CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 273Neurotransmitter Receptor Influence on BehaviorNeural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesCognitive Science and Education Research

Evolving Concepts of Emotion and Motivation

Open access
Berridge, Kent C.·2018·Frontiers in Psychology
DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01647PMC PMC6137142
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

Abstract

This review takes a historical perspective on concepts in the psychology of motivation and emotion, and surveys recent developments, debates and applications. Old debates over emotion have recently risen again. For example, are emotions necessarily subjective feelings? Do animals have emotions? I review evidence that emotions exist as core psychological processes, which have objectively detectable features, and which can occur either with subjective feelings or without them. Evidence is offered also that studies of emotion in animals can give new insights into human emotions. Beyond emotion, motivation concepts have changed over decades too, and debates still continue. Motivation was once thought in terms of aversive drives, and reward was thought of in terms of drive reduction. Motivation-as-drive concepts were largely replaced by motivation-as-incentive concepts, yet aversive drive concepts still occasionally surface in reward neuroscience today. Among incentive concepts, incentive salience is a core motivation process, mediated by brain mesocorticolimbic systems (dopamine-related systems) and sometimes called 'wanting' (in quotation marks), to distinguish it from cognitive forms of desire (wanting without quotation marks). Incentive salience as 'wanting' is separable also from pleasure 'liking' for the same reward, which has important implications for several human clinical disorders. Ordinarily, incentive salience adds motivational urgency to cognitive desires, but 'wanting' and cognitive desires can dissociate in some conditions. Excessive incentive salience can cause addictions, in which excessive 'wanting' can diverge from cognitive desires. Conversely, lack of incentive salience may cause motivational forms of anhedonia in depression or schizophrenia, whereas a negatively-valenced form of 'fearful salience' may contribute to paranoia. Finally, negative 'fear' and 'disgust' have both partial overlap but also important neural differences.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This review argues that emotion and motivation include objective core processes that can occur with or without subjective feelings, and it traces the historical shift from drive-reduction accounts to incentive motivation. It emphasizes the distinction between ‘wanting’ and ‘liking,’ mesocorticolimbic dopamine in incentive salience, and clinical implications for addiction, anhedonia, paranoia, and fear/disgust.

Key findings

  • Emotions need not be conscious: subliminal happy versus angry faces changed thirsty participants’ pouring, drinking, and willingness to pay without changing their subjective mood ratings; implicit prejudice and introspection studies also indicate verbal reports can miss or distort affective processes.
  • ‘Wanting’ and ‘liking’ are separable: dopamine mediated ‘wanting’ but not ‘liking’ in rats, including normal sweetness ‘liking’ after near-total dopamine lesions despite eliminated ‘wanting’; human studies around 2000 confirmed dopamine blockade or reductions did not reduce subjective liking for food, cocaine, or heroin but reduced wanting. The distinction rests on 30 years of animal results and 15 years of human confirmatory findings.
  • Motivation concepts shifted from aversive drive/drive reduction to incentive motivation: brain electrode stimulation could be both rewarding and motivating, hunger/thirst cues alone were weak motivators, and drive reduction was weak—rats bar pressed for intragastric nutrients at only about 30% of normal intake, and dogs given intravenous calories still ate customary amounts and became obese.
  • Clinical applications include incentive-sensitization in addiction; dopamine dysregulation syndrome in 15% or more of Parkinson’s patients on direct agonists; motivational anhedonia/avolition in schizophrenia, depression, and Parkinson’s as possible loss of ‘wanting’ rather than ‘liking’; and negatively valenced ‘fearful salience’ in nucleus accumbens as a possible contributor to paranoia.

Methods

  • Narrative historical review of motivation and emotion concepts in psychology and affective neuroscience, drawing on both animal and human studies; no systematic search, meta-analysis, or formal quantitative pooling is described.
  • Evidence discussed includes rat taste-reactivity, dopamine lesions and microinjections, brain stimulation, Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, human neuroimaging and drug studies, and clinical observations.
  • Main analysis is conceptual synthesis and argument rather than primary data collection.

Limitations

  • Stated: not all conclusions from animal affective neuroscience will transfer to humans; some predictions, such as a human nucleus accumbens desire-dread keyboard, remain untested, and exactly how neural differences produce qualitative emotional differences remains to be understood.
  • Evident: as a single-author narrative review, evidence selection and interpretation reflect the author’s theoretical framework; no systematic review protocol, inclusion criteria, or formal bias assessment is reported.
  • Evident: many cited animal manipulations use invasive microinjections, lesions, or brain stimulation, and the paper itself notes that extreme or unnatural stimulation parameters may affect conclusions about aversive drive.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01647

Cites

159 of 159 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 233 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingcitation

    In that study, participants' subjective ratings of mood or emotion were not changed at all by exposures to subliminal and backward-masked emotional faces, whether happy or angry.

    “Their subjective ratings of mood or emotion were not changed at all by exposures to subliminal and backward-masked emotional faces, whether happy or angry (Winkielman et al., 2005).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Winkielman et al., 2005 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Findingcitation

    Subliminal exposure to happy faces elicited a positive affective reaction that remained unconscious, revealed by presenting thirsty participants with a pitcher of fruit beverage.

    “Yet subliminal exposure to happy faces elicited a positive affective reaction that remained unconscious, but which could be revealed by presenting thirsty participants with a relevant incentive: a pitcher of fruit beverage.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingnone given

    Incentive salience as 'wanting' is separable from pleasure 'liking' for the same reward.

    “Incentive salience as ‘wanting’ is separable also from pleasure ‘liking’ for the same reward, which has important implications for several human clinical disorders.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Findingcitation

    In ordinary adults under certain circumstances, subliminally brief visual flashes of happy or angry facial expressions can elicit unconscious affective reactions, either positive or negative, which produce no change in subjective mood reports but control motivated behavior some minutes afterward.

    “Further, in ordinary adults under certain circumstances, subliminally brief visual flashes of happy or angry facial expressions can elicit unconscious affective reactions, either positive or negative, which produced no change in subjective mood reports but nonetheless controlled motivated behavior some minutes afterward (Winkielman et al., 2005).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Winkielman et al., 2005 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Findingcitation

    Cocaine addicts under some conditions will objectively work to take cocaine infusions, and choose them over saline infusions, even when the cocaine dose is too low to produce any subjective drug feelings of pleasure or arousal.

