Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In studying folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have mainly focused on how people conceive of non‐experiential states, such as beliefs and desires. As a result, we know very little about how the non‐philosophers (or the folk) understand the mental states that philosophers typically classify as being phenomenally conscious. In particular, it is not known whether the folk even tend to classify mental states in terms of their being or not being phenomenally conscious in the first place. Things have changed dramatically in the last few years, however, with a flurry of ground‐breaking research by psychologists and experimental philosophers. In this article, I will review this work, carefully distinguishing between two questions: First, are the ascriptions that the folk make with regard to the mental states that philosophers classify as phenomenally conscious related to their decisions about whether morally right or wrong action has been done to an entity? Second, do the folk tend to classify mental states in the way that philosophers do, distinguishing between mental states that are phenomenally conscious and mental states that are not phenomenally conscious?
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Gray, H. M., Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2007) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1134475 · Cited by 2,342
Facing up to the problem of consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (1996) · Toward a Science of Consciousness · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003 · Cited by 1,966
Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1997) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/7289.001.0001 · Cited by 1,479
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
Carruthers, P. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487491 · Cited by 632
Intuitions about consciousness: experimental studies
Knobe, J., & Prinz, J. (2008) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9066-y · Cited by 227
Two conceptions of subjective experience
Sytsma, J., & Machery, E. (2010) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9439-x · Cited by 213
Self-citationCommonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness: does anyone care about functional zombies?
Huebner, B. (2010) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-009-9126-6 · Cited by 72
Cited by
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Irvine, E. (2017) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-014-9273-4 · Cited by 25
“Part of this is of course to identify which are the common intuitions in the first place, and how they vary over people, cultures, history, educational background and so on (e.g. Wilkes 1984, 1988; Schwitzgebel 2011; Systma 2010; Systma and Machery 2010).”
BackgroundSytsma, J. (2014) · WIREs Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.1320 · Cited by 20
Self-citationBirch, J. (2024) · The Edge of Sentience · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Sytsma, J.
- Venue
- Philosophy Compass
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-07-20
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 700-711
- ISSN
- 1747-9991 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1553553754
- Cited by
- 39
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 1.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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