The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
Abstract
Incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in (respectively) implicit and explicit incentive contracts. We show that the presence of sufficiently effective explicit contracts can render all implicit contracts infeasible, even those that would otherwise yield the first-best. We also show, however, that in some circumstances objective and subjective measures are complements: neither an explicit nor an implicit contract alone yields positive profit, but an appropriate combination of the two does. Finally, we consider subjective weights on objective measures.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
Cited by
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530152466269 · Cited by 1,740
Evaluating students’ evaluations of professors
Braga, M., Paccagnella, M., & Pellizzari, M. (2014) · Economics of Education Review · doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2014.04.002 · Cited by 387
Tax farming redux: experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors
Khan, A. Q., Khwaja, A. I., & Olken, B. A. (2016) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjv042 · Cited by 267
Metrics: You are what you measure!
Hauser, J., & Katz, G. (1998) · European Management Journal · doi:10.1016/s0263-2373(98)00029-2 · Cited by 228
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2011) · doi:10.3386/w17579 · Cited by 227
Narula, R., Asmussen, C. G., Chi, T., & Kundu, S. K. (2019) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-019-00260-6 · Cited by 187
Lazzarini, S. G., Miller, G. J., & Zenger, T. R. (2008) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1070.0336 · Cited by 141
Information and Employee Evaluation: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention in Public Schools
Rockoff, J. E., Staiger, D. O., Kane, T. J., & Taylor, E. S. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.3184 · Cited by 138
Analyzing Interdisciplinary Research Using Co‐Authorship Networks
Ullah, M., Shahid, A., Din, I. U., Roman, M., Assam, M., Fayaz, M., Ghadi, Y., & Aljuaid, H. (2022) · Complexity · doi:10.1155/2022/2524491 · Cited by 76
Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence
Gil, R., & Zanarone, G. (2017) · Annual Review of Law and Social Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113413 · Cited by 56
(2014) · London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1994-11-01
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1125-1156
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2164370208
- Cited by
- 953
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 4.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