    “For example, cocaine addicts under some conditions will objectively work to take cocaine infusions, and choose them over saline infusions, even when the cocaine dose is too low to produce any subjective drug feelings of pleasure or arousal (Fischman and Foltin, 1992).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fischman and Foltin, 1992

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims. 85
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 52

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Subliminal viewing of angry faces had an opposite negative-valenced impact on the same thirsty participants: they poured less, drank less, and were willing to pay less than after seeing only neutral facial expressions, again without any intervening change in their subjective ratings of emotional mood.

    “Valence was evident in that subliminal viewing of angry faces had an opposite negative-valenced impact on the same thirsty participants: they poured less, drank less, and were willing to pay less than after seeing only neutral facial expressions – again without any intervening change in their subjective ratings of emotional mood (Berridge and Winkielman, 2003; Winkielman et al., 2005).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Berridge and Winkielman, 2003

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Winkielman et al., 2005 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Happy-exposed participants poured more drink, drank more of what they poured, and were willing to pay a much higher monetary price for the drink than after viewing emotionally-neutral faces.

    “Those happy-exposed participants poured more drink, drank more of what they poured, and were willing to pay a much higher monetary price for the drink offered than after viewing emotionally-neutral faces.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    For the first decade of the hypothesis, the schematic understanding from animal evidence was all they had, based on objective affective reactions, which stood alone and pointed the way.

    “But for the first decade of this hypothesis, the schematic understanding from animal evidence was all we had, based on objective affective reactions, which stood alone and pointed the way.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingnone given

    The distinction between 'wanting' and 'liking' initially came as a surprise to the author and colleagues; they had believed until the late 1980s that the two concepts necessarily went together.

    “The distinction between ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ initially came as a surprise to me and to my colleagues. We had believed until the late 1980s that the two concepts necessarily went together, as two semantic sides of the same psychological coin.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Findingnone given

    Robust and large mesocorticolimbic circuitry can generate intense 'wanting', including both mesolimbic dopamine projections and many of its target structures.

    “Robust and large mesocorticolimbic circuitry can generate intense ‘wanting’ (green), including both mesolimbic dopamine projections and many of its target structures.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    In rats, stimulating mesolimbic systems with an electrode to promote dopamine release turned on intense 'wanting' to eat, but failed to increase 'liking' at all.

    “Conversely, we found that stimulating mesolimbic systems with an electrode to promote dopamine release turned on intense ‘wanting’ to eat, but failed to increase ‘liking’ at all (Berridge and Valenstein, 1991).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Berridge and Valenstein, 1991

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    An amphetamine microinjection that releases dopamine in nucleus accumbens selectively magnifies only the CS triggered peaks of cue-triggered 'wanting,' without raising baseline effort based on act-outcome expectations or the effect of an irrelevant CS- control sound.

    “An amphetamine microinjection that releases dopamine in nucleus accumbens selectively magnifies only the CS triggered peaks of cue-triggered ‘wanting,’ without raising baseline effort based on act-outcome expectations or the effect of an irrelevant CS- control sound (Pecina and Berridge, 2013).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Pecina and Berridge, 2013

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingnone given

    The size of each hotspot discovered so far is only a cubic millimeter or so in volume in the brain of a rat.

    “The size of each hotspot discovered so far is only a cubic millimeter or so in volume in the brain of a rat.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Pleasure 'liking' is generated by an anatomically small, neurochemically restricted, and functionally fragile brain circuit - which leaves out the large dopamine projection system of 'wanting.'

    “Our research findings have indicated that pleasure ‘liking’ is generated by an anatomically small, neurochemically restricted, and functionally fragile brain circuit – which leaves out the large dopamine projection system of ‘wanting’ (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    At the moment the rat re-encounters the salt-cue lever in a newly depleted state, its mesocorticolimbic dopamine brain system of incentive salience is triggered into high activity, evident neurally as dopamine-related neurons start transcribing genes such as c-fos into protein such as Fos.

    “At the moment the rat re-encounters the salt-cue lever in newly depleted state, its mesocorticolimbic dopamine brain system of incentive salience is triggered into high activity, evident neurally as dopamine-related neurons start transcribing genes such as c-fos into protein such as Fos, to trigger metabolic activation of neuronal functions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Robinson and Berridge, 2013

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    The dopamine elevation makes cues trigger much higher surges of 'wanting' than they ordinarily would, but these surges decay within a minute or so once the cue disappears, although the dopamine remains continuously high.

    “The dopamine elevation makes the cues trigger much higher surges of ‘wanting’ than they ordinarily would, but these surges decay within a minute or so once the cue disappears, although the dopamine remains continuously high.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Wyvell and Berridge, 2000

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Pecina and Berridge, 2013

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    The transformation of the CS-triggered motivation needs no new learning and happens even before the rat ever re-tastes Dead Sea saltiness in its newly 'liked' status.

    “The transformation of the CS-triggered motivation needs no new learning – it happens even before the rat ever re-tastes Dead sea saltiness in its newly ‘liked’ status.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Robinson and Berridge, 2013

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Both the 'wanting' and the 'fear' generated by these brain manipulations require mesolimbic dopamine signals in the nucleus accumbens.

    “Both the ‘wanting’ and the ‘fear’ generated by these brain manipulations require mesolimbic dopamine signals in the nucleus accumbens.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Richard and Berridge, 2011

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Positive 'wanting' required only D1 types of receptor activation by dopamine, whereas negative 'fear' required activation of both D1 and D2 types, which implicates additional neuronal circuitry.

    “Positive ‘wanting’ required only D1 types of receptor activation by dopamine, whereas negative ‘fear’ required activation of both D1 and D2 types, which implicates additional neuronal circuitry (Richard and Berridge, 2011).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Richard and Berridge, 2011

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Tapping keys in the front of the nucleus accumbens shell elicits strong 'wanting,' reflected as large increases in eating (doubling or quadrupling food intake), or creating a desire to return to the place where the key was tapped.

    “Tapping keys in the front of this structure elicits strong ‘wanting,’ reflected as large increases in eating (doubling or quadrupling food intake), or creating a desire to return to the place where the key was tapped.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Reynolds and Berridge, 2008 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Richard and Berridge, 2011

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Only anatomical extremes resist retuning, so that far-anterior sites remain resolutely appetitive while far-posterior sites remain 'fear-generating,' regardless of external ambience.

    “Only anatomical extremes resist retuning, so that far-anterior sites remain resolutely appetitive while far-posterior sites remain ‘fear-generating,’ regardless of external ambience (Figure 3).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Reynolds and Berridge, 2008 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    The posterior portion of the medial shell has two 'fear' generating neurochemical modes (glutamate AMPA receptor blockade versus GABA receptor activation), and only the GABA mode also generates excessive 'disgust'.

