The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States
Abstract
On 8 November 1988, when the American voters decreed that Republican George Bush would succeed Ronald Reagan in the White House but the opposition Democratic Party would control both houses of the Congress, it was the sixth time in the last nine presidential elections that the electorate chose to split the government between the parties. As in 1988, so in the earlier elections of 1956, 1968, 1972, 1980, and 1984, the people placed their faith in Republican presidential leadership but voted to retain Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives and in the first three of those elections (as well as in 1988), Democratic majorities in the Senate also. This is something new in American politics. When Dwight D. Eisenhower took his second oath of office in 1957, he was the first chief executive in seventy-two years since Grover Cleveland in 1885to confront on Inauguration Day a Congress of which even one house was controlled by the opposition party. Sometimes the opposition would win majorities in the House or the Senate, or both, at the midterm election, but even such occasions were relatively rare. In the fifty-eight years from 1897 through 1954, the country experienced divided government during only eight years all in the last half of a presidential term or 14 percent of the time. Yet in the thirty-six years from 1955 through 1990, the government will have
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
Giné, V. L., & Tsebelis, G. (2003) · Reis · doi:10.2307/40184562 · Cited by 3,359
Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives
Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791123 · Cited by 1,134
Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination
MAINWARING, S. (1993) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414093026002003 · Cited by 950
Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States
Alt, J. E., & Lowry, R. C. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082709 · Cited by 932
Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior
Norris, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511790980 · Cited by 918
Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-6536 · Cited by 910
Setting the agenda: responsible party government in the U.S. House of Representatives
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-4315 · Cited by 910
Electoral engineering: voting rules and political behavior
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-1232 · Cited by 845
Sartori, G. (1991) · Journal of Theoretical Politics · doi:10.1177/0951692891003003001 · Cited by 696
Party Polarization in Congress
Theriault, S. M. (2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511790652 · Cited by 656
Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis
Tsebelis, G. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585576 · Cited by 645
Measuring Political Legitimacy
Weatherford, M. S. (1992) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1964021 · Cited by 633
The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96
Binder, S. A. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585572 · Cited by 621
Veto Players and Institutional Analysis
Tsebelis, G. (2000) · Governance · doi:10.1111/0952-1895.00141 · Cited by 420
Who's Responsible for the Economy? The Formation and Consequences of Responsibility Attributions
Rudolph, T. J. (2003) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/1540-5907.00049 · Cited by 344
The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government
Shugart, M. S. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082428 · Cited by 343
Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945-94
Howell, W., Adler, S., Cameron, C., & Riemann, C. (2000) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/440372 · Cited by 267
Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock
Jones, D. R. (2001) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/106591290105400107 · Cited by 262
Leech, B. L. (2010) · The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199542628.003.0028 · Cited by 91
Metadata
- Authors
- Sundquist, J. L.
- Venue
- Political Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1988
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 613-635
- ISSN
- 0032-3195 (ISSN-L)
- 1538-165X
- OpenAlex
- W2314297586
- Cited by
- 320
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 56.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.