The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Internal versus External Capital Markets
Abstract
This paper presents a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of internal versus external capital allocation. We focus primarily on comparing an internal capital market with bank lending. While both represent centralized forms of financing, in the former case the financing is owner-provided, while in the latter case it is not. We argue that the ownership aspect of internal capital allocation has three important consequences: (1) it leads to more monitoring than bank lending; (2) it reduces managers' entrepreneurial incentives; and (3) it makes it easier to efficiently redeploy the assets of projects that are performing poorly under existing management.
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Citations
Cites
Williamson, O. E. (1975) · Free Press eBooks · Cited by 12,044
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261729 · Cited by 5,364
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
Aghion, P., & Tirole, J. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262063 · Cited by 3,046
Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach
SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04661.x · Cited by 2,893
Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555496 · Cited by 1,020
Anatomy of Financial Distress: An Examination of Junk-Bond Issuers
Asquith, P., Gertner, R., & Scharfstein, D. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118416 · Cited by 939
Self-citationThe Success of Acquisitions: Evidence from Divestitures
KAPLAN, S. N., & WEISBACH, M. S. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb03980.x · Cited by 837
RESOURCE SHARING AMONG SBUs: STRATEGIC ANTECEDENTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS.
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A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction☆
MALMENDIER, U., & TATE, G. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 · Cited by 2,754
Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms
Stein, J. C. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00483 · Cited by 2,421
Self-citationHave Individual Stocks Become More Volatile? An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk
Campbell, J. Y., Lettau, M., Malkiel, B. G., & Xu, Y. (2001) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00318 · Cited by 2,415
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth
Morck, R., Wolfenzon, D., & Yeung, B. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205105774431252 · Cited by 1,863
Metadata
- Authors
- Gertner, R. H., Scharfstein, D. S., & Stein, J. C.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1994-11-01
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1211-1230
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2039077859
- Cited by
- 646
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 32.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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