The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives
Abstract
Lobbying efforts and campaign contributions from coalitions of groups are used to explain representatives' voting decisions within the U.S. House Ways and Means and Agriculture Committees. Information about which groups worked together on two controversial issues and which representatives they lobbied was obtained through personal interviews and a mail survey of professional lobbyists. The analysis reveals that committee-level voting, particularly in the Ways and Means Committee, is best explained by the total number of lobbying contacts representatives received from groups on each side of the issue. Campaign contributions proved somewhat useful for explaining groups' lobbying patterns; but it appears to be lobbying, not money, that shapes and reinforces representatives' policy decisions.
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Citations
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Cited by
Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?
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Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
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Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters
Baron, D. P. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944880 · Cited by 641
Metadata
- Authors
- Wright, J. R.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1990-06
- Volume
- 84
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 417-438
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2335549313
- Cited by
- 471
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 22.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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