The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures
Abstract
Congressional choices about administrative procedures affect an agency's political responsiveness and the technical accuracy of its decisions. Legislators would like to design procedures so that agencies make technically sound decisions and balance the needs of competing interests in the way intended. In practice, agency procedures designed to promote technical competence often allow for political drift, and those that promote political control provide little new technical information about the consequences of policy decisions. The trade-off between technical competence and political control is captured in a model of a legislative coalition's decision about agency procedures. The choice variables are the agency's expected preferences and independence. Depending on exogenous levels of technical and political uncertainty, optimal agency procedures can maximize technical competence, maximize political control, or achieve a combination of the two.
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The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU
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Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission
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Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bawn, K.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1995-03
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 62-73
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2034645929
- Cited by
- 546
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 16.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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