The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Spatial Models of Delegation
Abstract
Although a large literature on delegation exists, few models have pushed beyond a core set of canonical assumptions. This approach may be justified on grounds of tractability, but the failure to grasp the significance of different assumptions and push beyond specific models has limited our understanding of the incentives for delegation. Consequently, the justifications for delegation that have received recent scrutiny and testing differ from some of the more plausible justifications offered by informal studies of delegation. We show that surprisingly few results in the literature hinge on risk aversion, and surprisingly many turn on the ignored, though equally canonical, technological assumption that uncertainty is fixed (relative to policies). Relaxing the key assumptions about dimensionality and functional forms provides a clearer intuition about delegation—one that is closer to classical treatments. The theory allows us to relate different institutional features (commitment, specialization costs, monitoring, multiple principals) to delegation's observable properties.
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Cites
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Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
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Ferejohn, J. (1986) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00124924 · Cited by 2,161
Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers
Epstein, D., & O'Halloran, S. (1999) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609312 · Cited by 1,046
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
Deliberate discretion?: the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-0598 · Cited by 904
Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy
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Cited by
Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise
Gailmard, S., & Patty, J. W. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00286.x · Cited by 496
Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform
HUBER, J. D., & McCARTY, N. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055404001297 · Cited by 352
Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift
Schillemans, T., & Busuioc, M. (2015) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muu024 · Cited by 290
The Electoral Implications of Candidate Ambiguity
TOMZ, M., & VAN HOUWELING, R. P. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409090066 · Cited by 252
Executive Absolutism: The Dynamics of Authority Acquisition in a System of Separated Powers
Howell, W. G., Shepsle, K. A., & Wolton, S. (2023) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00021219 · Cited by 22
Metadata
- Authors
- BENDOR, J., & MEIROWITZ, A.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2004-05
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 293-310
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2029956352
- Cited by
- 283
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 19.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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