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Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information
Abstract
The correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes is often affected by the existence of information asymmetries among electoral participants and the presence of individuals or groups who exercise some form of agenda control. While the effects of agenda control in political decision making are widely recognized, the effects of information asymmetries are not as well understood. Since information asymmetries are fundamental characteristics of most elections, a deep understanding of the correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes requires a serious consideration of the “effects” of information. I develop a generalizable agenda control model that takes as given the observation that most voters are not naturally inclined to invest in political information. The model allows me to provide a dynamic description of how voters and political elites can adapt to the information problems that characterize political decision making. It also allows me to demonstrate the effect of these adaptations on electoral outcomes.
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The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent
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A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics
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(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-2956 · Cited by 541
Metadata
- Authors
- Lupia, A.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1992-06
- Volume
- 86
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 390-403
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2317693262
- Cited by
- 311
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 11.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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