 682
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 66.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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