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Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness

Sytsma, Justin · 2010 · Philosophy Compass
Cited by 39

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

In studying folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have mainly focused on how people conceive of non‐experiential states, such as beliefs and desires. As a result, we know very little about how the non‐philosophers (or the folk) understand the mental states that philosophers typically classify as being phenomenally conscious. In particular, it is not known whether the folk even tend to classify mental states in terms of their being or not being phenomenally conscious in the first place. Things have changed dramatically in the last few years, however, with a flurry of ground‐breaking research by psychologists and experimental philosophers. In this article, I will review this work, carefully distinguishing between two questions: First, are the ascriptions that the folk make with regard to the mental states that philosophers classify as phenomenally conscious related to their decisions about whether morally right or wrong action has been done to an entity? Second, do the folk tend to classify mental states in the way that philosophers do, distinguishing between mental states that are phenomenally conscious and mental states that are not phenomenally conscious?

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Metadata

Authors
Sytsma, J.
Venue
Philosophy Compass
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2010-07-20
Volume
5
Issue
8
Pages
700-711
ISSN
1747-9991 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1553553754
Cited by
39
References
8
FWCI
1.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00315.x
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Sytsma, J. (2010). Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophy Compass. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00315.x

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