What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
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Abstract
Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction. But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored.
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“The particular cause-effect structure of distinctions and relations specified by the system accounts for the quality of a particular experience-"what it is like to be" that system in its current state [8].”
From Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [8]
In the citing paper
“Consciousness itself is inaccessible to direct measurement, as conscious experience is subjective and its contents only accessible to the subject themselves (Nagel 1974).”
From The Measurement Problem of Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as Nagel 1974
In the citing paper
“IIT's axioms aim to provide an exhaustive list of the essential properties of consciousness, understood as the feeling of 'what it is like' to ha ve an experience (Nagel, 1974).”
From Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review (2026) · cites this paper as Nagel, 1974
In the citing paper
“The inherently subjective and qualitative nature of this auto-assessment process explains “how and why” it [consciousness] feels like something to the organism, for the organism (cf. Nagel, 1974).”
From The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle (2019) · cites this paper as Nagel, 1974
In the citing paper
“Certainty is not the form of knowledge we have about subjective experience in any other mind than our own (Nagel, 1974).”
From Evolving Concepts of Emotion and Motivation (2018) · cites this paper as Nagel, 1974
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Metadata
- Authors
- Nagel, T.
- Corresponding author
- Nagel, Thomas
- ORCID
- Nagel, Thomas
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1974-10
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 435
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2072267104
- Cited by
- 7,440
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 457 · 2025: 518 · 2024: 459 · 2023: 358 · 2022: 344 · 2021: 347 · 2020: 298 · 2019: 415 · 2018: 308 · 2017: 272 · 2016: 221 · 2015: 195 · 2014: 230 · 2013: 212 · 2012: 172
- FWCI
- 1.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- mind-body problem, consciousness, materialism, reductionism, what it is like, philosophy of mind
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