    “The posterior portion of its medial shell has two ‘fear’ generating neurochemical modes (glutamate AMPA receptor blockade versus GABA receptor activation), and only the GABA mode also generates excessive ‘disgust’.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Faure et al., 2010 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Ho and Berridge, 2014

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Motivation and emotion are psychological categories that overlap in phenomena, making it hard to draw absolute distinctions.

    “In this discussion, I will sometimes combine motivation and emotion together because those psychological categories overlap in phenomena, making it hard to draw absolute distinctions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Asking people to describe their emotional reasons for making a choice may lead them to construct false explanations of their own behavior and astray from immediate gut reactions.

    “In some cases, asking people to describe their emotional reasons for making a choice may lead them to construct false explanations of their own behavior. It can lead them astray from their immediate gut reactions that would be more emotionally authentic.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisereasoning

    Most science is a matter of reducing uncertainty by degrees, experiment by experiment, gradually building incremental evidence for a hypothesis and ruling out specific alternatives.

    “In fact, most science is rather a matter of reducing uncertainty by degrees, experiment by experiment, gradually building incremental evidence for a particular hypothesis, and gradually ruling out specific alternatives.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Evidence does not support the idea that emotions are necessarily conscious, nor that verbal reports are the best way to assess emotion.

    “Quite a lot of evidence exists, and in my view it does not support the idea that emotions are necessarily conscious, nor that verbal reports are the best way to assess emotion.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Emotions exist as core psychological processes with objectively detectable features and can occur either with subjective feelings or without them.

    “I review evidence that emotions exist as core psychological processes, which have objectively detectable features, and which can occur either with subjective feelings or without them.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    A negatively-valenced form of 'fearful salience' may contribute to paranoia.

    “Conversely, lack of incentive salience may cause motivational forms of anhedonia in depression or schizophrenia, whereas a negatively-valenced form of ‘fearful salience’ may contribute to paranoia.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Quite a lot of evidence contradicts contentions that emotions are always subjective feelings, and suggests emotions can also occur even in people without being subjectively felt, at least under some conditions.

    “Quite a lot of evidence actually contradicts contentions that emotions are always subjective feelings, and instead suggests that emotions can also occur even in people without being subjectively felt – at least under some conditions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Bringing introspective attention to pleasure feelings may dissipate those hedonic feelings; less introspective attention can mean more emotion and more accuracy about the underlying emotional reaction in some cases.

    “Indeed, bringing introspective attention to pleasure feelings may actually dissipate those hedonic feelings: less introspective attention can mean more emotion, as well as more accuracy about the underlying emotional reaction, in some cases (Wilson and Schooler, 1991; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Schooler and Mauss, 2010; Torre and Lieberman, 2018).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Wilson and Schooler, 1991 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Dijksterhuis et al., 2006 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Schooler and Mauss, 2010

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Motivation was once thought in terms of aversive drives, and reward was thought of in terms of drive reduction.

    “Motivation was once thought in terms of aversive drives, and reward was thought of in terms of drive reduction.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Aversive drive concepts still occasionally surface in reward neuroscience today.

    “Motivation-as-drive concepts were largely replaced by motivation-as-incentive concepts, yet aversive drive concepts still occasionally surface in reward neuroscience today.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Conscious or subjective feelings and unconscious or objective core processes within emotion and motivation often occur together, but sometimes need to be considered separately.

    “Conversely, I will often distinguish between conscious or subjective feelings and unconscious or objective core processes within emotion and motivation. Although these often occur together, they sometimes need to be considered separately.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Excessive incentive salience can cause addictions, in which excessive 'wanting' can diverge from cognitive desires.

    “Excessive incentive salience can cause addictions, in which excessive ‘wanting’ can diverge from cognitive desires.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Basic affective reactions can be triggered unconsciously by subliminal stimuli in ordinary humans, and can remain unreportable as feelings even when they change behavior and subsequent judgments.

    “There is also evidence that basic affective reactions can be triggered unconsciously by subliminal stimuli in ordinary humans, and can remain unreportable as feelings even when they go on to change a person’s behavior and subsequent judgments (Zajonc, 1980; Fischman and Foltin, 1992; Berridge and Winkielman, 2003; Winkielman and Berridge, 2004; Winkielman et al., 2005).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Zajonc, 1980 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Fischman and Foltin, 1992

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Berridge and Winkielman, 2003

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Scientific data never fully prove any hypothesis with complete certainty, but only can falsify bad hypotheses.

    “Indeed, some philosophers of science have argued that scientific data never fully prove any hypothesis with complete certainty (there is always a potential alternative lurking in the wings), but only can falsify bad hypotheses (Popper, 1972).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Popper, 1972

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    It is important to distinguish between subjective emotional feelings and objective emotional reactions.

    “We all agree it is important to distinguish between subjective emotional feelings and objective emotional reactions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Dropping a demand for scientific certainty for emotion in other humans, but insisting on it for animals, is to adopt a double standard on proof.

    “Dropping a demand for scientific certainty for emotion in other humans, but insisting on it for animals, is to adopt a double standard on proof.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Verbal reports from other human adults about their feelings are accepted as evidence of emotion on the basis of a socially convenient agreement based on mutual empathy, not scientific certainty.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Ordinarily, incentive salience adds motivational urgency to cognitive desires, but 'wanting' and cognitive desires can dissociate in some conditions.

    “Ordinarily, incentive salience adds motivational urgency to cognitive desires, but ‘wanting’ and cognitive desires can dissociate in some conditions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    These emotional reactions occur as core affective processes that can remain intrinsically psychological and emotional even without conscious feelings, and have objective consequences and features detectable in physiology and/or behavior.

    “These emotional reactions occur as core affective processes that can remain intrinsically psychological and emotional, even without conscious feelings, and which have objective consequences and features that can be detected in physiology and/or behavior.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Affective reactions can occur unconsciously as well as consciously, and we share many emotional processes and their brain circuitry with animals.

    “My own view is similar: that affective reactions can occur unconsciously, as well as consciously, and that we share many emotional processes and their brain circuitry with animals.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    There is no scientific certainty about the minimum neural circuitry needed for consciousness; neuroscientists disagree over whether the essential basis is cortical versus subcortical.

    “Clearly there is no scientific certainty about the minimum neural circuitry needed for consciousness: neuroscientists disagree among themselves over whether the essential basis is cortical versus subcortical, and so on.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Incentive salience is a core motivation process, mediated by brain mesocorticolimbic systems (dopamine-related systems) and sometimes called 'wanting'.

