The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collective Action and Group Heterogeneity: Voluntary Provision Versus Selective Incentives
Abstract
Several studies have concluded that heterogeneity within a group facilitates the initiation of collective action. However, a recent analysis found that heterogeneity can either facilitate or impede collective action, depending on factors like the strength of the temptation to free-ride. Reconciling these conclusions is difficult because the earlier studies assumed that public goods are provided voluntarily, whereas the later analysis assumed that selective incentives like norms or laws can mandate cooperation. I examine the link between group heterogeneity and collective action in three regimes: voluntary systems, in which actors make unrestricted decisions to participate in collective action; systems, in which actors create and enforce norms that compel others to participate in public goods production; and balanced systems, in which actors can create and enforce compliance norms or oppose such norms. The analysis reveals a complex link among group heterogeneity, collective action, and the type of regime. By fostering the organization of previously atomized groups and weakening the cohesion of highsolidarity groups, heterogeneity in contribution costs and valuation of the public good can reduce social power differentials.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Heckathorn, D. D.
- Venue
- American Sociological Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1993-06
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 329
- ISSN
- 0003-1224 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2325820431
- Cited by
- 301
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 21.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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