The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization
Abstract
This paper provides a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions, often approaching unanimous size, in the realm of distributive policies. Distributive policies are those which concentrate benefits in specific geographic areas (states, congressional districts) while spreading costs through general taxation. The explanation offered here-that legislators may rationally prefer universalism to hard-ball coalition politics-generalizes earlier work of Weingast and Fiorina. In particular, it extends their results to pork-barrel politics, i.e., projects that are economically inefficient, and demonstrates how packages of economically inefficient projects can nevertheless be politically popular. The main theoretical feature that induces preferences for universalism is uncertainty over the composition of winning coalitions and, consequently, the desire for the political insurance that universalism provides.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew
Page, B. I. (1975) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2148248 · Cited by 3,130
American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory
Lowi, T. J. (1964) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2009452 · Cited by 2,498
Riker, W. H., Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962) · Midwest Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2108773 · Cited by 2,059
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics
Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A., & Johnsen, C. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260997 · Cited by 1,736
Self-citationA Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
Weingast, B. R. (1979) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111001 · Cited by 666
Self-citationPolitics, pressures, and the tariff
Schattschneider, E. E. (1935) · Cited by 623
Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence, by R. Douglas Arnold
Ogul, M. S. (1980) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2149604 · Cited by 133
Cited by
The Politics of Blame Avoidance
Weaver, R. K. (1986) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x00004219 · Cited by 2,145
The New Economics of Organization
Moe, T. M. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110997 · Cited by 1,974
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics
Weingast, B. R., Shepsle, K. A., & Johnsen, C. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260997 · Cited by 1,736
Self-citationThe Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics
Dixit, A., & Londregan, J. (1996) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2960152 · Cited by 1,506
Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game
Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (1986) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2131098 · Cited by 1,274
Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy
HEALY, A., & MALHOTRA, N. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055409990104 · Cited by 931
Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results
Wittman, D. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261660 · Cited by 804
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (1981) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00133748 · Cited by 779
Self-citationThe Political Economy of Budget Deficits
Alesina, A., & Perotti, R. (1995) · Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund · doi:10.2307/3867338 · Cited by 694
Perotti, R., & Kontopoulos, Y. (2002) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00146-3 · Cited by 497
Competing for government procurement contracts: The role of corporate social responsibility
Flammer, C. (2018) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2767 · Cited by 464
An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance'
Moe, T. M. (1987) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/439745 · Cited by 441
The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending
BERRY, C. R., BURDEN, B. C., & HOWELL, W. G. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000377 · Cited by 377
Democracy, Development, and the Public Sector
Boix, C. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669356 · Cited by 351
Tullock, G. (1981) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00138239 · Cited by 318
Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions
Alesina, A., & Perotti, R. (1996) · IMF Working Paper · doi:10.2139/ssrn.882952 · Cited by 265
Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government
Miller, G. J., & Moe, T. M. (1983) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1958917 · Cited by 260
The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel
Bickers, K. N., & Stein, R. M. (1996) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111752 · Cited by 258
Metadata
- Authors
- Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1981-02
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 96
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1985027273
- Cited by
- 539
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 23.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.