    “Among incentive concepts, incentive salience is a core motivation process, mediated by brain mesocorticolimbic systems (dopamine-related systems) and sometimes called ‘wanting’ (in quotation marks), to distinguish it from cognitive forms of desire (wanting without quotation marks).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Negative 'fear' and 'disgust' have both partial overlap but also important neural differences.

    “Finally, negative ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’ have both partial overlap but also important neural differences.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Sensitized mesolimbic dopamine neurons release more dopamine when a drug is taken, and their dopamine-receiving target neurons become more receptive to excitatory glutamate signals.

    “Sensitized mesolimbic dopamine neurons release more dopamine when a drug is taken, their dopamine-receiving target neurons become more receptive to excitatory glutamate signals, etc.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    These results demonstrate that bivalent affective reactions can be subjectively unconscious even in adult humans, and even when detected objectively in behavior.

    “For now, my main point is simply that these results demonstrate that bivalent affective reactions can be subjectively unconscious even in adult humans, and even when detected objectively in behavior.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Dopamine surges in nucleus accumbens evoked by addictive amphetamine or by L-DOPA correlate poorly with human subjective liking ratings of the drug, but do control their subjective wanting ratings to take more of that drug.

    “Dopamine surges in nucleus accumbens evoked by addictive amphetamine or by L-DOPA correlate poorly with human subjective liking ratings of the drug - but do control their subjective wanting ratings to take more of that drug (Leyton et al., 2002; Evans et al., 2006).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Leyton et al., 2002 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Evans et al., 2006 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Neural sensitization grows or 'incubates' over weeks of drug abstinence, so that craving becomes stronger, and once sensitization emerges it can last years in animals and humans.

    “That is because neural sensitization grows or ‘incubates’ over weeks of drug abstinence, so that craving becomes stronger, and once sensitization emerges it can last years in animals and humans (Paulson et al., 1991; Boileau et al., 2006; Li et al., 2015).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Paulson et al., 1991 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Boileau et al., 2006 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Li et al., 2015

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Lack of therapeutic development from animal fear conditioning could mean that Pavlovian fear learning was not the best animal 'fear' reaction for assessing efficacy of fear-reducing medications.

    “However, this lack of therapeutic development could just as well mean that Pavlovian fear learning (e.g., behavioral freezing to a sound that predicts footshock) was not the best animal ‘fear’ reaction for assessing the efficacy of fear-reducing medications.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    These include a few from the author's own lab, and one is the brain-based distinction between 'wanting' and 'liking' pleasant rewards.

    “I believe these include a few from my own lab, and one is the brain-based distinction between ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ pleasant rewards (Figure 1), described next.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Thirst is a physiological state that should specifically amplify brain mesolimbic reactivity to perception of a drink, amplifying its incentive salience, and providing a higher brain motivation signal for unconscious emotional reactions to modulate.

    “Thirst is a physiological state that should specifically amplify brain mesolimbic reactivity to perception of a drink, amplifying its incentive salience, and providing a higher brain motivation signal for unconscious emotional reactions to modulate.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Each animal species has at its disposal some innate primary actions that implement the functions assigned to the ur-emotions.

    “They suggest: “each animal species has at its disposal some innate primary actions that implement the functions we have assigned to the ur-emotions” (p. 412)”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Frijda and Parrott, 2011

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Many current anti-anxiety medications used by human patients actually were developed through various animal models of 'fearful' reactions.

    “In any case, a counterargument has been made that many of the current anti-anxiety medications used by human patients actually were developed through various animal models of ‘fearful’ reactions (Treit et al., 2010; Bourin, 2015).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Treit et al., 2010

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Bourin, 2015 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Schematic understanding is the way we study perception, learning, memory and cognition in animals, and how we measure and understand perception in people whose visual world differs from ours.

    “Schematic understanding is the way we study perception, learning, memory and cognition in animals. It’s even how we measure and understand perception in people whose visual world differs from ours (e.g., detecting color blindness).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Animals as well as humans can express 'ur-emotions,' as objectively detectable psychological processes that combine appraisals, affective attitudes and action readiness.

    “Similarly, the psychologists of emotion Nico Frijda and W. Gerrod Parrott, posit that animals as well as humans can express ‘ur-emotions,’ as objectively detectable psychological processes that combine appraisals, affective attitudes and action readiness.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Frijda and Parrott, 2011

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Premisereasoning

    To apply animal studies to human emotions and motivations, we need to posit continuity between affective mechanisms in animals and humans.

    “For that, we need to posit continuity between those affective mechanisms in animals and humans.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Many rewards induce dopamine release as a consequence and correlate, but not the cause, of pleasure.

    “Similarly, it is now increasingly clear that increases of human dopamine do not reliably cause enhancement of subjective ratings of pleasure (although many rewards do induce dopamine release as a consequence and correlate, but not the cause, of pleasure) (Leyton et al., 2002; Evans et al., 2006; Liggins et al., 2012).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Leyton et al., 2002 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Evans et al., 2006 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Liggins et al., 2012 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Early animal evidence showed that 'liking' was different from 'wanting,' and that dopamine mediated 'wanting' but not 'liking.'

    “In short, the early animal evidence showed that ‘liking’ was different from ‘wanting,’ and that dopamine mediated ‘wanting’ but not ‘liking’ (Figure 1).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    There are many other cases where animal studies of emotion have produced results with successful implications for understanding human psychology and disorders.

    “And there are many other cases where animal studies of emotion have produced results with successful implications for understanding human psychology and disorders.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Blockade of human dopamine receptors by antagonist drugs, or dietary-induced reductions of dopamine release, did not reduce people's subjective liking ratings for food pleasure, or for drug pleasures of cocaine or heroin.

    “Studies began to report that blockade of human dopamine receptors by antagonist drugs, or dietary-induced reductions of dopamine release, did not reduce people’s subjective liking ratings for food pleasure, or for drug pleasures of cocaine or heroin (Brauer and De Wit, 1997; Leyton, 2010; Sienkiewicz-Jarosz et al., 2013).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Brauer and De Wit, 1997

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Leyton, 2010

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Sienkiewicz-Jarosz et al., 2013 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisenone given

    According to drive theories, the intense motivations had to be aversive.

    “According to drive theories, the intense motivations had to be aversive.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisenone given

    Drive was typically conceived as an aversive state that goaded behavior into action to reduce the unpleasant drive.

    “Drive was typically conceived as an aversive state that goaded behavior into action to reduce the unpleasant drive (hunger, thirst, sex, drug withdrawal, etc.).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Mice will actually work to turn on their hypothalamic AgRP neurons that previously made them eat, indicating that the increased appetite can be dissociated from negative valence, and even take on a positive valence in the right conditions.

