The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978–1986
Abstract
While the allocation of interest group monies to specific politicians has been extensively studied, little is known about the factors that determine of the overall level of political activity across groups. We study total contributions by corporate political action committees at the industry level. We create a large data set on industry political activity, covering 124 industries across five election cycles from 1978 to 1986 and sketch out a simple benefit-cost model to predict total corporate PAC contributions in each industry. The few previous studies of this phenomenon use relatively small samples and employ statistical techniques that are either biased or impose untested restrictions. The selectivity-corrected regression technique used here solves these problems. We find that industries with greater potential benefits from government assistance contribute systematically more but that the ability to realize these benefits is constrained by collective action problems facing firms in each industry.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Heckman, J. J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912352 · Cited by 28,779
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables
Tobin, J. (1958) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907382 · Cited by 6,996
(1976) · Annals of Economic and Social Measurement · Cited by 5,035
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
Cragg, J. G. (1971) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1909582 · Cited by 2,600
Gragg, J. (1971) · Econometrica · Cited by 1,645
Theories of Economic Regulation
Posner, R. (1974) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.3386/w0041 · Cited by 1,481
Theories of Economic Regulation
Posner, R. A. (1974) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.2307/3003113 · Cited by 1,151
Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees
Hall, R. L., & Wayman, F. W. (1990) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962767 · Cited by 932
Cited by
Corporate Political Activity: A Review and Research Agenda
Hillman, A. J., Keim, G. D., & Schuler, D. (2004) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1016/j.jm.2004.06.003 · Cited by 1,495
Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?
Ansolabehere, S., de Figueiredo, J. M., & Snyder, J. M. (2003) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533003321164976 · Cited by 1,281
Political Ideologies of CEOs: The Influence of Executives’ Values on Corporate Social Responsibility
Chin, M. K., Hambrick, D. C., & Treviño, L. K. (2013) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0001839213486984 · Cited by 1,125
Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns
COOPER, M. J., GULEN, H., & OVTCHINNIKOV, A. V. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01548.x · Cited by 870
PURSUING STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS: A MULTIVARIATE APPROACH.
Schuler, D. A., Rehbein, K., & Cramer, R. D. (2002) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/3069303 · Cited by 625
Corporate Political Activity: A Literature Review and Research Agenda
Lawton, T., McGuire, S., & Rajwani, T. (2013) · International Journal of Management Reviews · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2370.2012.00337.x · Cited by 505
Lux, S., Crook, T. R., & Woehr, D. J. (2011) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206310392233 · Cited by 495
Dorobantu, S., Kaul, A., & Zelner, B. (2017) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2590 · Cited by 441
Richter, B. K., Samphantharak, K., & Timmons, J. F. (2009) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00407.x · Cited by 406
In search of El Dorado: The elusive financial returns on corporate political investments
Hadani, M., & Schuler, D. A. (2013) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2006 · Cited by 391
Firm-level responses to government regulation: Theoretical and research approaches
Shaffer, B. (1995) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1016/0149-2063(95)90017-9 · Cited by 382
Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace
Bonica, A. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12014 · Cited by 381
Nonmarket Strategy Performance: Evidence from U.S. Electric Utilities
Bonardi, J.-P., Holburn, G. L. F., & Vanden Bergh, R. G. (2006) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2006.23478676 · Cited by 381
Hansen, W. L., & Mitchell, N. J. (2000) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586214 · Cited by 365
Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective
Milyo, J., Primo, D., & Groseclose, T. (2000) · Business and Politics · doi:10.2202/1469-3569.1004 · Cited by 302
Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence
Potters, J., & Sloof, R. (1996) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(96)00008-0 · Cited by 298
Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature
Stratmann, T. (2005) · Policy Challenges and Political Responses · doi:10.1007/0-387-28038-3_8 · Cited by 283
Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy
GORDON, S. C., & HAFER, C. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051634 · Cited by 281
Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying
de Figueiredo, J. M., & Silverman, B. S. (2006) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/508248 · Cited by 280
Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-Context Theory of Lobbying
Lowery, D. (2007) · Polity · doi:10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300077 · Cited by 278
Jia, N. (2014) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2092 · Cited by 272
Analyzing Censored and Sample-Selected Data with Tobit and Heckit Models
Sigelman, L., & Zeng, L. (1999) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a029811 · Cited by 264
Leech, B. L. (2010) · The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199542628.003.0028 · Cited by 91
Metadata
- Authors
- Grier, K. B., Munger, M. C., & Roberts, B. E.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1994-12
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 911-926
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2134361522
- Cited by
- 499
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 26.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.