    “However, other neuroscientists have found that mice will actually work to turn on their hypothalamic AgRP neurons that previously made them eat, indicating that the increased appetite can be dissociated from negative valence, and even take on a positive valence in the right conditions (Chen et al., 2016).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Chen et al., 2016 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Receptor-stimulated DDS patients can become sensitized, and are reported to compulsively pursue incentive activities in an addictive-like fashion: gambling, shopping, sex, internet, hobbies, taking drugs or even over-consuming their medications in much higher quantities than intended by their physicians.

    “Receptor-stimulated DDS patients can become sensitized, and are reported to compulsively pursue incentive activities in an addictive-like fashion: gambling, shopping, sex, internet, hobbies, taking drugs or even over-consuming their medications in much higher quantities than intended by their physicians (Ondo and Lai, 2008; Callesen et al., 2013; Friedman and Chang, 2013; Politis et al., 2013).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Ondo and Lai, 2008

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Callesen et al., 2013 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Friedman and Chang, 2013

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Opponent-process theory posited negative hedonic states of withdrawal and dysphoria to be the chief force driving addicts to take drugs.

    “For example, in drug addiction, the opponent-process theory posited negative hedonic states of withdrawal and dysphoria to be the chief force driving addicts to take drugs (Solomon and Corbit, 1974), a view that still has adherents (Koob and Volkow, 2016; Keramati et al., 2017).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Solomon and Corbit, 1974 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Koob and Volkow, 2016 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Keramati et al., 2017 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Natural motivations were viewed by drive-reduction theory as generators of aversive states, triggered by signals for physiological homeostatic needs or other forms of deprivation.

    “Natural motivations were viewed by drive-reduction theory as generators of aversive states, triggered by signals for physiological homeostatic needs (low nutrient reserves for hunger, dehydration for thirst) or of other forms of deprivation (lack of sex, withdrawal from addictive drugs, etc.) (Hull, 1951; Miller, 1971).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Hull, 1951

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Miller, 1971

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Dopamine does not actually cause pleasure, nor does dopamine downregulation cause pleasure deficits.

    “on grounds that dopamine does not actually cause pleasure nor does dopamine downregulation cause pleasure deficits, and on grounds that addictions persist after withdrawal syndromes go away (Berridge and Robinson, 2016).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Berridge and Robinson, 2016

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    A mouse may subsequently avoid a flavor that was paired with the AgRP neuronal stimulation that made it eat, leading some authors to suggest that stimulated hunger is necessarily an aversive drive that the mouse later associates with the flavor.

    “However, a mouse may subsequently avoid a flavor that was paired with the AgRP neuronal stimulation that made it eat, leading some authors to suggest that stimulated hunger is necessarily an aversive drive that the mouse later associates with the flavor (Betley et al., 2015).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Betley et al., 2015 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Drive reduction served as reward in this motivational framework; not as a positive pleasure or incentive, but in a negative reinforcement sense of eliminating the aversive drive.

    “Drive reduction served as reward in this motivational framework; not as a positive pleasure or incentive, but in a negative reinforcement sense of eliminating the aversive drive.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Many patients who pursue one of those activities may also pursue a second or a third, as their sensitized 'wanting' spills over into several potential targets, and typically the compulsive motivations decline when the medications are reduced or stopped.

    “Many patients who pursue one of those activities may also pursue a second or a third, as their sensitized ‘wanting’ spills over into several potential targets and typically the compulsive motivations decline when the medications are reduced or stopped.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisenone given

    According to drive reduction theories, reward was produced by reducing motivations, not by increasing drives.

    “According to drive reduction theories, reward was produced by reducing motivations, not by increasing drives.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Their deficit really reflects a selective loss of incentive motivation or 'wanting,' rather than loss of pleasure 'liking.'

    “Some investigators therefore have suggested their deficit really reflects a selective loss of incentive motivation or ‘wanting,’ rather than loss of pleasure ‘liking’ (Sienkiewicz-Jarosz et al., 2005; Dowd and Barch, 2010; Treadway and Zald, 2011; Barch et al., 2014).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Sienkiewicz-Jarosz et al., 2005 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Dowd and Barch, 2010

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Treadway and Zald, 2011 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Their respective rewards were all viewed to reduce the unpleasant drives, by consuming the drive's goal object until the aversive deficit state was gone.

    “Their respective rewards were all viewed to reduce the unpleasant drives, by consuming the drive’s goal object until the aversive deficit state was gone (food, water, copulation, addictive drug, etc.).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Hull, 1951

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Miller, 1971

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Brain reward electrodes were not only rewarding (rats and people worked eagerly to activate them), but the same electrodes were also often powerfully motivating in the sense of apparently turning on natural motivations.

    “It quickly became clear that brain reward electrodes were not only rewarding (in the sense that rats and people worked eagerly to activate them), but the same electrodes were also often powerfully motivating in the sense of apparently turning on natural motivations.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Many patients with schizophrenia or Parkinson's, and possibly some with major depression, are not actually anhedonic: they report normal sensory pleasure ratings of ice cream or other sensory reward in the moment, even though they attach little value to any sensory, social or other pleasant reward in life.

    “However, recent studies suggest that many patients with schizophrenia or Parkinson’s, and possibly some with major depression, are not actually anhedonic after all: they report normal sensory pleasure ratings of ice cream or other sensory reward in the moment, even though they attach little value to any sensory, social or other pleasant reward in life.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Sienkiewicz-Jarosz et al., 2005 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Dowd and Barch, 2010

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Treadway and Zald, 2011 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    The electrodes may actually not have caused much pleasure 'liking' after all, but they certainly activated 'wanting' for a variety of natural incentives.

    “The electrodes may actually not have caused much pleasure ‘liking’ after all, but they certainly activated ‘wanting’ for a variety of natural incentives (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Hunger neurons include those in the hypothalamus that release agouti-related peptide (AgRP), and stimulating those neurons causes mice to eat.

    “Hunger neurons are thought to include those in the hypothalamus that release agouti-related peptide (AgRP), and stimulating those neurons cause mice to eat.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Simply giving free stimulations of the electrodes, without making them work for it, caused rats to suddenly start eating, or start drinking, or begin engaging in sex, or parental behaviors, etc.

    “That is, simply giving free stimulations of the electrodes, without making them work for it, caused rats to suddenly start eating, or start drinking, or begin engaging in sex, or parental behaviors, etc. (Valenstein et al., 1970).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Valenstein et al., 1970 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    Behavioral neuroscientists of the time expected that an electrode that increased sex or hunger or thirst motivations would be a punishing electrode, and expected that a reward electrode would reduce drive and stop ongoing eating, drinking, or sex behavior, never stimulate those motivations.

    “Thus behavioral neuroscientists of the time expected that an electrode that increased sex or hunger or thirst motivations, would be a punishing electrode. They expected that a reward electrode would reduce drive, and so stop any ongoing eating, drinking, or sex behavior – never stimulate those motivations.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Miller, 1973

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Olds, 1973

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Stuber and Wise, 2016

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Compulsive motivations of DDS do not seem to involve higher pleasure 'liking' for the pursued reward once obtained, but rather exist alone as intense and often disturbing 'wants.'

    “Compulsive motivations of DDS do not seem to involve higher pleasure ‘liking’ for the pursued reward once obtained, but rather exist alone as intense and often disturbing ‘wants.’”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The hedonic deficiency view has been critiqued on grounds that dopamine receptor downregulation is probably a consequence of drug taking rather than the original cause of addiction.

    “However, this hedonic deficiency view has been critiqued on grounds that dopamine receptor downregulation is probably a consequence of drug taking rather than the original cause of addiction, on grounds that dopamine does not actually cause pleasure nor does dopamine downregulation cause pleasure deficits, and on grounds that addictions persist after withdrawal syndromes go away (Berridge and”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Berridge and Robinson, 2016

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Artificial stimulation of neurons in the hypothalamus made mice drink, but mice would work to turn off the stimulation if given a choice, leading the authors to suggest that thirst is essentially aversive.

    “These thirst-study authors found that artificial stimulation of neurons in the hypothalamus made mice drink, but that mice would work to turn off the stimulation if given a choice, thus leading the authors to suggest that thirst is essentially aversive.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Allen et al., 2017 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In human psychiatric patients who had been implanted with similar brain electrodes, activation of a reward electrode caused sudden sexual urges, or urges to drink, or other intense motivations, in addition to supporting button pressing to self-stimulate their electrodes.

    “Similarly in human psychiatric patients who had been implanted with similar brain electrodes, activation of a reward electrode caused sudden sexual urges, or urges to drink, or other intense motivations, in addition to supporting button pressing to self-stimulate their electrodes (Moan and Heath, 1972).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Moan and Heath, 1972

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisereasoning

    To drive theorists, a reward electrode that also increased motivation is an inexplicable paradox.

    “To drive theorists, a reward electrode that also increased motivation is an inexplicable paradox (Miller, 1973; Olds, 1973; Stuber and Wise, 2016).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Miller, 1973

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Olds, 1973

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Stuber and Wise, 2016

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Modern proponents suggest that downregulation or loss of brain dopamine D2 receptors makes addicts experience less pleasure in their lives than other people, and consequently addicts must take addictive drugs to achieve normal levels of dopamine stimulation and pleasure.

    “Modern proponents suggest that downregulation or loss of brain dopamine D2 receptors (one of the two main types of neuronal receptors for dopamine) make addicts experience less pleasure in their lives than other people (Koob and Volkow, 2016; Keramati et al., 2017). Consequently, these theorists argue that addicts must take addictive drugs to achieve normal levels of dopamine stimulation and”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Koob and Volkow, 2016 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Keramati et al., 2017 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    A food incentive cue elicits eating, but a hunger cue does not.

    “That is, a food incentive cue elicits eating, but a hunger cue does not.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Incentive motivation theories posit that motivation is directed toward affectively positive incentives, and that brain motivation systems modulate those incentive values.

    “Incentive motivation theories posit that motivation is directed toward affectively positive incentives, and that brain motivation systems modulate those incentive values (Toates, 1986; Berridge, 2004).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Toates, 1986

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Berridge, 2004 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Hungry rats merely walked slowly to a place where they expect intra-gastric milk, but eagerly ran to a place where they could drink and taste the milk while hungry.

    “Similarly, hungry rats merely walked slowly to a place where they expect intra-gastric milk, but eagerly ran to a place where they could drink and taste the milk while hungry (Miller and Kessen, 1952).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Miller and Kessen, 1952

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Incentive motivation is focused on reward, which involves three categories of mechanism: wanting, liking and learning.

    “Incentive motivation is focused on reward, which involve three categories of mechanism: wanting, liking and learning.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Delivering daily calories intravenously to dogs, who were also allowed to eat actual food normally if they wished, did not suppress their daily eating intake: the dogs continued to eat customary amounts of food in addition to their full doses of intravenous nutrients, and so soon became obese.

    “For example, delivering daily calories intravenously to dogs, who were also allowed to eat actual food normally if they wished, did not suppress their daily eating intake: the dogs continued to eat customary amounts of food in addition to their full doses of intravenous nutrients, and so soon became obese (Turner et al., 1975).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Turner et al., 1975

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    If opportunity to taste a mouthful of saccharin at the same time as a gastric nutrient infusion, then the rats do learn to bar press for the combination; the sweet taste by itself is similarly insufficient, revealing an importance of interaction between incentive stimulus and physiological state.

    “However, if opportunity to taste a mouthful of saccharin at the same time as a gastric nutrient infusion, then the rats do learn to bar press for the combination (the sweet taste by itself is similarly insufficient, revealing an importance of interaction between incentive stimulus and physiological state, captured by Bindra-Toates rules of incentive motivation described below) (Holman, 1969).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Holman, 1969 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Hunger acts to enhance the incentive value of food, and thirst enhances the incentive value of water - but in the absence of incentives or their learned expectation, neither need state effectively motivates behavior as posited by aversive drive theory.

    “Hunger acts to enhance the incentive value of food, and thirst enhances the incentive value of water – but in the absence of incentives or their learned expectation, neither need state effectively motivates behavior as posited by aversive drive theory.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Encountering a place paired with thirst drive does not alter behavior, but encountering a cue for water will evoke intense increases in activity in thirsty rats, as though searching for water.

    “Similarly, for thirst,: encountering a place paired with thirst drive does not alter behavior, but encountering a cue for water will evoke intense increases in activity in thirsty rats, as though searching for water (Campbell, 1960).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Campbell, 1960 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Rats typically fail to increase eating in a place previously paired with hunger drive, nor to increase drinking in a place paired with thirst drive.

    “For example, rats typically fail to increase eating in a place previously paired with hunger drive, nor to increase drinking in a place paired with thirst drive (Huston, 1972; Mineka et al., 1972; Toates, 1986).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Huston, 1972

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Mineka et al., 1972 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Toates, 1986

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    'Liking' reactions reflect the hedonic impact of pleasant reward, and are often considered the essential kernel of reward.

    “‘Liking’ reactions reflect the hedonic impact of pleasant reward, and is often considered the essentional kernal of reward.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Cues for the incentive stimulus evoke motivation in a state, whereas cues for the drive state by itself do not.

    “In these cases, cues for the incentive stimulus evoke motivation in a state, whereas cues for the drive state by itself do not.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Both incentive motivation and fearful motivation require local mesolimbic dopamine.

    “Both incentive motivation and fearful motivation require local mesolimbic dopamine.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Reynolds and Berridge (2008) source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Richard and Berridge (2011)

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Incentive salience makes reward cues attractive and attention-grabbing, eliciting approach and giving them a 'motivational magnet' property.

    “Incentive salience makes those reward cues attractive and attention-grabbing, eliciting approach and giving them a ‘motivational magnet’ property (Saunders and Robinson, 2013; Flagel and Robinson, 2017).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Saunders and Robinson, 2013

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Flagel and Robinson, 2017

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    A 'wanting' increase may still occur when unanimity is prevented, illustrating the more robust nature of 'wanting' circuitry.

    “However, a ‘wanting’ increase may still may occur in such a case, again illustrating the more robust nature of ‘wanting’ circuitry (Smith and Berridge, 2007; Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Smith and Berridge, 2007

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Frederick Toates suggested that reward cues additionally participate in a CS-state interaction, similar to a reward UCS-state interaction called alliesthesia.

    “Frederick Toates suggested in the 1980s that reward cues additionally participate in a CS-state interaction, similar to a reward UCS-state interaction called alliesthesia.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Toates, 1986

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Incentive salience is often a spur to action, reflecting the overlap between dopamine functions of motivation and of movement.

    “Incentive salience is often thus a spur to action, reflecting the overlap between dopamine functions of motivation and of movement (Salamone et al., 2015, 2018).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Salamone et al., 2015 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Salamone et al., 2018 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Reward cues alone are relatively powerless at producing motivation without an appropriate brain state; the brain's reaction to a cue matters for 'wanting' motivation via incentive salience.

    “Reward cues alone are relatively powerless at producing motivation without an appropriate brain state. It’s the brain’s reaction to a cue that matters for ‘wanting’ motivation via incentive salience (Berridge, 2012; Dayan and Berridge, 2014).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Berridge, 2012 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Dayan and Berridge, 2014

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    An incentive percept (food or associated cues) would generate intense motivation when perceived in a physiologically hungry state, but not so much when perceived in a satiated state.

    “That is, an incentive percept (food or associated cues) would generate intense motivation when perceived in a physiologically hungry state, but not so much when perceived in a satiated state.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Toates, 1986

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Toates suggested that a learned cue or CS similarly interacted with an individual's current internal state to generate incentive motivation.

    “Toates suggested that a learned cue or CS similarly interacted with an individual’s current internal state to generate incentive motivation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Toates, 1986

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    These cue features include the ability of CSs to trigger motivated 'wanting' to seek and consume their reward, and to a degree also trigger hedonic 'liking.'

    “These cue features include the ability of CSs to trigger motivated ‘wanting’ to seek and consume their reward, and to a degree also trigger hedonic ‘liking.’”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bindra, 1978 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Alliesthesia refers to the phenomenon that food becomes more hedonically rewarding when hungry, water when thirsty, nasty seawater when sodium-deprived, warmth when cold, and coolness when hot.

    “Alliesthesia refers to the phenomenon that food becomes more hedonically rewarding when we are in a state of hunger, water is more rewarding when thirsty, nasty seawater becomes a rewarding taste if we are sodium-deprived, warmth is more rewarding when we are cold, coolness more rewarding when we are hot, and so on (Cabanac, 1971).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Cabanac, 1971 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    People who experience a novel salt appetite sometimes report feeling slightly ill, but do not necessarily crave salt.

    “This may be why people who experience a novel salt appetite sometimes report feeling slightly ill, but do not necessarily crave salt (Leshem, 2009).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Leshem, 2009 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    This hypothesis is based on evidence of mesolimbic dopamine hyperactivity in schizophrenia, and also on the ability of anti-dopamine drugs that block D2 receptors to treat schizophrenic symptoms.

    “This hypothesis is based on evidence of mesolimbic dopamine hyperactivity in schizophrenia, and also on the ability of anti-dopamine drugs that block D2 receptors to treat schizophrenic symptoms.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Howes and Kapur, 2009 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In humans, disgust and fear expressions have nearly opposite statistical patterns of facial configuration, giving rise to the suggestion that these facial expressions may oppositely modulate sensory feedback: fear expressions may enhance relevant sensory perception, whereas disgust may suppress relevant sensory perception.

    “In humans, disgust and fear expressions have nearly opposite statistical patterns of facial configuration, giving rise to the suggestion that these facial expressions may oppositely modulate sensory feedback: fear expressions may enhance relevant sensory perception (e.g., eye widening), whereas disgust may suppress relevant sensory perception (Susskind et al., 2008).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Susskind et al., 2008 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Addiction is the most extreme example, as neural sensitization makes brain dopamine systems more permanently hyper-responsive to drugs and drug cues, triggering strong urges to relapse and actually take drugs.

    “Addiction is the most extreme example, as neural sensitization makes brain dopamine systems more permanently hyper-responsive to drugs and drug cues, triggering strong urges to relapse and actually take drugs.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Berridge and Robinson, 2016

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Sensitized 'wanting' in addicts creates a probabilistic form of cue-triggered compulsion, in the form of exaggerated temptation that can come by surprise, be amplified further by stress, and be hard to resist.

    “Sensitized ‘wanting’ in addicts creates a probabilistic form of cue-triggered compulsion, in the form of exaggerated temptation that can come by surprise, be amplified further by stress, and be hard to resist (Berridge and Robinson, 2016).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Berridge and Robinson, 2016

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Neural mechanisms that generate 'disgust' and 'fear' reactions are mostly distinct, though they do partly overlap in the posterior shell of nucleus accumbens.

    “However, neural mechanisms that generate ‘disgust’ and ‘fear’ reactions are mostly distinct, though they do partly overlap in the posterior shell of nucleus accumbens (Faure et al., 2010; Maren et al., 2013; Ho and Berridge, 2014; Perusini and Fanselow, 2015; Paré and Quirk, 2017).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Faure et al., 2010 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Maren et al., 2013 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Ho and Berridge, 2014

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    In many cases, conclusions can transfer from affective neuroscience studies based on animals to human emotions and motivations.

    “In many cases, conclusions can transfer from affective neuroscience studies based on animals to human emotions and motivations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    An incremental difference at one overlapping stage of a neural circuit can still be translated into qualitative neural and psychological differences at other stages to recruit different anatomical patterns of activity.

    “Of course, an incremental difference at one overlapping stage of a neural circuit can still be translated into qualitative neural and psychological differences at other stages to recruit different anatomical patterns of activity.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: An incremental difference at one overlapping stage of a neural circuit can be translated into qualitative neural and psychological differences at other stages.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Those conclusions that do transfer often carry important implications for understanding human clinical affective disorders.

    “But those that do often carry important implications for understanding human clinical affective disorders.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Not all conclusions will transfer from animal affective neuroscience to human emotions and motivations.

    “Admittedly, not all conclusions will transfer.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Animal findings at the very least tell investigators what to look for in people, shaping the questions to be asked so that the right answers are found.

    “In such cases, animal findings at the very least tell investigators what to look for in people, shaping the questions to be asked so that the right answers are found.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Because nucleus accumbens neurons normally inhibit their targets by releasing GABA, this stronger inhibition could release downstream neurons in ventral pallidum and other targets into higher excitation levels, to produce the additional emotional reaction.

    “Because nucleus accumbens neurons normally inhibit their targets (by themselves releasing GABA as neurotransmitter), this stronger inhibition could release downstream neurons in ventral pallidum and other targets into higher excitation levels, to produce the additional emotional reaction.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Best progress in building an integrated psychology and affective neuroscience of emotion and motivation requires combining human and animal approaches together, and consideration of both subjective and objective features of affective reactions.

    “Best progress in building an integrated psychology and affective neuroscience of emotion and motivation requires combining human and animal approaches together, and consideration of both subjective and objective features of affective reactions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    These core affective processes can be schematically understood, so that their psychological features become objectively identified, and allowing them to be mapped to underlying brain mechanisms.

    “These core affective processes can be schematically understood, so that their psychological features become objectively identified, and allowing them to be mapped to underlying brain mechanisms.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The GABA drug probably produces a stronger electrophysiological inhibition of shell neurons than the glutamate blocking drug (e.g., DNQX), which produces only a mode of pure coping 'fear.'

    “The GABA drug probably produces a stronger electrophysiological inhibition of shell neurons than the glutamate blocking drug (e.g., DNQX), which produces only a mode of pure coping ‘fear.’”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Emotional and motivational processes occur in people most notably as subjective feelings, but also have underlying core psychological processes with objective features.

    “Emotional and motivational processes occur in people most notably as subjective feelings, but also have underlying core psychological processes with objective features.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
117 of 117

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Verbal reports from other human adults about their feelings are accepted as evidence of emotion on the basis of a socially convenient agreement based on mutual empathy, not scientific certainty.

    “But this is a socially convenient agreement based on mutual empathy. It is essentially an assumption we are willing to make for each other (and perhaps evolutionarily compelled to make), but not a scientific certainty.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    It is possible to induce mesolimbic sensitization without drugs in susceptible individuals, such as by exposures to traumatic stresses or strong specific appetites.

    “However, it has subsequently become clear that it is also possible to induce mesolimbic sensitization without drugs in susceptible individuals, such as by exposures to traumatic stresses, exposures to strong specific appetites, etc.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Some people who are especially vulnerable to developing mesolimbic sensitization may become spontaneously sensitized in particular situations via endogenous mechanisms, resulting in behavioral addictions.

    “Recently it has even become plausible that some people, who may be especially vulnerable to developing mesolimbic sensitization, may become ‘spontaneously’ sensitized in particular situations via endogenous mechanisms, resulting in behavioral addictions.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There are strong individual differences in sensitization vulnerability, due to genes, hormones, previous experiences, etc.

    “There are strong individual differences in sensitization vulnerability, due to genes, hormones, previous experiences, etc.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Those who develop behavioral addictions are the most vulnerable individuals, able to develop mesolimbic sensitization via endogenous mechanisms, without need of drugs.

    “Presumably those who develop behavioral addictions are the most vulnerable individuals, able to develop mesolimbic sensitization via endogenous mechanisms, without need of drugs.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Modern people and modern lab rats have more than enough NaCl in their foods, so that they have never in their lives been sodium deficient.

    “modern people and modern lab rats have more than enough NaCl in our foods, so that we have never in our lives been sodium deficient.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    An incremental difference at one overlapping stage of a neural circuit can be translated into qualitative neural and psychological differences at other stages.

    “Of course, an incremental difference at one overlapping stage of a neural circuit can still be translated into qualitative neural and psychological differences at other stages to recruit different anatomical patterns of activity.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    ‘Fear’ defends against external bodily danger threats, while ‘disgust’ defends against oral and internal toxic threats.

    “‘Fear’ defends against external bodily danger threats, while ‘disgust’ defends against oral and internal toxic threats.”
8 of 8

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

2 of the 161 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 11

  1. Clore, 1994, Why emotions are never unconscious, The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, 285
  2. Frijda, 2007, Universal The Laws of Emotion.
  3. Hull, 1951, Essentials of Behavior.
  4. Huston, 1972, Classical conditioning of consummatory behavior, Control Mechanisms of Drinking, 165
  5. Miller, 1973, How the project started, Brain Stimulation and Motivation: Research and Commentary, 53
  6. Olds, 1973, The discovery of reward systems in the brain, Brain Stimulation and Motivation: research and commentary, 81
  7. Popper, 1972, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Impression Revised
  8. Rozin, 2008, Disgust, Handbook of Emotions, 757
  9. Salamone, 1991, Behavioral pharmacology of dopamine systems: a new synthesis, The Mesolimbic Dopamine System : From Motivation to Action, 599
  10. Titchener, 1902, A Primer of Psychology. Rev.
  11. Toates, 1986, Motivational Systems.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Berridge, K. C.
Affiliations
University of Michigan (US)
Corresponding author
Berridge, Kent C.
ORCID
Berridge, Kent C.
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Publisher
Frontiers Media SA
Published
2018-09-07
Volume
9
Pages
1647-1647
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01647
PMC
PMC6137142
OpenAlex
W2890468836
Semantic Scholar
9f76bc3d0d033c883df6ee118d6f030743fa47a2
Cited by
273
References
161
Citations by year
2026: 21 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 47 · 2022: 49 · 2021: 36 · 2020: 27 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 1
FWCI
3.04
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
National Institutes of Health (DA015188, MH63649)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience › Neurotransmitter Receptor Influence on Behavior
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
Keywords
emotions, motivation, incentive salience, want, incentive motivation, drive reduction, reward, dopamine, mesocorticolimbic system, anhedonia, depression, schizophrenia, paranoia, fear, disgust, animal emotions, subjective feelings

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-08.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-08.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review